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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation traces how NATO has evolved from a defensive alliance concerned with 
the collective defense of its members to a global security nexus engaged in preemptive 
crisis management interventions. In reaction to what I see as the limitations of traditional 
methodological approaches in the discipline of International Relations I develop an 
alternative research program that places the production of space and trans-scalar 
interactions at the heart of my analysis. I discuss how NATO reacted to the end of the 
Cold War and the emergence of a new geoeconomic order as neoliberalism spread across 
the planet and the United States became a global hegemon. Particular attention is paid to 
the effect of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis upon NATO. The new era of austerity, 
which followed, accelerated and deepened changes that had begun within NATO starting 
in the 1990s. NATO now sought to form partnerships with countries across the world and 
adopted a far broader understanding of security that saw it intervening far from its 
traditional European area of operations. The impact of austerity is also readily apparent in 
the two interventions NATO has carried out thus far in the 21st century in Afghanistan 
and Libya. NATO’s sustained peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan contrasts sharply 
with its aerial assault on Libya in 2011. I posit that the intervention in Libya can best be 
understood as a trans-scalar space of intervention, a concept I develop to analyze how 
and why NATO became embroiled in the country. I conclude the dissertation by 
examining Russia’s recent actions in Ukraine and hypothesize that they will lead to a 
renewed focus on collective defense within NATO. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 RESEARCH QUESTION AND DESIGN 
The 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the turn towards austerity by Western 
governments, which followed, accelerated a trend towards the primacy of risk analysis 
techniques within the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the displacement 
of collective defense as the strategic foundation of the Alliance. This transition has 
altered both the institutional framework of NATO and the format of NATO operations. 
At the institutional level, formerly inconsequential components of NATO’s apparatus, 
namely Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Office, have 
been greatly elevated in importance due to the new strategic priorities of the Alliance. 
These institutional changes mark, I argue, the evolution of NATO from a regional 
security actor to what I call a global security nexus. This organizational transformation 
has had a clearly observable impact upon how NATO conducts its operations. NATO’s 
last two interventions, Afghanistan and Libya, offer a sharp contrast in mission styles. 
Afghanistan, conducted prior to the crisis and NATO’s strategic and organizational 
alteration, represents a now outdated style of intervention, with its deployment of 
thousands of NATO forces for over a decade in a peacekeeping mission. Libya, NATO’s 
first intervention since the 2007 crisis, lasted a total of eight months and was notable for 
the complete lack of post conflict reconstruction, with the role of NATO being limited to 
conducting bombing runs. Libya, I argue, represents a new model for NATO combat 
operations, what I conceive of as a trans-scalar space of intervention, born from the 
intertwining of the imperative of austerity with the logic of risk management within the 
global military apparatus of NATO. A trans-scalar space of intervention is defined as a 
site where violence is temporarily concentrated by a transnational military apparatus to 
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eliminate a perceived threat. This is a threat that is contained within a particular national 
locale and is unable to manifest itself transnationally; its capacity is therefore several 
orders of magnitude below the force projection abilities of the transnational military force 
seeking its destruction.   
The declaration that NATO is involved in the production of trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention requires not only a recognition that NATO is transgressing traditional 
territorial boundaries and divisions, but that in doing so NATO is actually producing new 
scales and spaces. The trans-scalar space of intervention is a temporary space of violence 
that is inaugurated by NATO’s decision to engage and closes when it withdraws.  To 
fully analyze this process requires a movement outside of the traditional confines of 
International Relations, as historically the discipline has fixated on the international as a 
discrete space of analysis, without a consideration of how the international is 
interpenetrated from a variety of areas conceptually considered to be formally outside of 
it.1 This has led to a rigid understanding of different scales and levels as largely separate 
spheres with one necessarily predominant over the others, as seen in the levels of analysis 
approach, the foundational methodology for the majority of International Relations 
scholarship today.  
My development of trans-scalar interventions as a concept will emerge through a 
critique of the levels of analysis literature in International Relations, elaborated most 
notably by Kenneth Waltz and J. David Singer. I will expand upon this critique to 
elaborate by own perspective through an engagement with the alternative understandings 
                                                     
1 This criticism is made most notably in Richard Ashley, “The Poverty of Neorealism,” International 
Organization 38 (1984): 225-286. 
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of space and scale that exist within the fields of geography and critical geopolitics by 
relying on the work of Neil Brenner, John Agnew, and others. This critique will allow me 
to link, in a comprehensive manner, the challenges of the present security environment to 
instability in the global economy. Oddly, the fields of security studies and international 
political economy are often conducted in isolation from one another2 whereas I see the 
dynamics of both as intrinsically interconnected. However, while engaging in academic 
debate and bridging disciplinary boundaries is a useful endeavour and necessary to 
comprehensively address my research agenda, on its own it is insufficient. I must also 
outline what I see as the contours of the current conjuncture and trace the sources of the 
major factors that are impinging upon the present. 
  Austerity, as I have already noted, emerges as a central organizing logic post-
2007. Yet, austerity was not responsible for beginning the ascendancy of risk 
management within NATO, rather austerity ensured it. The start of the process of 
incorporating the logic of risk management within NATO begins with the end of the Cold 
War and the formation of what I term the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. The 
concept of geoeconomics originates in the work of Edward Luttwak and was employed to 
describe the perceived primacy of economics over traditional political concerns in the 
immediate post-Cold War period, countries would now, it was argued, utilize economic 
tools, rather than military force to compete with each other. In the dissertation, I 
                                                     
2 There is a separation that has emerged since the late 1970s. Prior to this a wealth of analysis that 
combined political economy and security studies was conducted under the rubric of the military-industrial 
complex. Foe examples see Gordon Adams, The Politics of Defense Contracting: The Iron Triangle, (New 
Brunswick: Transaction Books, 1982). Seymour Melman, The Permanent War Economy: American 
Capitalism in Decline. (New York: Touchstone, 1974.)  Michael Reich, “Military Spending and the U.S 
Economy,” in Testing the Theory of the Military-Industrial Complex, ed. Steven Rosen, (Lexington: 
Lexington Books, 1973). 
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significantly modify and extend the limits of geoeconomics to explain the transition 
between different forms of world order, in this instance the binary dynamic of the Cold 
War period, with the far more complex post-Cold War geopolitical environment.   
I believe that geoeconomics is useful for comprehending this transition in the 
structural underpinnings of world order because it connects together spatial, economic, 
and political processes within a unified framework of analysis. At the economic level, 
neoliberalism became the global ideology of capitalism,3 superseded the binary 
geopolitical confrontation of the Cold War. A stable frame for conflict no longer exists. A 
new geopolitical environment and a new period of capitalism require the creation of new 
conceptual tools and material apparatuses in order to analyze and guide effective action. 
These wider dynamics were reflected within NATO during the course of the 1990s with 
the growing irrelevance of collective defense as a strategic framing that was no longer 
appropriate in this new epoch. In its place a strategy of risk management was gradually 
elaborated which provided a more effective means of framing the increased geopolitical 
uncertainty that characterized the end of the Cold War. In 1999 after its intervention in 
Kosovo, risk management, or as it was rebranded within NATO, crisis management, 
moved over the course of a decade, from an accepted part of the Alliance’s wider 
strategic rubric, to following its 2010 Strategic Concept, an essential core task of the 
Alliance. When one considers the sheer unpredictably and near infinite sources of threat 
that policy makers are presently forced to confront it is not surprising that NATO has 
chosen to adopt this new strategic posture. Below I outline the contours of the present 
                                                     
3 For a broad overview of this process see Miguel Centeno and Joseph Cohen, “The Arc of Neoliberalism,” 
Annual Review of Sociology, Vol. 38 (2012):317-340. 
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moment, before explaining why I decided to focus upon NATO, rather than other security 
actors and conclude by detailing the content of the chapters that comprise the dissertation.  
The contemporary world is beset by uncertainty and instability as the United 
States, the world’s hegemonic power and architect of the military, financial, and political 
institutions that have underpinned global interactions since the Second World War is 
beset by trouble at home and abroad.  Domestically the 2007 Global Financial Crisis 
destroyed the confidence that the public had in Wall Street and in the potential for 
continual stable growth.4 Claims that the American economy had entered a period of 
stability and steady growth in the 1990s5 have faded. They have been replaced by the 
necessity, according to all major political parties, following the debts incurred from the 
coordinated bailout of their respective financial sectors, of enduring a new normal of 
tightly restrained budgets and greatly reduced expectations regarding social services, 
steady employment, and general quality of life. Record high levels of inequality, driven 
by decades of stagnant wages and attack on labour rights have led to a deep and 
widespread deterioration of America’s middle classes, once the linchpin of the global 
economy.6 This situation is replicated across Western Europe with unemployment in the 
double digits across the continent and anemic levels of growth. The remarkable political 
                                                     
4 A recent survey found that over three quarters of American do not feel confident that their children will 
enjoy a better life than they do. Patrick O’Connor, “Poll Finds Widespread Economic Anxiety,” Wall Street 
Journal August 5 2014. 
5 Commonly referred to as the “Great Moderation” during this period there was a widespread perception 
that of a reduction in the volatility of business cycles starting in the mid-1980s and was commonly utilized 
to explain the period of robust growth the American economy experienced from the mid-1990s to 2001. For 
further detail see Craig S. Hakkio, “The Great Moderation: 1982-2007,” 
http://www.federalreservehistory.org/Events/DetailView/65 
6 Two striking journalistic accounts that chronicle the depths to which portions of the American middle 
class have fallen are George Packer, The Unwinding: An Inner History of America (New York: Farrar, 
Straus and Giroux, 2013). Chris Hedges and Joe Sacco, Days of Destruction, Days of Revolt (New York: 
Nation Books, 2012).  
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stasis, dysfunction, and disconnect of the political elites of the West with the everyday 
reality of their societies have spurred ever greater hostility from an increasingly 
disillusioned public, record low approval ratings7 and steadily falling turnout in 
elections.8   
Internationally the War on Terror continues despite setbacks on its two major 
fronts, with Iraq on the verge of fragmentation and a resurgent Taliban on the move in 
Afghanistan. American Special Forces and drones span the globe eliminating whoever is 
deemed a threat, based upon an opaque disposition matrix without the basic legal right of 
due process.9 The extensive surveillance and security apparatus put in place after the 
events of 9/11, ostensibly to protect Western societies, remains firmly entrenched and 
largely outside the scope of public oversight. This despite frequent scandals, the NSA 
revelations of Edward Snowden only the most recent in a long line, which demonstrate 
that civil liberties and individual privacy have been fundamentally undermined by these 
very same institutions. 
  While Western states have remained fixated on fighting an intractable and 
seemingly endless conflict, regional powers, most notably Russia in Ukraine and China in 
the South China Sea, are jockeying for position. Both are testing the extent to which they 
can expand their sphere of influence as the West remains distracted by the War on Terror 
                                                     
7 Approval ratings for the US Congress, for example, have in the last several years dipped to record lows of 
9% and have rarely been above 20% since 2011. Jeffrey Jones, “Congress Job Approval Starts 2014 at 
13%: Essentially unchanged since December,” Gallup Politics, January 14, 2014. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/166838/congress-job-approval-starts-2014.aspx 
8 Mair recounts the growing lack of engagement of the public with official political institutions in Western 
Europe in Peter Mair, Ruling the Void: The Hollowing of Western Democracy (New York: Verso, 2013). 
9 Scott Shane and Jo Becker, “Secret Kill List proves test of Obama’s Principles and Will,” New York 
Times October 26 2012. Scott Shane and Charlie Savage, “Memo cites Legal Basis for Killing U.S Citizen 
in Al Qaeda,” New York Times February 5 2013.  
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and weakened by the effects of the Global Financial Crisis. In these circumstances 
NATO, the cornerstone of Western security for over sixty years is being called upon to 
play a key role, far outside of the region, Europe, in which its operations have 
traditionally occurred and with drastically different mission parameters than those that 
were originally envisioned for when it was established at the start of the Cold War. 
NATO is the site in which both a new security architecture that extends beyond its 
official membership is being forged and new strategies and tactics are being elaborated in 
response to a rapidly altering and highly unpredictable economic, social, and geopolitical 
environment. Understanding this dynamic is the motivation behind the research and 
analysis that follows.  
While the United States, as the world’s foremost military power and with an 
empire, spanning the globe will loom large in the following discussion, this dissertation is 
by no means solely, about how the American political and military establishment have 
responded to the crisis. Numerous books, articles, and a constant stream of online 
commentary already exist that analyze contemporary American military practice and 
strategy from every conceivable angle. With such an extensive literature already in 
existence, it would be difficult to contribute anything mildly original. My research 
agenda is focused upon how the West generally, not simply the United States, has 
responded to the crisis. Although the world order forged at the end of the Second World 
War had been American led, it was structurally; in terms of the states, it brought together, 
a Western order, whose basis extended beyond the North American continent to envelop 
Europe as well. This Western world order included states that were aligned to American 
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power, but also pursued their own particular national interests; fixating on just the United 
States means largely ignoring this rich interplay of relations. 
With these motivations in mind NATO, the trans-Atlantic link that provided an 
institutional framework that connected together the security policies of North America 
and Europe, becomes the obvious candidate for the primary subject of my dissertation. 
While there are a number of studies that examine how well NATO was adapting to 
performing peacekeeping operations in Afghanistan,10 not many have discussed the path 
it would take as its commitment there wound down. NATO’s intervention in Libya, a 
relatively quick affair with no boots of the ground provided a stark contrast to its over a 
decade commitment in Afghanistan offers a new model for future NATO interventions. 
Austerity and the quantification and identification of risk are the central and connected 
factors that have spurred this change, not only in how NATO conducts operations, but 
also in how it conceives of itself and its role in the world. 
What follows is an analysis that breaks with a number of the conventions 
traditionally practiced in International Relations and draws upon an eclectic range of 
sources, from internal NATO policy documents to the work of French philosophers. 
While some may criticize my lack of adherence to a single specific subfield, I see it as 
source of strength and dynamism that avoids loyalty to ossified modes of thought. It is 
my hope that the discussion that follows will offer some insight into the contemporary 
                                                     
10 David Auerswald and Stephen Saideman, NATO in Afghanistan: Fighting Together, Fighting Alone 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2014). Sten Rynning, NATO in Afghanistan: The Liberal 
Disconnect (Stanford: Stanford Security Studies, 2012).  
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production of Western security and its relationship with the requirements of continual 
capital accumulation and present social conditions.  
Chapter Outline 
The first chapter lays out my theoretical and methodological framework, provides 
the basis for the more expansive, and detailed analysis that follows in later chapters. I 
will elucidate the connection between the contemporary dynamics of political economy 
and the organizational state of NATO through the elaboration of a range of concepts. My 
central argument in this chapter will be demonstrating that austerity has created an 
intensified variant of neoliberalism, which has forced NATO to metamorphosize into 
what I term a global security nexus. This transformation has altered the format of 
NATO’s interventions from sustained peacekeeping operations to the generation of trans-
scalar spaces of intervention.  
The second chapter will explore how NATO responded to the tectonic shift in 
geopolitics that occurred with the sudden end of the Cold War and the disappearance of 
its major adversary, the Soviet Union. Throughout the 1990s, NATO grappled with a new 
strategic environment and sought to find a way to justify its continued existence. The 
formation of an expanded set of external partnerships, coupled with a growing acceptance 
of out of area operations provided a renewed sense of purpose to the Alliance. NATO’s 
1999 intervention in Kosovo, as this chapter will demonstrate, was a watershed moment, 
marking the final acceptance of out of area operations, and transforming NATO from a 
defense alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members to one that sought 
to proactively confront threats to its members’ interests.  The 1999 Strategic Concept that 
followed on the heels of the intervention in Kosovo would mark the first mention of crisis 
10 
 
management as one of the core tasks of NATO and mark the start of its evolution into a 
global security nexus. 
The third chapter will detail the effects of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis upon 
NATO. The turn towards austerity and the subsequent intensification of neoliberalism 
resulted in sharp cuts to the defense budgets of NATO members. At the same time, with 
rising global instability the tasks the Alliance was expected to perform were increasing. 
In response, NATO redoubled its efforts at renewal by elevating the importance of 
institutions such as Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology 
Office and making crisis management one of its strategic pillars in its 2010 Strategic 
Concept. This reconfiguration of the organizational structure of NATO and the creation 
of new strategic priorities demonstrate how far removed the Alliance is from its Cold 
War posture.  
 Chapter four will begin by examining the shortcomings in resources that have 
consistently plagued NATO and argue that their root cause lies in the conflict between 
the national sovereignty of member states and the collective sovereignty of the Alliance. 
This clash has undermined the governance capabilities of NATO and threatened its 
ability to secure the interests of its members. Disputes over governance are a reoccurring 
trend in NATO and have negatively impacted its last two operations in Afghanistan and 
Libya. The manner in which these two interventions were carried out and their objectives 
sharply differ. What Afghanistan can be viewed as an example of neoliberal state 
building I will argue that the intervention in Libya is the first example of the creation of a 
trans-scalar intervention by NATO. Libya represents a new form of intervention, which 
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can occur more rapidly and regularly, as a mechanism to reinforce Western power in an 
ever more unstable world.  
 My argument will conclude in chapter five where I will begin by analyzing the 
recently proposed Smart Defense program. This initiative seeks to integrate national 
military forces and provide a new mechanism of force projection for NATO. As I 
demonstrate, the impetus behind Smart Defense arose from the desire for NATO to have 
the capacity to carry out further Libyan style interventions in the future. However, a rapid 
shift in the geopolitical situation on the European continent since 2014 has greatly 
diminished the probability that out of area operations will be conducted by NATO in the 
near future. NATO’s last two summits that occurred in Chicago in 2012 and Wales in 
2014 clearly illustrate a shift in strategic priorities. Although separated by only two years 
the concerns that drove the discussions at each conference and the newly proposed 
programs that emerged from these discussions were radically different. Chicago was 
about solidifying NATO’s embrace of crisis management, with Smart Defense offered as 
a potential solution to its chronic budgetary problems. Wales, in contrast was 
overshadowed by the Ukrainian crisis and an increasingly hostile Russia that necessitated 
a renewed focus upon collective defense. As I will demonstrate, this is a new variant of 
collective defense complementary to the procedures of crisis management. The chapter 
and the dissertation will end with an encapsulation of its major arguments and posit that 
collective defense will assume a renewed prominence in the future.  
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CHAPTER 1 
A WORLD IN FLUX: THE SHIFTING CONTOURS OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 
AND GLOBAL SECURITY 
The unipolar moment proclaimed after the West's victory in the Cold War11 has 
passed. A global reordering of power is now underway with huge consequences for both 
geopolitics and the world economy. The actual contours of this reconfigured world order 
are not yet clear however. What is certain is that the West, as a coherent constellation of 
power, has weakened considerably since the onset of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis, a 
crisis that has yet to be satisfactorily resolved.  The architecture of Western power, 
constructed following the Second World War under the oversight of the United States was 
extensive and allowed for a multifaceted expression of power. Although in the immediate 
post-war period the United States bore the burden alone, establishing the Bretton Woods 
institutions and funding the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan, once the 
recovery was complete Europe wed itself to American power.12 This created a trans-
Atlantic formation that while politically and economically independent would work in 
concert to ensure that the foundations necessary for the continued accumulation of capital 
on a global scale would continue to be reproduced and that the pre-eminence of the West, 
politically, economically, and militarily would remain in place.13   
 Central to this projection and protection of Western power was the formation of 
                                                     
11See Charles Krauthammer, “The Unipolar Moment,” Foreign Affairs, 70 (1990): 23-33, for the 
origination of this concept. 
12 Geir Lundestand, “Empire by Invitation? The United States and Western Europe, 1945-1952,” Journal of 
Peace Research, 23 (1986): 263-277 recounts this process. 
13 See Robert
 
Cox, Power, Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History. (New 
York: Columbia University Press, 1987), 211-273 for a discussion of this. 
13 
 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in 1949.14   Yet as it nears its seventh 
decade, NATO is struggling to maintain its role as the world's dominant military 
organization in the contemporary period, as the West finds itself mired in a deep and 
prolonged crisis, one characterized by a generalized turn towards austerity.  
 At its core, my dissertation is about the contemporary relationship between 
security and austerity. I have chosen NATO as my central focus because it is the world’s 
predominant security organization. NATO’s actions significantly influence the 
contemporary manifestation of security by maintaining a particular world order that 
results in the reproduction of a specific form of capitalism, all of which reflect the 
interests of Western states.15 However, this is not a singular process. The contemporary 
structure of world capitalism and geopolitical dynamics also shape the conditions of 
NATO’s existence. Thus, NATO can serve as a lens, which can be employed to analyze 
the larger interrelation and manifold effects of austerity upon the modern provision of 
                                                     
14 My primary interest is not to offer a different interpretation of the role that NATO played in the Cold 
War or its struggle to find a purpose in the 1990s following the collapse of the Soviet Union; numerous 
accounts of both of these periods already exist. For a history of NATO's actions in the Cold War see: 
Gustav Schmidt, A History of NATO: The First Fifty Years, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2001). William 
Park, Defending the West: A History of NATO, (College Park: Wheatsheaf Books, 1986). Daniele Ganser, 
NATO's Secret Armies: Operation GALDO and Terrorism in Western Europe, (Milton Park: Frank Crass, 
2005). For NATO's struggles to adapt to the end of the Cold War see John Norris, Collision Course:  
NATO, Russia, and Kosovo. (Westport: Praeger, 2005). S. Papacosma and Mary Heiss, NATO in the Post-
Cold War Era: Does it Have a Future? (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995). Mark Webber, James 
Sperling and Martin Smith, NATO's Post-Cold War Trajectory: Decline or Regeneration? (London: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 
15 The idea of the West and who are, and are not members, of this cultural, political, and economic 
formation is a contentious issue. It is incorrect, for example, to claim that all members of the West are also 
members of NATO. Australia and Japan are seen as core members of the West today but are excluded by 
the terms of the NATO charter from official membership. Lithuania and Estonia are members of NATO, 
but cannot claim the mantle of the West to the same extent as Australia and Japan. For the sake of argument 
when I employ this term it will mean states that are closely allied with the United States, are clearly 
militarily subordinate to it, with American bases often on their own national soil, and are neoliberal in their 
economic and political orientation. For further discussion of the malleable concept of the West, see Alastair 
Bonnett, The Idea of the West: Politics, Culture and History, (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004). 
14 
 
security.16  
This dissertation is driven by the desire to understand how, at a variety of levels, 
(organizationally, epistemologically, and in terms of military strategy and tactics) NATO 
has sought to adapt and respond to the contemporary conjuncture. This is a project that is 
often conducted within the research parameters of the discipline of International 
Relations (IR). I found it necessary, however to move beyond these debates and expand 
upon concepts that I found to be too restricting. In constructing my own methodological 
approach and conceptual framework, I drew heavily upon the fields of International 
Political Economy and Geography to develop my own perspective that places space and 
scale as its central components, not typical forms of analysis in IR.  
This chapter will lay out my theoretical perspective, methodological approach, 
and elaborate a terminology that clarifies the connections between a variety of elements 
and processes. I will conduct this discussion in three stages beginning with terms 
concerned with the foundation of political economy, then turning to their geopolitical 
ramifications before I finally present my methodological synthesis.17 The political 
economic concepts of intensified neoliberalism, austerity, and geoeconomics will be 
employed to comprehend the current political and economic environment. This first set of 
factors is the driving force behind the second collection of terms I utilize to analyze the 
organizational state of NATO: risk management and global security nexus. Both the 
                                                     
16 Of course the viability of this approach is based in the assumption that NATO will continue to exist in 
the future as a meaningful security assemblage. Past practice does not ensure future events and NATO 
could collapse from a range of unforeseeable events. However for the temporal period under analysis here, 
NATO is an effective and powerful security actor, an assumption which will inform the discussion which 
follows.   
17 This implies that, following Marx, the present political moment, i.e. the manifestation of world order is 
derivative of the economic situation and the balance of class forces. See Karl Marx, A Contribution to the 
Critique of Political Economy, (Moscow: International Publishers, 1979), 9-18. 
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independent environmental variables and the dependent organizational variables are 
linked together in my trans-scalar methodological approach, which expands on the 
dominant levels of analysis perspective in International Relations to incorporate the 
production of space by trans-scalar configurations of power. This process results in what I 
refer to as a trans-scalar space of intervention, a concept I deploy to encapsulate NATO’s 
contemporary format of interventions. With the initial introduction of my approach and 
the historic frames of reference provided this chapter lay the foundation for the more 
expansive and detailed analysis that follows in later chapters.  
The Dynamics of Political Economy: The transition between geoeconomic orders, 
the formation of intensified neoliberalism, and the spread of austerity  
Before providing an explanation of the term intensified neoliberalism, I must 
illustrate how it diverges from standard neoliberalism.  This requires an overview of how 
neoliberalism reworked state institutions and priorities, with particular emphasis on the 
American experience, to become the sole prevailing ideology of political economy. By 
detailing the internalization of neoliberalism within Western, state structures in the 1970s 
and 1980s and its global spread in the 1990s following the end of the Cold War the 
foundation will be laid for the presentation of my first conceptual term, geoeconomics, 
which I use to theorize the transmutation of neoliberalism from a Western to a global 
phenomenon. I will then have the basis to discuss how the intensification of neoliberalism 
has occurred since 2008 with the extension of austerity to the military sector.   
After the collapse of the Breton Woods system in the 1970s, the United States 
became the locus for a new highly financialized version of capitalism.18 This 
                                                     
18For an intellectual history of neoliberalism see Jamie Peck, Constructions of Neoliberal Reason, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2010). For accounts that trace the global spread of neoliberalism and its 
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transformation, conducted under the aegis of what later became known as neoliberalism, 
provoked wide-ranging transformations in the state, society, and individual preferences. 
Neoliberalism is a broad and contested concept that combines ideological, institutional, 
and economic elements, many of which are contradictory. For the purposes of the ensuing 
discussion, however the definition provided by Campbell and Pederson provides a good 
foundation. They state that, “Neoliberalism is a heterogeneous set of institutions 
consisting of various ideas...it includes formal institutions, such as a minimalist welfare-
state and business regulation programs... it includes normative principles favoring free 
market solutions to economic problems...It includes institutionalized cognitive principles, 
notably a deep, taken for granted belief in neoclassical economics.”19 Perhaps one of the 
clearest transformations that occurred within Western states with the rise of neoliberalism 
was the reconfiguration of welfare state policies to expose ever-larger areas of society to 
the competitive mechanisms of the market. This process was not a uniform one, as Albo 
and Fast argue, but assumed different characteristics and intensity depending upon the 
prevailing social conditions within each particular state.20 
 Jessop provides a useful paradigm for framing this transition, arguing that it 
marks a shift from the welfare to the workfare state. Rather than the pursuit of full 
employment policies that characterized the welfare state of the Bretton Woods era, the 
workfare state of the neoliberal era is concerned with the promotion of labor flexibility. 
                                                     
transformative effects see Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (Toronto: 
Knopf, 2007) and David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2007).  
19John Campbell and Ove Pedersen, “The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis,” in John 
Campbell and Ove Pedersen, eds., The Rise of Neoliberalism and Institutional Analysis, (Princeton: 
Princeton University Press, 2001), 5. 
20 Gregory Albo and Travis Fast, “Varieties of Neoliberalism: Trajectories of Workfare in Advanced 
Capitalist Countries,” (Presented at the Annual Meetings of the Canadian Political Science Association, 
Halifax, May 30 2003). 
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This new workfare form of state was concerned with as Jessop argues, “...intervening on 
the supply-side to strengthen as far as possible the structural and/or systemic 
competitiveness of the relevant economic spaces...serving as the nodal point in a wide 
range of economic, social and cultural discourse which has implications for the 
reconstruction of entire social formations.”21 As opposed to the embedded liberalism22 of 
the past, where society was explicitly protected from the major vicissitudes of the market, 
it would now be open to them. Polanyi spoke of a double movement through which, 
“...the extension of market organization in respect to genuine commodities was 
accompanied by its restriction in respect to fictitious ones.”23 Neoliberalism gradually 
overturned this dynamic. 
 A reengineering of the state was central to the project of neoliberalism.24 
Neoliberalism never sought a generalized rollback of the state. Rather as Konings argues, 
“...neoliberalism was a return to classical liberalism only on an ideological level; 
neoliberal practices were never about institutional retreat or the subordination of public 
and private actors to the discipline of disembedded markets but precisely involved the 
creation, legitimation and consolidation of new institutional capacities and mechanisms 
                                                     
21 Bob Jessop, The Future of the Capitalist State, (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 250. 
22 For the operation of embedded liberalism in the Bretton Woods era see John Ruggie, “International 
Regimes, Transactions and Change: Embedded Liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order,” International 
Organization, 36 (1982): 379-415. 
23Karl Polanyi, The Great Transformation, (Beacon Hill: Beacon Press, 1957), 76 
24 In Grasmcian terms neoliberalism should be understood as an “organic ideology” that provided the 
intellectual basis for the structural reconfiguration of the both civil and political society. “One must 
distinguish between historically organic ideologies, that is ideologies that are necessary to a given structure 
and arbitrary rationalistic, willed ideologies. Insofar as they are historically necessary, ideologies have a 
validity that is psychological; they organize the human masses, they establish the ground on which humans 
move, become conscious of their position, struggle, etc. As for arbitrary ideologies, they produce nothing 
other than individual movements, polemics, etc.” Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol. 3, ed. Joseph 
Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 171. 
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of control.”25 While the capacities of the state, under the influence of neoliberalism, were 
reduced in some areas, most notably the provision of social services, in others, 
particularly surveillance and control, they were extended. What was occurring under 
neoliberalism was not a process of deregulation that sought to reduce the absolute size of 
the state, but instead a re-regulation that relatively increased the capacities of the state in 
specific areas.26 While this failure to reduce the size of the state in an absolute sense 
would appear to conflict with one of the core tenets of neoliberalism, its desire for a 
minimal state, to arrive at this conclusion would be a misreading of neoliberalism. A 
range of authors central to the neoliberal tradition acknowledges the crucial role played 
by the state in creating the conditions conductive to the functioning of markets.27 What 
neoliberalism provided the impetus and guidance for was not a retrenchment of the state, 
but instead its redesign. 
 This redesign occurred in primarily two areas, welfare and the penal system. New 
disciplinary logics were inserted into both areas and mechanisms of surveillance and 
control were greatly extended. Welfare benefits were substantially reduced and the 
requirements to obtain welfare were greatly increased.28 Concurrent with this trend the 
                                                     
25Martijn Konings, “Neoliberalism and the state,” in Damien Cahill, Lindy Edwards and Frank Stilwell, 
eds., Neoliberalism: Beyond the Free Market, (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 2012), 54-5. 
26 Pantich and Konings demonstrate this in regards to the financial sector. Leo Panitch and Martijn 
Konings, “Myths of Neoliberal Deregulation,” New Left Review 57, May-June 2009, 67-83.  
27For the role of the state in generating a market society see Fredrick Hayek, The Road to Serfdom, 
(London: Routledge, 1976), 31, 84. Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom, (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1962), 8. A. Rustow, “General social laws of the economic disintegration and possibilities 
of reconstruction,” Afterword to Ropke W, International Economic Disintegration, (London: W. Hodge, 
1942). W. Willgerod and A. Peacock, “German liberalism and economic revival. In Peacock A, and W 
Willgerod, eds., German Neoliberalism and the social market economy. (London: Macmillan, 1989), 6. 
28A key moment in this process was the signing into law of the 1996 Personal Responsibility and Work 
Opportunity Reconciliation Act in the United States. Amongst its provisions was a lifetime cap of five 
years support, the exclusion for consideration for aid for formerly protected categories including poor 
children suffering from disabilities and teen mothers who refuse to reside with their parents, and changes to 
federal funding which greatly reduced the overall national level of aid provided. See Loic Wacquant, 
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prison population, in the United States especially, exploded at an exponential rate.29 As 
Wacquant argues the ever-greater restrictions placed upon welfare and the vast expansion 
of the prison system must be viewed a cohesive process that sought to target specific 
segments of the population.  
The activation of disciplinary programs applied to the unemployed, the indigent, 
single mothers, and others on assistance so as to push them onto the peripheral 
sectors of the employment market on the one side, and the deployment of an 
extended police and penal net with a reinforced mesh in the dispossessed districts 
of the metropolis on the other side, are the two components of a single apparatus 
for the management of poverty aims at effecting the authoritarian rectification of 
the behaviours of population recalcitrant to the merging economic and symbolic 
order.30 
 
The creation and extension of these programs sought to contain and control those viewed 
as potential threats to the social order. Rather than considering them as extra-economic 
functions of the state, the alterations to these two programs must be viewed in light of the 
rising inequality and greater levels of poverty resulting from the deployment of neoliberal 
economic policies.31 The changes made to welfare sought to push those on it into the 
emerging low wage service sector. While the surge in the numbers of those imprisoned, 
the majority for minor crimes, served to warehouse those deemed incompatible, for a 
multitude of reasons, with the new demands of neoliberal society. By removing, those 
incapable of successfully competing in an ever-crueller society the foundations for 
                                                     
Punishing the Poor: the neoliberal government of social insecurity. (Durham: Duke University Press, 
2009), 73-109 for greater detail. 
29The prison population in the United States increased eight times from 1970 to 2007, with 60 percent of 
the prison population either Black or Latino. James Austin, et al. “Unlocking America: Why and How to 
Reduce America's Prison Population,” (Washington D.C: JFA Institute, 2007), 1. 
30Loic Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: the neoliberal government of social insecurity. (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 2009), 14. 
31In the United States over the period 1979-2004 income for the top one percent rose by 176% while for the 
lowest fifth income increased by only 6%, below the rate of inflation. See Congressional Budget Office, 
“Historical Federal Effective Tax Rates, 1979-2004,” (Washington D.C: Congressional Budget Office, 
2007), supplemental tables. In terms of poverty levels the extreme poverty rate in the United States doubled 
from 1996 to 2011. See National Poverty Center, “Extreme Poverty in the United States, 1996-2011,” 
(Washington D.C: National Poverty Center, 2011).   
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continued accumulation based upon the neoliberal model were strengthened. 
Neoliberalism, as it was carried through the institutional framework of the state, 
entailed an undermining of its beneficial functions and an expansion and hardening of its 
coercive mechanisms. Neoliberalism strengthened the state in some areas while 
weakening it in others. Perceptions of the neoliberal state, as Hilgers notes, are dependent 
upon the nature of your interaction with it. “The state is thus both more present and 
visible, but at the same time more absent and weak, capable of coercion through informal 
measures but incapable of fulfilling its social obligations. In certain cases, we see a state 
that is expanding and even becoming stronger in some ways. Yet, its weakness and 
porousness are revealed on a daily basis.”32 For those seeking to petition the state for 
benefits the state is likely to appear quite weak, even fragmented, while for those who, 
for whatever reason are deemed to be a threat the state will appear to be quite strong and 
coordinated. 
Smashing the radical social movements of the 1960s was a prerequisite for the 
establishment of neoliberalism.33 Also required, as Short notes, was the formation and of 
a coherent intellectual and political leadership was capable of putting neoliberal ideas 
into practice and flexible enough to adapt as circumstances demanded.34  Only once this 
                                                     
32 Matthew Hilgers, “The historicity of the neoliberal state,” Social Anthropology, 20 (2012): 85. 
33 The FBI’s COINTELPRO program, an extensive operation of psychological warfare, harassment, 
wrongful imprisonment, and assassination targeted against a range of New Left organizations including the 
Black Panthers, American Indian Movement, and Students for a Democratic Society would result in the 
disorganization and containment of radical social movements in the United States, thus laying the 
groundwork for the eventual dominance of neoliberalism. For further detail see Ward Churchill & Jim 
Vander Wall. Agents of Repression: The FBI's Secret Wars Against The Black Panther Party and The 
American Indian Movement. (New York: South End Press, 2002)  Ward Churchill & Jim Vander Wall, The 
COINTELPRO Papers: Documents from the FBI's Secret Wars Against Dissent in the United States. (New 
York: South End Press, 2002)  James Davis. Assault on the Left. (New York: Praeger Trade, 1997). 
34 Nicola Short, “Leadership, neoliberal governance and global economic crisis,” in Stephen Gill, ed., 
Global Crises and the Crisis of Global Leadership, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 38-
55. 
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process had been completed could the definitive break with the postwar social order 
occur, allowing the epoch of neoliberalism to be ushered in.35 The outcome of these 
moments of rupture is variable and dependent upon the relation of social forces, as 
Gramsci noted. In the Prison Notebooks he argued that “A rupture can occur either 
because a prosperous situation is threatened or because the economic malaise has become 
unbearable and the old society seems bereft of any force capable of mitigating it... 
various outcomes are possible: victory by the old society, which obtains for itself some 
breathing space by physically destroying the enemy’s elite and terrorizing its reserves, or 
even the reciprocal destruction of the conflicting forces and the establishment of a peace 
that is as quiet as a graveyard...”36 The contemporary conjuncture is reflective of the 
historic defeat which the working class suffered across the West in the 1970s. It was not a 
reciprocal destruction of conflicting forces that occurred, but rather the severe 
degradation of one and the near absolute victory of the other, which the consequential 
establishment of a new equilibrium marked by occasional, manageable, outbursts of 
discontent. 
Already in the late 1970s the new relationship between the state and society and 
their impact upon the political were clear to Poulantzas who declared that, “A new form 
of state is currently being imposed...namely intensified state control over every sphere of 
socio-economic life combined with a radical decline of the institutions of political 
democracy and with draconian and multiform curtailment of so-called formal 
                                                     
35 The Volcker Shock of 1979-1981 which more than doubled interest rates in the United States is usually 
considered to be the founding moment of neoliberalism. Sandy Brian Hager, “Investment Power and 
Neoliberal Regulation: From the Volcker Shock to the Volcker Rule,” in Henk Overbeek and Bastiaan van 
Apeldoorn, Neoliberalism in Crisis, (Houndsmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012), 82. Leo Panitch and Sam 
Gindin, “The Current Crisis: A Socialist Perspective,” Studies in Political Economy 83: 23. 
36 Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Vol. 2, ed. Joseph Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2011), 182. 
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liberties...”37 While formally the role of the state in the economy appeared to be declining 
with the mass privatization of state owned enterprises, it was the state, as shown above, 
which continued to ensure social stability and made the continual accumulation of capital 
possible38, albeit on a footing that was now considerably less favorable to the majority of 
the population. Yet it was not simply the relationship between individuals and the state 
that altered, the interactions between individuals were transformed as well.  
 Neoliberal ideology sought to place the market as the sole mechanism through 
which individuals engaged with one other.39 The level of intervention by the state within 
society was not drastically reduced, instead it was reconfigured and sought to place 
market mechanisms at the heart of every interaction. Foucault astutely observed the start 
of this process, 
Neoliberal intervention is no less dense, frequent, active, and continuous than in 
any other system. But what is important to see is what the point of application of 
these government interventions is now...Government must not form a 
counterpoint or a screen, as it were, between society and economic processes... it 
has to intervene on society so that competitive mechanism can play a regulatory 
role at every moment and every point in society and by intervening in this way its 
objective will become possible, that is to say, a general regulation of society by 
the market.40  
 
Neoliberalism then posited society as a collection of atomized individuals whose sole 
purpose was to maximize their own market value, rather than as a collective that 
                                                     
37 Nicos Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism, (London: New Left Books, 1978), 203-204. 
38 For the central role of the state in the reproduction of capitalism both domestically and internationally see 
Ellen Meiksins Wood, Empire of Capital, (London: Verso, 2003). Especially 19-20. 
39 In this sense then neoliberalism can be read as evoking the real subsumption of capital, as ever larger 
areas of society are brought under the guidance of market relations. Under conditions of real subsumption 
capital imbues the temporal fabric of all forms of labor with the specificity of capitalist production. For 
further elaboration of real subsumption and its contrast to formal subsumption see Karl Marx, Capital 
Volume I, (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1976), 1025. Karl Marx, Capital Volume II, (London: Penguin, 
1992), 177. Antonio Negri, Marx Beyond Marx: Lessons on the Grundrisse, (London: Pluto Press, 1991), 
144. 
40 Michel Foucault, The Birth of Biopolitics: Lectures at the College De France 1978-1979, (New York: 
Picador, 2010), 145. 
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represented a plurality of views and potentials for the future.   
Neoliberalism was an attractive paradigm to some because it was presented as 
increasing individual freedom through limiting the extent that society could impinge 
upon individual action. In fact, a false sort of freedom was offered. As Bauman notes, 
“Paradoxically, the call to take life into one’s own, individual hands and the pressure to 
do just that may rebound in less individual control over its course. That call and those 
pressures divert the minds and the deeds of individuals from the collectively set 
conditions that determine the agenda and the chances of their individual choices and 
efforts.”41 Rather than increased freedom and the multiplying of the possible choices that 
one could pursue to shape one’s own life, what resulted was a sharp curtailing of freedom 
and a limiting of choices for the majority of society and an increasing concentration of 
economic and political power within a smaller fraction of the population.  
This was not accidental, but a desired outcome of the advocates of neoliberalism, 
as market relations were extended to encompass society. The freedom that neoliberalism 
sought was the freeing of capital from its restraints. This particular type of freedom 
depended upon shifting elements that were formerly governed by society to the market, in 
the process closing them off from the majority of society. With the advent of 
neoliberalism, the ability for the individual to make choices about their own life, and their 
ability to influence collective decision making through the election of representatives, 
who determined how society was to be governed, were sharply curtailed. Instead, choice 
was abstracted and removed to the realm of the market with neoliberalism eventually 
becoming the shared consensus amongst all mainstream Western political parties. 
                                                     
41 Zygmunt Bauman, Society Under Siege (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2002), 69. 
24 
 
The fall of the Berlin Wall and the full reintegration of the former Soviet states 
within the global economy in the 1990s would mark the victorious globalization of 
neoliberalism. The gradual spread of neoliberalism across the planet was a process that 
proceeded in a number of simultaneous stages. From its initial formulation in its 
heartlands of Western Europe and North America, neoliberalism was violently imposed 
upon Latin America, adopted by Deng Xiaoping in China42 and introduced into Eastern 
Europe and Russia through policies of shock therapy.43 The proclamation of the 
Washington Consensus44 represented the apex of neoliberalism, occurring at a time when 
the United States was riding high on its victory in the Cold War and was growing 
accustomed to dictating the appropriate economic policies to the rest of the world. It was 
the end of the Cold War that made possible the unquestioned dominance of neoliberalism 
across the globe.45 The vanishing of “actually existing socialism” made neoliberalism the 
only game in town, a condition that continues today, even in the wake of the worst 
economic crisis since the Great Depression. As Peck and Ticknell argue, “Neoliberalism 
does indeed seem to be everywhere. And its apparent omnipresence is at the same time a 
manifestation of and a source of political-economic power.”46 The lack of a competitor to 
                                                     
42 My historical background is based upon the sequence of events that David Harvey lays out in David 
Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). A fine overview is also 
provided in Noam Chomsky, Profit Over People: Neoliberalism and Global Order, (New York: Seven 
Stories Press, 1999). 
43 Within Russia the social upheaval caused by shock therapy would be a major factor in the deterioration 
of Western relations with Russia. This connection is made in Joseph Stiglitz, Globalization and its 
Discontents, (New York: WW Norton, 2002), 133-165. 
44 John Williamson, “What Washington Means by Policy Reform,” in John Williamson, ed., Latin 
American Readjustment: How Much has Happened, (Washington D.C: Institute for International 
Economics, 1989), 7-41. 
45 Neoliberalism was not reproduced in a monolithic fashion as Ablo and Fast remind us. The 
characteristics of its manifestation were dependent upon prevailing social conditions. Greg Albo and Travis 
Fast, “Varieties of Neoliberalism: Trajectories of Workfare in Advanced Capitalist Countries,” Presented at 
the Annual Meeting of the Canadian Political Science Association, May 30th, 2003. 
46 Jamie Peck and Adam Tickell, “Neoliberalizing Space,” Antipode 34 (2002): 392. 
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the neoliberal model was a stark contrast to the decades of the Cold War, when the Soviet 
Union loomed as an ever present, though not appealing alternative.  
The transition between the Cold War era and the post-Cold War period of the 
1990s can, I argue, best be understood as the movement between different geoeconomic 
orders. The Cold War both created and was determined by a set of institutions, economic 
relations, and spatial and political configurations that for over forty years overlaid the 
conduct of states within the international system. The rapid dissolution of the Soviet 
Union and the subsequent end of the Cold War gave rise to a new set of dynamics and 
processes that dramatically altered the nature of world order. A crucial ramification of 
this process was, as I have noted, the expansion of neoliberalism from a primarily 
Western to a truly global phenomenon.  
Geoeconomics is a useful term to employ to understand this transition because it 
connects together spatial, economic, and political processes47 all aspects that figure 
prominently in my methodological approach. Edward Luttwak originally coined 
geoeconomics in a 1990 essay where he asserted that in contrast to the Cold War era, 
economics would assert its priority over traditional security concerns. The dichotomy 
between low and high politics would be inverted. Luttwak stated that “Everyone, it 
appears, now agrees that the methods of commerce are displacing military methods with 
disposable capital in lieu of firepower, civilian innovation in lieu of military-technical 
advancement, and market penetration in lieu of garrisons and bases. States, as spatial 
                                                     
47 Cowen and Smith also note these interconnections. They argued that a new geopolitical social emerged 
in the post-Cold War period. “This geopolitical social, the assemblage of territory, economy and social 
forms that was both a foundation and effect of modern geopolitics is currently being recast by an emerging 
geography of economy and security that might best be captured as geoeconomics with its own attendant 
social forms.” Deborah Cowen and Neil Smith, “After Geopolitics? From the Geopolitical Social to 
Geoeconomics,” Antipode 41 (2009): 23. 
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entities structured to jealously delimit their territories, will not disappear but reorient 
themselves toward geoeconomics in order to compensate for their decaying geopolitical 
roles.”48 Written in the heady days following the end of the Cold War Luttwak overstated 
his case.49 Military power was not going to dissipate and borders were not going to 
evaporate, but Luttwak’s analysis did speak to wider systemic changes that were 
occurring in the world economy and political order, as the United States and her allies 
reshaped global governance arrangements to more effectively reflect their interests and 
extend their influence. As Gilpin notes, “Systemic change involves a change in the 
governance of the international system. That is to say, it is a change within the system 
rather than a change of the system itself…”50 These changes included a world recast 
along neoliberal lines as capital penetrated into the former Soviet states,51 Western states 
sought to concentrate and consolidate their coercive power through the expansion of 
NATO, and a general spatial reordering, all of which occurred throughout the 1990s.  
All these changes constitute the movement from one geoeconomic order to 
another. While the end of the Cold War was a moment of profound historical significance 
for NATO and the world, the 2007 Global Financial Crisis occupies the central narrative 
in my analysis. I see this crisis as the pivotal event that shaped the contemporary contours 
of NATO because it placed austerity as the foundation of Western economic policy. This 
resulted in the spread of an intensified form of neoliberalism, with significant impacts 
upon the military sectors of Western states. 
                                                     
48 Edward Luttwak, “From Geopolitics to Geoeconomics: Logic of Conflict, Grammar of Commerce,” 
National Interest 20, 18. 
49 This sort of triumphalism was not uncommon in this period. Fukuyama’s end of history thesis is the most 
famous example of this. Francis Fukuyama, “The end of History?,” National Interest 16 (1989): 3-18. 
50 Robert Gilpin, War and Change in World Politics, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 42. 
51 This was a highly violent and disruptive process as Naomi Klein recounts. Naomi Klein, The Shock 
Doctrine: The Rise of Disaster Capitalism, (New York: Picador, 2007), 275-310. 
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To be clear the pursuit of austerity as socio-economic policy is nothing new. 
While austerity is currently one of the central organizing logics of the present providing 
both the justification and the means through which contemporary Western societies are 
being reordered, 52 and is hence, usually associated with neoliberalism its utilization as a 
technique of government predates both the current crisis and the advent of neoliberalism. 
Austerity is deployed as a set of economic and social policies that seek to reduce the 
functions and responsibilities of a state that is deemed to be playing too large of a role in 
society.  In terms of its policy parameters Blyth defines austerity as “...a form of 
voluntary deflation in which the economy adjusts through the reduction of wages, prices, 
and public spending to restore competitiveness, which is (supposedly) best achieved by 
cutting the state's budget, debts, and deficits.”53 Austerity should be understood then as a 
set of economic policies utilized to reduce the size of the state. The professed aim of 
these policies is to restore economic growth by reducing the state’s capacity to intervene 
in a progressive manner within society.54 As a policy, austerity is defined by the lowering 
of tax rates on top income earners and corporations and deep reductions in a wide range 
of social services provided by the state, such as education and healthcare. Austerity is 
also utilized as a reason by corporate and state actors to weaken labor protections and 
rollback collective bargaining rights.55 These moves are driven by the desire to eliminate 
                                                     
52 Both Europe and the United States are fixated upon austerity as the solution to current economic malaise. 
See Abraham Newman, “Austerity and the end of the European Model: How Neoliberals Captured the 
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54 Programs commonly associated with the post-war welfare state, which are designed to reduce inequality 
and provide increased social opportunities to vulnerable segments of the population are the most viciously 
attacked by the extension of austerity.    
55 The attack on collective bargaining rights by Wisconsin governor Scott Walker is perhaps the most 
blatant example of this. For an overview see Etienne Cantin, “The Politics of Austerity and the 
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state deficits and restore conditions of corporate profitability. Western governments have 
continually turned to austerity to rectify what is deemed an overextended state or in 
response to a stagnant economy. Austerity has a long history, but it was perhaps most 
notably employed in the interwar era as the initial response of governments to the onset 
of the Great Depression, to disastrous effect.56  
Austerity then is not a new tool of governance; however, the specific manner in 
which it is employed differs depending upon prevailing conditions. Although austerity is 
inherent to the current variation of neoliberalism, which I have termed intensified 
neoliberalism, austerity is not equivalent to neoliberalism in the general sense. It is 
possible to have fiscally expansive forms of neoliberalism that increase public financing 
to support the private provision of services. This is not the case in the current period as 
intensified neoliberalism is characterized by the general reduction of state budgets in 
sectors traditionally sheltered from the demands of the market.  
While neoliberal policies suffered a near death experience in 2007-2008, several 
years on from the depth of the crisis it is clear that in terms of economic policy 
neoliberalism remains more entrenched than ever.57 There is no immediate post-
neoliberal dawn on the horizon, as some commentators believed during the depths of the 
crisis.58 Instead governments, through deploying austerity measures, are seeking to renew 
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the conditions upon which neoliberalism has historically been based.59 This requires, as 
Harvey succinctly puts it, “...the integrity of the financial system and the solvency of 
financial institutions over the well-being of the population...”60 The result is the 
prioritization of part-time low wage precarious labor that constrains future economic 
growth.   
The intensification of neoliberalism caused by the pursuit of austerity is a project 
Western governments have been pursuing since 2010. After a brief flirtation with 
Keynesian deficit financing in the immediate wake of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis61 
the G20, during its Toronto summit in June 2010, would declare that the time had come 
for Western states to begin rolling back their stimulus programs and shift focus to deficit 
reduction, with states pledging to half their deficits by 2013.62 This is the point at which 
our present age of austerity began.63 
This turn towards austerity should be viewed as an effort to resuscitate a morbid 
neoliberalism by attempting to reconstruct its socio-economic basis. What I refer to as 
intensified neoliberalism64 is a mutation of neoliberalism that emphasizes particular 
elements that have been inherent within it since its initial coalescence in the late 1970s. 
As a form of capitalism neoliberalism sought to roll back the postwar welfare state and 
                                                     
59 Albo shares this assessment, see Gregory Albo, “Neoliberalism and the Discontented,” in Leo Panitch 
and Colin Leys, eds., Socialist Register 2008: Global Flashpoints, Reactions to Imperialism and 
Neoliberalism (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2007).  
60 David Harvey, A Brief History of Neoliberalism, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71. 
61 Further detail on why this turn to Keynesianism ended so abruptly can be found in Mark Blyth, Austerity: 
The History of a Dangerous Idea, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 54-62. 
62G20, “The G-20 Toronto Summit Declaration,” June 26-27 (2010), 3. 
63A phrase coined by British Prime Minister David Cameron. Deborah Summers, “David Cameron Warns 
of New Age of Austerity,” The Guardian, April 29, 2009 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2009/apr/26/david-cameron-conservative-economic-policy1 
64 For an excellent analysis of how neoliberalism not only survived, but was strengthened by the financial 
crisis see Philip Mirowski, Never Let a Serious Crisis Got to Waste: how Neoliberalism Survived the 
Financial Meltdown, (London: Verso, 2013). 
30 
 
increase economic exploitation, reordering the relationship between the state, capital, and 
society. The current turn towards austerity is one that is deeply rooted in the logic of 
liberalism and seeks to extend and deepen these processes. The most recent crisis as 
Peck, Theodore, and Brenner remind us is only the latest in a series faced and overcome 
by neoliberalism. They argue that “...crises have repeatedly served as moments of 
(re)animation and renewal for the neoliberal project, and the Great Recession has been no 
exception. Rather than a death knell for neoliberalism, we may be witnessing another 
historical inflection point in the mutating processes of neoliberalization.”65 The pursuit of 
austerity is provoking just such a mutation by spreading the rationalities of neoliberalism 
to new areas of society and deepening the operations of neoliberalism where they already 
exist. 
  Nowhere is the spread and deepening of neoliberalism clearer than in the military 
sector. In the last several years, Western states have begun to implement a remarkable 
series of rollbacks in their military expenditures.66 Once sacred military budgets have 
been slashed, forcing the implementation of creative programs and initiatives as Western 
governments seek to preserve military capacities while responding to new economic 
imperatives; imperatives which they had been sheltered from while they served as the 
governing principles for the rest of the economy. The governments of Europe and the 
United States have responded differently to these new economic realities. Historically 
European defense budgets have been chronically low, especially when compared to the 
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United States.67 The Global Financial Crisis has only worsened this situation, as it has 
prompted cuts in the core operating capacity of European states. The recent British 
experience is emblematic of the declining fortunes of European defense. 
 Britain has undergone not one, but two rounds of spending cuts to its military 
since the onset of the crisis. The first round, embodied in the Strategic Defence and 
Security Review68 published in October 2010 led to a total budget cut of 7.7% over four 
years with total military personal reduced by 42,000.69 Historical centerpieces of 
Britain’s military such as its sole aircraft carrier, the Arc Royal, and its Harrier jump jets 
were retired as part of this review. The second round of cuts, proposed in December 
2012, call for additional reductions of 245 million pounds in 2013 and 490 million 
pounds in 2014.70 The effect of these cuts, according to the UK National Defense 
Association is that, “The security of the United Kingdom is being severely 
compromised...our armed forces have lost many of essential capabilities.”71 Ivo Daalder, 
the American Ambassador to NATO, shared these concerns.72 While the continual budget 
reductions to Britain’s military signal the end of the sheltering that the military sector has 
traditionally received from the curtailment of government spending that has characterized 
other sectors of society under neoliberalism, the transformation underway in the British 
military go beyond the drive to eliminate redundancies. The new drive for efficiencies, of 
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doing the same, with far less resources, is leading to the creation of innovative 
agreements between states as they seek to share the burden of defense in an era of 
austerity. Britain's signing of the Defence and Security Co-operation treaty with France in 
November 2010 is an example of this trend.73 The treaty not only seeks to promote the 
pooling of resources and opens access of each country’s defense market to one another, 
but also establishes a senior level group that will coordinate the defense policies of both 
countries.74 This merging of the defense policies and military capabilities of two 
sovereign states, is symptomatic of the effect that neoliberalism is having upon Western 
militaries. As will be seen later, these processes are not restricted to just the UK and 
France; NATO is also seeking to promote the integration of member militaries through its 
Smart Defense initiative. 
Cuts have also begun to affect the American defense establishment, although there 
has been no suggestion of integrating the American military with other national 
militaries. Since the end of the Second World War, the United States has possessed the 
world's preeminent military force.75 Under the pressures of the Cold War and the Global 
War on Terror, the American military has consistently received extraordinarily high levels 
of funding.76 In 2011, the American defense budget was $ 739.3 billion US dollars, 300 
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billion more than the next ten countries combined.77 The position of the American 
military as a privileged sector, once protected from the ravages of austerity that are 
effecting the rest of the American economy,78 would appear to be a given then. Yet, 
although the situation for America's defense budget is nowhere near that of the United 
Kingdom, large reductions are in the early stages of being enacted. Already cuts in 
defense spending totalling $487 billion US dollars over the next decade have been agreed 
to.79 
 American finances are simply not able to sustain record spending on the military 
that has been reached with the onset of the War on Terror. As Layne argues, “The Nation's 
ballooning budget deficits are going to make it increasingly difficult to sustain the United 
States' level of military commitments...Its strategic commitments exceed the resources 
available to support them.”80 In the early stages of the multi-year long debate over the 
federal deficit that has paralyzed Washington the Budget Control Act of 2011 was signed 
into law. This act provides for an automatic series of cuts in the budget, should Congress 
and the President be unable to agree upon a deficit reduction strategy. The ranker between 
the two parties and the failure to reach a final agreement on a number of occasions81 
meant that the Budget Control Act went into effect in March 2013, immediately cutting 
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85.4 billion dollars from the budget.82 In response dozens of government grant, research, 
and education programs were cut.83 Although low income support programs were largely 
protected from the sequester expansions to the US food stamp program and 
unemployment insurance which were undertaken in the very depths of the crisis were 
allowed to expire by Congress, further reducing demand in the American economy and 
harming the prospects for future growth.84 
On the defense, side with the Budget Control Act coming into force it is 
calculated that military spending will be cut by 1 trillion dollars over the course of the 
next decade.85 The scale of these cuts would dramatically reduce American engagement 
around the world, according to military experts.86  In the opinion of Baron, Bensahel and 
Sharp, “... we judge that the U.S military’s ability to execute America's global 
engagement strategy , as it is currently articulated would be placed at a high risk...”87  
The looming cutbacks to the American defense budget have sparked concern amongst 
some analysts that a retrenchment is underway for America's international 
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commitments.88 This retrenchment can clearly been observed in how the Department of 
Defense has chosen to respond to budget cuts, by reducing the size of the Army to pre-
World War II levels and eliminating long-term successful programs, like the A-10 
aircraft.89 These cuts mark a dramatic deviation in the formerly sacrosanct American 
defense budget and demonstrate the incorporation of austerity within the military sector, a 
central component of intensified neoliberalism. 
The effect of austerity upon NATO: The adoption of risk management and its 
transformation into a global security nexus  
 Beyond simply a reduction of resources, the key effect that austerity has had upon 
NATO is promoting a rapid acceleration of its adoption of risk management techniques. 
This process began with the end of the Cold War, as NATO sought to adapt to new 
uncertainty realities of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order, which contrasted markedly 
when compared to the relative stable bipolar configuration that preceded it.  
With the end of the Cold War the predictable and clear delineation of potential 
adversaries, that collective defense assumed appeared to be rapidly receding, in favor of 
an increasingly complex and ever more unpredictable world. The emergence of a new 
geoecononomic order in the 1990s obliviously had the potential to undermine the entire 
conceptual and strategic edifice upon which NATO had been based throughout the Cold 
War. Rather than fade away however as numerous authors predicted, NATO sought to 
reinvent itself by elaborating a radically different understanding of the world, based upon 
the precepts of risk management. The ever-increasing prominence of risk management 
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within NATO was due to long standing tendencies that emerged with the end of the Cold 
War, with the propagation of austerity by Western governments in response to the Global 
Financial Crisis finally triggering this seismic shift. With the reduced resources of its 
members and persistent geopolitical uncertainty outside of its borders, risk management 
techniques were seen to perform a crucial function for NATO by providing a recognized 
manner to determine potential threats and hence allow preventative action to be taken. 
Further risk management would allow for an improvement in the efficiency of NATO, as 
only select events would require contingencies to be put in place and fewer still an 
eventual response from NATO. 
 The elevation of crisis management as one of the strategic foundations of NATO 
is a watershed moment in its history. Collective defense, the basis upon which NATO was 
founded and its central operating principle for more than fifty years saw its influence in 
both theory and practice significantly diminished. This shift redefined how NATO 
conceives of security and laid the foundation for a wide-ranging institutional 
transformation that transformed it into what I term a global security nexus. Risk 
management is an attempt to quantify uncertainty and to create a measure of 
predictability or, at the very least, a recognized standard of response to events as they 
occur. This desire to understand and contain uncertainty arises from the sheer complexity 
and unpredictability of the modern security environment. Risk analysis serves to frame 
dangers, either real or potential, in a manner in which makes them calculable to security 
actors allowing for coherent action to be taken against them. Through the logics of risk 
analysis as Beck notes, “The unpredictable is transformed into something predictable; 
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what has not yet occurred becomes the project of present action.”90  However the utility 
of risk analysis extends beyond the identification of specific threats, it also weaves 
together a wide spectrum of dangers into a cohesive narrative. Risk management 
techniques provide, as Rasmussen notes, the link that allows for connections to be drawn 
between the seemingly distinct entities that challenge the West, allowing for policy 
makers to make sense of what would otherwise be an inconceivable set of dangers. As he 
explains, “The concept of risk as the new guiding principle of strategy makes it possible 
to connect a number of events, policy initiatives and technological developments, which 
would otherwise seem random and unconnected...the risk framework allows one to see 
how these well-known elements are being put together in a new way...”91 The procedures 
of risk management then function as a paradigm that binds together seemly disparate 
elements and provides the mechanisms that allow for the formulation of coherent action 
by taking institutional knowledge and aggregating it in a manner that allows for the 
creation of a coherent set of dangers that can be targeted. 
  The manner in which risk management was incorporated within NATO under the 
rubric of crisis management affected both its strategic orientation and had tactical 
ramifications that altered the format of its operations.  NATO is now seeking to transform 
itself from a standard international security organization that was concerned, above all, 
with the collective defense of its members, to a transnational organization focusing upon 
crisis management. Rather than simply operating in the collective defense of its members 
NATO has, since its 2010 Strategic Concept, assumed a role as the preeminent vehicle of 
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global crisis management. Instead of defensively reacting to threats, NATO is retooling 
itself as an aggressive, pre-emptive organization. Gheciu encapsulates this shift in 
NATO's priorities. As she argues, “The main approach to security issues is now 
preventive defense against a multitude of dangers; most of which are ill-defined and 
abstract...the institutions of the transatlantic security community must now take 
preventive action on a global scale, targeting actors, be they states or non-state actors that 
are perceived as a source of actual or potential risk to international security.”92  The 
incorporation of risk management techniques in NATO has altered its organizational and 
conceptual framework marking the transition of NATO from a traditional military 
alliance to what I call a global security nexus, a far more flexible and dynamic 
configuration that can more rapidly respond to threats.93 
The global security element of this term is self-explanatory. NATO is now a 
global actor, which seeks to promote, in a multitude of ways, the security of Western and 
Western aligned states. The choice of the word nexus requires further elaboration 
however. Oxford defines a nexus as, “a connection or series of connections.”94  Since the 
1990s and in particular since its most recent Strategic Concept in 2010, NATO has sought 
to significantly increase the interconnectedness of its member militaries and to provide a 
greater level of analytical insight and actionable intelligence through the creation of new 
institutions and initiatives.95  These developments have served to expand and deepen 
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NATO’s architectural framework. By labeling NATO as a nexus, I seek to provide a 
conceptual tool that will assist in comprehending the scope of these transformations. The 
idea of a global security nexus is not an entirely original one96 but it has yet to be 
employed to examine NATO or utilized at length in an academic analysis. 
The contemporary nexus form of NATO serves as a coordinating center and a 
point of linkage that reduces the costs associated with collaborating amongst a diverse 
range of military actors.  This large core organization which is headquartered in Brussels, 
but has offices across the world,97 is why NATO should be thought of as a nexus, rather 
than other terminology that is applied to analyze contemporary organizational forms. 
Classifying NATO as a network for example, would be incorrect, because it would 
overlook the hierarchical organizations of NATO that carry out regularized sets of tasks 
and follow specific sets of procedures that comprises the majority of what NATO is as an 
organization.98  Yet NATO’s influence and impact extends beyond these organizations. 
Referring to NATO as a nexus seeks to encapsulate its ever-growing scale, both in terms 
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of how it approaches the planning and implementation of operations and the broadening 
apparatus through which it seeks to engage and connect together its formal members with 
non-member states. Taken together both elements give rise to a cohesive web of 
interactions that extend across the globe and buttress a Western led world order, allowing 
NATO to penetrate into the spaces wherever threats are deemed to lurk.99 This unique 
combination of a core set of bureaucratic institutions organized on a pyramid structure,100 
with clearly delimited responsibilities and chains of command alongside an ever-
expanding web of relationships with non-member states are what make NATO a nexus of 
global security.   
This new nexus configuration is fixated on increasing the amount of connections 
that NATO has with other states and deepening these connections where they already 
exist. As a global security nexus, NATO is confronting the dilemma of striving to be 
adaptable and responsive to world events as they occur, while remaining a massive 
organization stretched across more than twenty countries with conflicts often present 
between its members. In these circumstances, it is incredibly difficult for an organization 
like NATO to react quickly to situations as they materialize. As a result, there has been a 
movement within NATO away from involving its entire membership in a unified action 
towards self-selected members and outside partners acting to contain threats that are seen 
to imperil their own interests. This development potentially extends the range and 
frequency of NATO’s operations but it could also fracture its historic unity. This would 
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fatally weaken the Alliance it. The continued viability of NATO as it completes its 
evolution into a global security nexus is thus far from assured.  
Framing NATO’s transformation: The necessity of a trans-scalar methodology 
 To analyze the full spectrum of what NATO’s transformation into a global 
security nexus entails while clarifying its relationship to the dynamics of political 
economy requires the elaboration of a methodological framework that breaks with many 
of the conventions in International Relations. Instead of focusing upon which level of 
analysis is most appropriate for analyzing a specific phenomenon or what agency should 
be ascribed to NATO my methodology is concerned with illuminating how NATO is 
engaged in the production of space and is fostering interactions that occur across a range 
of scales. This approach allows for a more comprehensive understanding of how the 
institutional transformation of NATO into a global security nexus has affected the format 
of its interventions and how each has been driven by the demands of austerity.  
As a global security nexus, NATO is forging ever more extensive and elaborate 
governance mechanisms that multiply and deepen the points of connection between 
member and non-member states. In doing so NATO is, to an ever-greater degree, 
bisecting traditional divisions between the national and international sphere and 
solidifying a trans-scalar set of interactions. However, this concern with governance does 
not extend to cultivating it within areas subject to NATO’s intervention. Instead, after 
identifying threats through the application of risk management techniques NATO creates 
what I refer to as a trans-scalar space of intervention, temporary spaces where violence is 
applied from the trans-national scale and concentrated against targets at the local scale, 
once they are eliminated NATO withdraws and the space of intervention collapses. 
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NATO’s most recent intervention in Libya is an example of such a formation. This style 
of intervention is a stark departure from past NATO efforts, which were concerned with 
re-engineering societies upon neoliberal lines. NATO’s footprint is now far more 
ephemeral. The full breadth of the changes that have occurred within NATO through its 
transformation into a global security nexus and the effect that these changes have had on 
the geopolitical environment is not something that can be determined through the simple 
application of either of the major methodological approaches in International Relations. 
Both levels of analysis and the manner in which agency and structure are typically 
discussed fall short, as I will demonstrate through a brief initial critique. 
The influence of Kenneth Waltz for those seeking to engage with questions of 
international politics is inescapable. Waltz provided the initial formulation for what 
would become the levels of analysis debate in Man, the State, and War, one that still has 
a great deal of resonance for how research is conceptualized and conducted within the 
disciple of International Relations today. Waltz proposed that relations between states, in 
particular the outbreak of war, could be most effectively understood through the three 
images of the individual, the state, and the international system as a whole. Although 
Waltz argued that the condition of anarchy that prevailed in an interstate system, the third 
image, was the general underlying cause of conflict101, he clearly noted that in particular 
cases it was often interactions between the three images that led to a specific conflict. As 
Waltz presented it “Some combination of our three images, rather than any one of them, 
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may be required for an accurate understanding of international relations…understanding 
the likely consequence of any one cause may depend on understanding its relation to 
other causes.”102  Despite realizing the potential for interaction between these three 
images, Waltz saw them as largely immutable. Although powerful individuals could 
influence the policies of states, they would never be capable of changing the basic 
parameters of the international system.103  Further, the conditions of anarchy would 
always structure states to behave according to certain patterns. Radical breaks that 
reconfigure the international system itself are not possible in the Waltzian framework,104 
with the sole exception of changes in polarity. This blindness to the dynamics of political 
economy and shifts in geoeconomic orders is a great weakness of this approach.105  
Despite Waltz’s major contribution of the structural effect that anarchy has upon 
shaping the relationships between states, his model obscures a number of processes that 
that are crucial to explaining NATO’s current behavior. This is primarily because his 
three-image framework explicitly rules out the formation of new levels or new units that 
are not sovereign states, but composed in a different manner and capable of penetrating 
                                                     
102 Ibid., 14 
103 While having evil or moral political leaders surely has an impact on the course of events and the 
decisions a state makes, it is not the determining factor for Waltz. Human nature for him is not a panacea in 
the matter it is for Morgenthau.  “The importance of human nature as a factor in causal analysis of social 
events is reduced by the fact that the same nature, however defined, has to explain an infinite variety of 
social events.” Ibid., 27 
104 The difficulty in modifying the international system for Waltz becomes apparent through this critique, in 
chapter five, of the policies of European socialist parties immediately preceding and during the First World 
War and in the conclusion where he states that “…the following discussion is not intended to suggest how a 
balance of power analysis now must be different from such an analysis applied to the nineteenth or 
eighteenth centuries, but rather to suggest the fundamental points on which there is continuity despite the 
many and important changes induced by shifts in the distribution of power and transformations in 
technology.” Ibid., 217. Thus, while the content and context of the international system has changed 
drastically over the last three centuries for Waltz, certain interactions remain the same. 
105 A traditional of realist political economy does exist however and is exemplified by the work of Robert 
Gilpin. However the Waltzan contribution to levels of analysis lacks a direct engagement with issues of 
political economy. 
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through levels and reshaping the respective units contained within.  What Waltz’s 
framework obscures is the subtle way that political actors can work between levels, 
altering the interactions occurring within and between states and thus having a systemic 
impact, creating a condition in which anarchy between states becomes manageable, but 
not eliminated.  These are the functions that I see NATO as a global security nexus 
performing. NATO in this formation is inter-scalar; it is operating within and between the 
levels identified by Waltz. NATO’s efforts to build a unified command and control 
framework and promote the sharing of knowledge across its institutions and through its 
members’ security and intelligence services is causing a blurring of the distinction 
between the national and international level.  
Restricting NATO to a single level of interaction therefore makes no sense, 
because NATO is currently impinging across a number of levels. NATO is active at the 
international level, indeed, it is a global security organization, but it is also shaping 
domestic processes of security by encouraging its member’s states to adopt programs that 
allow for their more effective interfacing with the institutional apparatus of NATO. In this 
regard, NATO also challenges the parameters of the structure-agent problematique, 
another dominant methodological approach within International Relations. NATO is 
neither a structure nor an agent; in fact, it manifests the properties of both.106  As a 
structure, NATO shapes the perspectives and priorities of its members by providing a 
comprehensive and overarching security framework. Yet NATO is also an agent, it has a 
                                                     
106 Giddens refers to this phenomenon as the duality of structure where, “…the essential recursiveness of 
social life, as constituted in social practices: structure is both medium and outcome of reproduction of 
practices. Structure enters simultaneously into the constitution of the agents and social practices, and exists 
in the generating moments of this constitution.” Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in social theory: 
Action, Structure, and contradiction in social analysis, (University of California Press, Los Angeles, 1979), 
5. For a systemic analysis and critique of Gidden’s structuration theory see William Sewell, “A Theory of 
Structure: Duality, Agency, and Transformation,” American Journal of Sociology 98 (1992): 1-29. 
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bureaucracy and an institutional apparatus that is concerned with its own self-
perpetuation and as a result has formed its own interests. Therefore, the demand that the 
study of NATO must occur through reference to only a single level of analysis or one side 
of the structure agent dynamic sharply limits the potential for complete analysis of its 
current functions,107 and is reflective of the restricted ontological scope prevalent within 
contemporary IR.108   
In contrast to the approaches outlined above my own methodological framework 
is a flexible one capable of incorporating contrasting and at times contradictory process.  
Central to my approach is comprehending how the contemporary engagements of NATO 
are leading to the formation and closure of space. 109 Yet merely examining the 
production of space obscures the full depth and degree to which NATO is impinging upon 
a multitude of different social processes. It is also necessary to provide a method that 
allows for the discerning of how NATO privileges particular types of interactions over 
                                                     
107 The rigidity of traditional international relations methodology can be traced back, as Latham argues, to 
their dependence upon territory as the sole container for social interactions and its lack of theorizations of 
alternative considerations of space. He argues that “…the fundamental context for the classic level-of-
analysis framework is the set of territorial nation-states and the interactions among them. Yet space itself is 
not an explicitly theorized concept in IR…This is especially problematic, since it is increasingly recognized 
that social and political space can be understood along lines extending beyond the political territoriality of 
nation-states.” 
Robert Latham, “Getting out from Under: Rethinking Security Beyond Liberalism and the Levels of 
Analysis Problem,” Millennium 25 (1996): 99. This opinion is echoed in Johannes Stripple, “The Stuff of 
International Relations? Process philosophy as meta-theoretical reflection on security, territory and 
authority,” Presented at the sixth Pan-European International Relations Conference, Turin Italy 12-15 
September 2007. 
108 Indeed the third ‘great debate’ of international relations that revolved  around the foundational research 
issues of epistemology, ontology and methodology and which pit positivists against reflectivists was never 
substantially resolved. Instead the discipline fractured into a number of different isolated camps. The terms 
of this debate and the resulting schisms is recounted in David Lake, “Theory is dead, long live theory: The 
end of the Great Debates and the rise of eclecticism in international relations,” European Journal of 
International Relations 19 (2013): 567-587. 
109 NATO’s role in the construction of space remains an unexplored topic. The sole existing analysis 
focuses upon NATO’s construction of discursive spaces. See Andreas Behnke, NATO’s Security Discourse 
After the Cold War: Representing the West, (London: Routledge, 2013), 31. My approach differs 
substantially from Behnke’s. 
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others. What is required then is a methodological framework that offers a clear means of 
differentiation that allows for an analysis of how NATO penetrates down several distinct 
fields of social interaction in its creation of a trans-scalar space of intervention and how 
the formation of these spaces establishes a new set of relations in place of prior ones. 
Rooting my analysis of NATO’s role in spatial production within a set of shifting scales 
achieves this purpose by maintaining the dynamism and explanatory potential of my 
methodological approach.110  Both space and scale are the product of social processes, 
but also, through their formation, serve to constrain and privilege certain practices and 
interactions over others.111   
For NATO the efficient and effective application of violence is its primary 
concern. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are simply the latest manner in which the 
violence of NATO is deployed.112  The existence of these spaces is reflective of the 
                                                     
110 Scales overcome the rigidness present in levels of analysis; for this reason then scales then, cannot as 
Moore argues, be equated with levels. Instead he argues that “…treating scales as the given levels, 
platforms or arenas of politics profoundly flattens and distorts a variety of sociospatial processes by erasing 
spatial differences and granularity and oversimplifying the complex, and multiple, spatial positionality of 
social actors and events.” 110 Adam Moore, “Rethinking scale as a geographical category: from analysis to 
practice,” Progress in Human Geography 32 (2008): 212. 
111 The role that social processes, arising as a result of particular material conditions, play in shaping the 
creation of space and scale has been clearly noted by Swyngedouw. “The struggle over the control over 
place produces specific forms of territorial coherence at various scale levels. In short, territory as a social 
relationship is a spatial moment in the historical unfolding of class relationships, while the scale of territory 
defines the spatial moment of control in the struggle in and over space.” E A. Swyngedouw, “The 
Mammon quest: glocalisation, interspatial competition and monetary order: The construction of new spatial 
scales,” in M Dunford and G Kafkalas, eds., Cities and Region in the New Europe: The Global-Local 
Interplay and Spatial Development Strategies. (London: Belhaven Press, 1992), 60.  
112 These spaces, on the surface, appear to resemble what Agamben labeled spaces of exception, where the 
political power is utilized to negate individual rights and where certain subjects no longer have value 
ascribed to them, becoming merely a barrier to the achievement of various political objectives. In 
Agamben’s view, “…the state of exception is a legal civil war that allows for the physical elimination not 
only of political adversaries but of entire categories of citizens who for some reason cannot be integrated 
into the political system." Giorgio Agamben, State of Exception, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2005), 2. The situation which trans-scalar spaces of intervention are meant to contain is different however.  
As opposed to spaces of exception where violence is enacted upon segments of the population in pursuit of 
a comprehensive project of governance, NATO has no interest in governing in the spaces where its 
violence is operative. The elimination of individuals then is, in this instance is detached from the concerns 
of governance. 
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current economic environment of NATO. It is through the procedures of risk 
management, which have been adopted due to the impact of austerity, that a threat is 
identified and the forces of NATO mustered to eliminate it. NATO’s engagement in the 
practice of creating these new spaces is a result of the limited resources available to 
Western states and hence NATO. The growing disinterest by NATO in conducting 
sustained peacekeeping operations, which characterized its interventions during the 
waning years of the 20th and early years of the 21st century, is a direct outgrowth of the 
circumscribed economic conditions it now confronts.  
This chapter presented the argument that the 2007 Global Financial Crisis and the 
subsequent turn to austerity by Western governments had a dramatic effect on NATO. 
The constrained budget NATO was forced to operate with spurred the adoption of risk 
management techniques and sparked a wide-ranging institutional transformation, with the 
Alliance evolving into what I termed a global security nexus. At the tactical level, the 
format of operations that NATO engages in has altered as well, away from sustained 
peacekeeping and towards the creation of what I labeled as trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention. This chapter laid out the broad contours of my argument and provided the 
initial presentation of the core concepts and the overarching methodological approach 
that will guide my analysis. The following chapters will expand upon and root these ideas 
within their historical and material condition.   
 
 
 
 
48 
 
CHAPTER 2 
THE END OF THE COLD WAR AND NATO’S SEARCH FOR PURPOSE IN THE 
1990S AND BEYOND 
This chapter will position NATO within its historic context and argue that it has 
played a crucial role in rreproducing the West both materially and ideationally. I will do 
so by first detailing how NATO operated under the logic of collective defense during the 
Cold War and not only bound together the states of Europe and North America in a 
cohesive configuration of power but in doing so served as a platform that aided in the 
global projection of American power.  The primary focus of this chapter however will be 
not upon how NATO operated during the Cold War, but how it struggled to respond to its 
sudden end. I will trace the process of slow and halting internal reform that NATO 
underwent throughout the 1990s as it fumbled towards becoming the global security 
nexus that it is today with risk management and out of area operations core parts of the 
Alliance.  The United States, as I will demonstrate, was central to this transformation, 
constantly pushing NATO to adopt a more global configuration and take on a wider 
security role. NATO’s European members, in contrast, were far more cautious fearing 
that such a change would lead to a de-emphasis of European security concerns in favor of 
more diffuse global issues. That the United States succeeded in eventually overcoming 
this hesitation illustrates the substantial influence that it has within NATO. By detailing 
the shifts in the ideational and material priorities of NATO, following the end of the Cold 
War this chapter provides an overview of the state of the Alliance prior to the 2007 
Global Financial Crisis.  
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NATO: Constructing World Order and Representing the West 
Forged in the crucible of the Cold War NATO was designed to ensure the 
collective defense of its members. On paper, NATO is an alliance of equals, but the 
United States has always occupied a central role in the Alliance, largely determining its 
orientation and the scope of activities. American influence in NATO derives from the 
simple fact the majority of the cost of running NATO is bore by the United States, which 
provides roughly three quarters of NATO’s budget.113 From the era of collective defense 
during the Cold War, on its mutation into a global nexus the United States has maintained 
its commitment to NATO. The reason, as John Kornblum, US senior deputy to the 
undersecretary of state for European affairs, succulently explains is simple. “The Alliance 
provides a vehicle for the application of American power and vision to the security order 
in Europe.”114 NATO was deemed to be an important organ for the maintaining the 
cohesiveness of Western power because it served to entrench American hegemonic power 
by providing a recognized forum for trans-Atlantic military interactions. 
Yet NATO also played a key role in constructing an image of the West that could 
be projected around the world. The heavy emphasis that NATO placed on the promotion 
of Western values separated it from prior defensive arrangements. Although Gress may 
overstate the ideological function of NATO somewhat by declaring that, “Within the 
Western community itself, NATO's political and cultural role as the institutional cement 
                                                     
113 The United States provides roughly 25 percent of the funding in each of NATO’s three major budget 
lines. See Carl Ek, “NATO Common Funds Burdensharing: Background and Current Issues,” (Washington 
DC: Congressional Research Office, 2012), 9. 
114 John Kornblum, “NATO’s Second Half-Century, Tasks of an Alliance,” NATO on Track for the 21st 
Century, Conference Report, (The Hague: Netherlands Atlantic Commission, 1994), 14. This argument also 
matches the one made by Waltz to explain the reasons for NATO’s continued existence after passing of the 
Cold War, that the United States had determined that it was in its national interest, an incorrect conclusion 
according to Waltz, to keep NATO functioning. Kenneth Waltz, “Structural Realism after the Cold War,” 
International Security 25 (2000): 5-41. 
50 
 
of what people began calling the Atlantic civilization was more important than its 
military role.”115 NATO has always served to both project and embody Western values. 
NATO is the archetypical security community116 whose compatible values and mutual 
responsiveness reinforce its continued viability.117 Of course, as Deutsch recognized, 
shared values and a general cultural understanding were not the sole reason for the 
creation of the North Atlantic security community. The hegemonic role played by the 
United States was pivotal to its construction.118 Despite the power of the United States, 
the domestic values and norms of other members have impinged upon and influenced the 
direction of NATO, generating a greater collective identity. 119 The strength of these ties 
is the reason behind NATO’s continued existence after the end of the Cold War.  
 NATO not only provides a dense and complex framework that establishes and 
regulates a mode of behavior amongst its members, it produces abstract and applied 
forms of knowledge that informs its strategic understanding of the world. In doing so 
NATO serves as means of coherently organizing Western power at a transnational 
scale.120 As the world’s premier military alliance for over six decades, NATO has an 
                                                     
115 David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the West and its opponents. (New York: The Free Press, 
1998), 423. 
116 Indeed NATO continues to be studied as a security community. See Thomas Risse-Kappen, “Collective 
Identity in a Democratic Community: The Case of NATO,” in Peter Katzenstein, ed., The Culture of 
National Security Norms and Identity in world politics (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 357-
400. Frank Schimmelfennig, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” Security Studies 8 
(1998): 198-234. 
117 Karl Deutsch, Political Community and the North Atlantic Area: International Organization in the Light 
of Historical Experience (New York: Greenwood Press, 1957), 123-133.  
118 Ibid., 138. 
119 This has been noted in Simon Koschut, “Transatlantic conflict management inside-out: the impact of 
domestic norms on regional security practices,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs 27 (2014): 339-
361. 
120 I have chosen to employ the concept of epistemic communities rather than rely upon the far more 
popular regime theory, because I feel that the latter suffers from a number of deficiencies and was designed 
to response to different circumstances than the ones I am concerned with. Regime theory, at least in its 
initial formulation, was an analysis of how a liberal world economic order would survive the perceived 
decline of American power in the 1970s and 1980s. See Robert Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation 
and Discord in the World, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984). It did not have much to say about 
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extensive institutional apparatus and a wealth of institutional and professional memory to 
draw upon. It also retains extensive material support, with the world’s sole remaining 
superpower as a member, along with many of the largest and most productive economies 
in the world. Further, despite the recent wave of defense cutbacks in 2014 NATO will still 
account for 56 percent of total worldwide defense spending.121 NATO then clearly speaks 
with an authoritative voice on security issues. How NATO defines the problems it faces 
and the solutions it proposes to them have far-reaching implications. 
The argument that NATO plays an important role in both producing and 
representing the West is not a new one. However, when scholars have discussed this topic 
the crux of their analysis has usually been upon NATO’s wider cultural role, especially 
how it reinforces the ontological boundaries of the West, while largely ignoring its 
epistemological significance. Behnke’s approach is indicative of this trend. As he 
presents it, “NATO’s task to represent the West is not only an ontological challenge in 
that this cultural identity needs to be rearticulated in the absence of its constitutive other. 
It is also a challenge to the very idea that cultural identities can be universal, that in other 
words, they can define sites from which all other cultural articulations can be truthfully 
assessed in terms of their correspondence to history.”122 While this style of approach is 
useful in drawing out how closely the ideas of the West and NATO are interrelated, I 
                                                     
issues of international security. Further, while learning and the ability to alter state behavior are central to 
regime theory, its focus is on diffuse sets of rules and norms, instead on the creation of a new conceptual 
apparatus and strategic frame by a single organization. A definition of regimes that matches this description 
can be found in Stephen Krasner, “Structural Causes and Regime Consequences: Regimes as Intervening 
Variables,” International Organization 36 (1982): 186.  Finally regime theory adopts a technical approach 
and eludes the issue of power relations, a concern that is central to my research. For an expansion of this 
argument see Susan Strange, “Cave! Hic Dragones: A Critique of Regime Analysis,” in Stephen Krasner, 
ed., International Regimes, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1983, 337-354. 
121Anders Rasmussen, “Secretary General’s Annual Report 2012,”  (NATO, January 31, 2013) 
122 Andreas Behnke, “NATO’s Security Discourse After the Cold War: Representing the West, (London: 
Routledge, 2013), 3. A similar approach is adopted in David Gress, From Plato to NATO: The Idea of the 
West and its Opponents, (New York: Free Press, 2004). 
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want to move past what is largely a discursive frame of analysis to an examination of 
how the strategic logics of NATO have evolved over time. In tracing these changes, I 
believe it is useful to classify NATO as an epistemic community because it offers a 
coherent means of illustrating the connections between abstract concepts like collective 
defense and risk management and material transformations. Positing that NATO is an 
epistemic community provides a more integrated method for understanding how it is 
continually recreating a Western led world order. 
NATO’s operations and actions have always been driven by an elaboration of a 
form of knowledge that provides logic and coherence to its actions. The construction of 
world order123 and the maintenance of global capitalism is a continual process that is 
never truly solidified. As a socio-economic system, capitalism is inherently unpredictable 
and constantly subject to disarray.124 The continual (re)construction of the circuits of 
capital accumulation requires the production of new forms of knowledge and the 
elaboration of new conceptual frames that can apply this knowledge to ontological 
existence.125  Doing so allows so not only makes the world comprehensible, but also 
                                                     
123 Agnew and Corbridge provide a useful starting point for considering what world order entails, “…order 
refers to the routinized rules, institutions, activities and strategies through which the international political 
economy operates in different historical periods.” John Agnew and Stuart Corbridge, Mastering Space: 
Hegemony, Territory and International Political Economy, (London: Routledge, 1995), 15. 
124 Marx noted the tendency for contradictions to form which lay the groundwork for future crises in 
numerous writings, most notably in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, The Communist Manifesto, (London: 
Penguin, 1967), 224-225. See Karl Marx, Capital Volume I, (London: Penguin, 1976), 209. Karl Marx, 
Capital Volume 3, (London: Penguin, 1981), 969-970. Discussion of this tendency extends to Keynesians 
influenced by Marx; see Hyman Minsky, “The Financial Instability Hypothesis,” Levy Economics Institute 
Working Paper No.74, May 1992, 6-8; along with non-Marxist heterodox economists, Joseph Schumpeter, 
Capitalism, Socialism, and Democracy, (Whitefish: Kessinger, 2010), 103. 
125 The world must be made safe for global capital. This requires that strategies be developed that create the 
conditions which allow for the continued accumulation of capital. A stable and predictable environment is a 
prerequisite for most forms of capital accumulation. Thus, the state strives to create a legal framework that 
provides a mechanism for resolving disputes and hold a monopoly of violence within its own territory 
which is utilized to protect property relations. At the global level organizations such as NATO maintain a 
particular Western framework of power that assists in regulating global interactions and favors some 
capitals over others. The actions which NATO takes in defense of the West require that it comprehends the 
contemporary conjecture, which requires an epistemological method, and that it possess the capabilities, 
53 
 
provides guidance to the actors that reside in a world over-determined by the relations of 
capital.126 The formation of an epistemological framework is thus a prerequisite for 
meaningful action within the world.127   
 In carrying out its geopolitical role to buttress Western power NATO brings 
together networks of professionals with recognized knowledge and skills in security 
issues thereby forming an epistemic community.128  Epistemic communities offer a means 
of comprehending the intertwining of knowledge and power within international 
organizations by providing a method for determining how international organizations 
recognize their interests and make decisions.129 In order to function international 
organizations must be able to analyze and comprehend their environment.130 As Cross 
                                                     
along with the ontological awareness, to act in a manner which defends the interests at stake. Thus in this 
instance epistemology and otology are linked through the provision of security in the defense of a particular 
set of socio-economic relations. The relationship between epistemology and ontology in this instance is not 
positivist, as the form of knowledge produced is not “objective” but is determined by the structures and 
interests of the organization. Further discussion of this issue can be found in John Ruggie, Constructing the 
World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization, (London: Routledge, 1998), 95-97. 
126 NATO is a product of and acts within a world shaped at every level by capital relations. A single 
geopolitical event that NATO may be forced to confront is determined by multiple causes, many of which 
may be related to the process of capital accumulation.  For further discussion of how capital relations 
overdetermine social phenomenon. See Louis Althusser, For Marx, (London: Verso, 2005), 87-128.  
127 Gramsci spoke of this at the individual level when he noted that “…everyone, in his own way, is a 
philosopher,  no normal human being of sound mind exists who does not participate, even if unconsciously, 
in some particular conception of the world.” See Antonio Gramsci, Prison Notebooks Volume 3, ed., Joseph 
Buttigieg, (New York: Columbia University Press, 2007), 352. This is also applicable to complex 
transnational organizations such as NATO. In order to function they themselves must possess a particular 
conception of the world. 
128 Hass defines them as “…networks of professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a 
particular domain and an authoritative claim to relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area.” Peter 
Haas, “Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination,” International 
Organization 46 (1992): 3. Haas was responsible for popularizing this concept within international 
relations. 
129 John Ruggie, “What Makes the World Hang Together?,” International Organization 52 (1998): 855-
886. Here Ruggie employs the concept of epistemic communities and examines how they conflict with 
habit formation within international organizations. 
130 This task is crucial. If international organizations cease to analyze the international environment they 
cease to exist. Haas concurs with this assessment arguing that, “…international organizations are hyper 
dependent on their environments; they can hardly be distinguished from their environments.” Ernst Haas, 
When Knowledge is Power: Three Models of Change in International Organizations, (Berkeley: University 
of California Press, 1990), 27.  
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argues, epistemic communities make sense of the world. He states, “One cannot assume a 
priori that facts have a fixed interpretation, objects have a given value, and actor 
preferences are inherent. Epistemic communities are an actor that helps to assign 
meaning to things.”131 Epistemic communities construct reality based upon the 
conceptual framework that they employ and the analytical tools utilized. Depending upon 
their influence epistemic communities cannot only set the conditions by which their 
members interact in the world, but as Ruggie notes, they can set the contours of 
international society itself. By shaping intentions, expectations, symbols, behavioral 
rules, and points of reference epistemic communities “…delimit the proper construction 
of social reality for its members, and if successful, for international society.”132 This is 
certainly the case for NATO, as its impact now extends far beyond its membership or 
regional area of operations to effect the strategic calculations and organizational logics of 
states across the globe.133   
Epistemic communities, like NATO, play a key role in transnationalizing their 
areas of concern. 134 The connections they create between other actors across the globe 
give rise to new structures of governance. Cross argues that “Epistemic communities are 
at the forefront of recognized trends towards transnational governance, and they are a 
                                                     
131 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later,” Review of International 
Studies 39 (2013): 149. 
132 John Ruggie, “International Responses to Technology: Concepts and Trends,” International 
Organization 29 (1975): 570. 
133 The formation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in 2001 can be read as an attempt to counter 
the influence of NATO in Central Asia. See Adam Castillo, “SCO: Rise of NATO East?,” Diplomatic 
Courier August 18, 2008.  
134 Global economic governance and transnational activism are just two of countless areas in which 
epistemic communities have promoted transnational linkages. For further detail on each area see Marie-
Laure Djelic and Sigrid Quack, Transnational Communities and Governance: Shaping Global Economic 
Governance, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010). Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, 
Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
1998). 
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major means by which knowledge translates into power.”135 Since its foundation NATO 
has been a transnational security actor, weaving together the fates of Western Europe and 
North America. Over its decades of existence, NATO has created an elaborate and 
extensive framework of knowledge that has informed and influenced the strategic 
orientation of the organization and its membership. 
The conceptualization of NATO as an epistemic community that I have presented 
above is a broad understanding of the term that conflicts with how it is has often been 
narrowly interpreted to apply only to the production of scientific and technical 
knowledge.136 However, I believe that my interpretation can serve as a useful concept for 
understanding the interactions presently occurring within NATO as well as their wider 
ramifications. Indeed Cross has argued that epistemic communities can be applied to 
understand high-level military interactions.  He writes, “…specific groups of high 
ranking military officials who interact transnationally have the potential to form 
epistemic communities by virtue of their shared professional norms and expertise as long 
as they seek collective policy goals as a result of these policies.”137 NATO clearly 
satisfies these characteristics as it constantly adapts to changes in the international 
environment by formulating responses that offer comprehensive guidance to its 
membership.  
NATO does not simply statically reproduce the values of its members, rather it 
promotes social learning amongst its members, fostering the creation and acceptance of 
                                                     
135 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later,” Review of International 
Studies 39 (2013): 138. 
136 For example see Clair Gough and Simon Shackley,” The Respectable politics of climate change: the 
epistemic communities and NGOs,” International Affairs 77 (2001): 329-346. 
137 Mai’a K. Davis Cross, “Rethinking epistemic communities twenty years later,” Review of International 
Studies 39 (2013): 156. 
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new norms and establishing a new collective identity amongst members.138 NATO then, 
is far more than the sum of its parts, if it was it would merely be an alliance of Western 
states. Instead, NATO, as Rasmussen argues, has come to represent the collective identity 
of the West. “Whereas the West is a collective identity that shapes the actions of certain 
governments on a wide range of issues, NATO has become the pivot of Western security. 
It institutionalizes a collective identity at the same time as it provides the military and 
political infrastructure for its member governments to act in concert.”139 As the 
overarching security architecture of the West, NATO has sought to protect Western 
interests and maintain its preeminence as the world's most powerful collection of states. 
Ensuring the collective defense of its members has been, for much of NATO's history, 
how it primarily achieved these goals. 
Formulating a Strategic Logic: The Basis of Collective Defense 
The essence of NATO's collective defense doctrine is contained in article five of 
its founding treaty, which declares that, “The parties agree that an armed attack against 
one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against 
them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs that each of 
them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense... will assist the Party 
or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other 
Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and 
                                                     
138A perspective shared by Alder and Barnett “…the emergence of collective identities is prompted by 
learning processes that occur within institutionalized settings, and subsequently lead to changes in 
cognitive structures. In an event, the processes that develop are critical for the development of a security 
community.” Emanuel Alder and Michael Barnett, “A Framework for the study of security communities,” 
in Emanuel Adler and Michael Barnett, eds., Security Communities, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1998), 45. 
139 Mikkel Rasmussen, “Reflective Security: NATO and International Risk Society,” Millennium 30 (2001): 
295. 
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maintain the security of the North Atlantic area.”140 In this regard, NATO would appear to 
be simply a regular defensive alliance, in the mold of the Concert of Vienna, aimed at 
maintaining an equilibrium of power on the European continent.141 However, as Thies 
notes, NATO is distinctive from previous military alliances, because despite the Soviet 
threat providing the impetus for its formation, it always sought to be more than simply a 
reaction to a single danger. As he observes “...pre-1939 alliances were often little more 
than temporary arrangements created to address a particular need, typically to launch an 
attack or repel one, after which they were disbanded or rendered inoperative. The Atlantic 
Alliance, in contrast, was intended to be both permanent and open ended...”142 NATO 
then was always viewed by its membership an integral part of the postwar liberal world 
order.143 The structure that NATO would come to assume and the security logics it would 
employ were an outgrowth of its immersion within the wider postwar liberal world 
order.144   
In terms of military strategy, collective defense is a mechanism that allied states 
employ to guarantee their own security and the perpetuation of a particular form of world 
order. It involves aligning the foreign policies of member states along with the sharing of 
information on potential threats to members of the collective defense arrangement. Yet, as 
I will show, collective defense extended beyond the realm of strategy generating an 
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epistemological framework that determined the ontological path available to NATO 
during the Cold War. The central purpose of a collective defense posture is to deter 
attacks by states outside the collective defense framework upon member states.  The 
desire to achieve the heightened security offered by a collective defense arrangement is 
what initially brought NATO member states together. It is important however to draw 
attention to the fact that NATO is, in its organizational sense, not a collective defense 
organization. Rather, it should be classified as a collective security organization. As Rupp 
argues, a collective security organization interacts with the world in a fundamentally 
different manner than states that are simply parties to a collective defense agreement. He 
makes the point that “Collective defense is far less ambitious than collective security. 
Whereas collective security seeks large-scale memberships, and seeks to unite diverse 
states against threats to peace, collective defense binds a limited number of states sharing 
the view that a particular state, or states, threatens the vital interests of each of them.”145 
While NATO was formed to ensure the collective defense of its members, its promotion 
of a shared cultural understanding of the world, meant that NATO developed into a 
collective security organization, seeking to protect the interests of its member states 
wherever they are threatened.146 NATO came to practice a limited form of collective 
security, in contrast to the aspirations of the global form of collective security sought by 
the United Nations. While NATO then is in a technical sense a collective security 
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organization to maintain conceptual clarity I will primarily refer to NATO in this chapter 
as operating under the logic of collective defense, as this was the term used by NATO to 
designate its primary strategic doctrine. 
 At its heart, collective defense is about maintaining the status quo. It seeks to 
minimize and contain disruptions and achieve a stable and predictable form of 
geopolitics. Collective defense seeks to restrict changes to the current world order, but 
ironically, this serves to induced blindness to potential sources of change, as Pick and 
Critchley note: “Inherently, collective defense shares the weakness of all status quo 
oriented systems by ignoring the dynamics of political, social, and economic change. 
Change, and the management of change are the stuff of politics, an essentially static 
system becomes unreal...collective security is rigid and inflexible.”147 Collective defense 
envisions a perpetual extension of the present, a world in which, through concerted and 
concentrated action, the avenues of metamorphosis can be foreclosed as they emerge. 
This ability is based upon the assumption that threats to the present order are clearly 
perceptible.  
 During the Cold War, a narrow spectrum of threats confronted NATO and Western 
powers. The clearly discernible and rigid geopolitical framing of the Cold War, of two 
superpowers and their allies confronting one another, determined the forms of knowledge 
and analytical tools that were developed to comprehend this situation and provide 
strategic guidance to NATO and other relevant actors. Those tasked with making these 
assessments were also drawn from a specific subset of institutions that further constrained 
the epistemological framework that was produced during this period. 
During the Cold War, geopolitical risk analysis was the monopoly of an 
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establishment community of intellectuals of defence and statecraft. It was their 
job to survey the surface of world affairs, identify dangers and calculate risks. The 
larger narrative that enframed their work as risk analysts was the struggle between 
the two geopolitical superpowers and their allies. Risks within this narrative were 
mapped onto both territory and otherness, the clearly identifiable territorial home 
of one’s geopolitical antagonist, and the overdetermined otherness that made this 
antagonist the enemy.148 
Collective defense was patterned upon a dual set of relationships: the internal dialogues 
between members of the epistemic community of NATO and other related bodies and 
their external connection to the geopolitical binary of the Cold War. The manner in which 
collective defense was understood and employed by NATO throughout the Cold War 
grew out of these relationships and informed NATO’s behavior during this period.    
By internalizing the logic of collective defense, NATO would predicate its 
operations upon a particular set of procedures that would determine the possible spectrum 
of actions available to it.  Collective defense served to generate a strategic rubric for 
NATO that was based upon certain assumptions about world order. In assuming a largely 
static world order, collective defense presupposes that the threats which emerge can be 
easily perceived and that quickly contained. Cimbala makes this assertion noting “…this 
theory assumes that in most interstate conflict situations one can determine with 
reasonable clarity the identity of the aggressor and the defender. The identity of the 
aggressor established, it follows that the member states will permit their forces to be used 
to reestablish international order according to the status quo...”149 Collective defense is 
both a means of deterrence and a reactive approach to inter-state conflict. Ideally, under 
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the logic of collective defense, potential aggressors will not challenge the interests of 
those who are party to a collective defense arrangement, because they are aware that 
doing so would provoke the reaction of the entire group of states that are subject to the 
agreement. If however a party does attempt to act against the interests of the members of 
a collective defense arrangement, the doctrine assumes that the forces of the allied 
member states can be marshaled to prevent the realization of the aggressor’s goals before 
irreparable damage is caused to their interests.  This was the strategic frame that NATO 
functioned within during the decades of the Cold War. Collective defense created an 
acceptable and clearly defined range of actions available to NATO based upon 
international developments; in doing so it set the parameters of NATO’s ontological 
existence.  
 Not only were the threats that NATO assumed that it would face during the Cold 
War easily discernible and emerging from a clearly identified rival, but the type of threats 
that would emerge to challenge NATO were considered to be highly circumscribed. The 
threats that NATO was tasked with responding to were the traditional issues of high 
politics that concerned the very survival and future viability of its members.150 The 
referent object of security151 was thus quite constricted, with the ever-present possibility 
of imminent nuclear annihilation focusing the minds of policy makers and military 
professionals upon a restricted set of concerns. This is an assessment that Gilpin concurs 
with when he states, “During the Cold War, the United States and its allies generally 
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subordinated potential economic conflicts within the alliance to the interests of political 
and security cooperation. Their emphasis on security interests and alliance cohesion 
provided the political glue that held the world economy together.”152 Security issues, 
understood in this sense, were of paramount importance during the Cold War. NATO was 
a central component of the post-war liberal world order constructed by the West during 
the Cold War to confront the Soviet Union and its allies. The binary opposition between 
the superpowers and the wider geopolitical realities of the period provided the impetus 
for NATO’s formation and established both its epistemological scope and ontological 
characteristics. 
The security guarantee provided by NATO was just one element of a far vaster 
apparatus that was constructed under the guidance of the United States in the post war 
period.153 This included not only the Bretton Woods institutions, but also sustained 
connections at innumerable levels through organizations such as the G7 and OECD that 
as Cox argued fostered a systemic level of understanding between Western states. As he 
argues, “Adjustments were thus perceived as responding to the needs of the system as a 
whole and not to the will of dominant countries. External pressures upon national policies 
were accordingly internationalized…Not only were pressures on state behavior within 
this power structure internationalized, they were also, through ideological osmosis, 
internalized into the thinking of participants.”154 NATO played a crucial role in this wider 
dynamic by providing a mechanism that coordinated interactions across Western 
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militaries and arrayed them in a coherent fashion against the Soviet Union. While the 
liberal post-war order largely effectively responded to the challenges posed by the Cold 
War, it was caught completely unaware by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
sudden removal of the conditions that had both given rise to its initial formation existence 
and sustained a particular framework of power for decades.    
The transition between geoeconomic orders and the redefining of security 
The passing of the historical moment of the Cold War and the transition to an 
uncertain post-Cold War future would have far reaching ramifications; a new world order 
would have to be constructed.155  Latham explains the scale of transformation that can 
occur as one historical moment fades away and a new one is brought into view. He 
asserts, “…periods or even episodes when routines tend to fall away or are smashed, 
creating the opportunity for the construction of either new relations and structures or the 
reestablishment of old ones in relatively new terms. This type of period is what I mean by 
a historical moment.”156 As the overarching security framework of the West NATO 
sought during the Cold War to deter the threat of the Soviet Union, while also projecting 
an appealing vision of world order based upon liberal norms. The collapse of the bipolar 
system that defined the Cold War drastically altered the security environment rendering 
obsolete many of the security calculations and logics that were crafted in this era. The 
spread of neoliberal rationalities after the end of the Cold War provoked a general spatial 
reordering that resulted in the production of new forms of space and the decline of 
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territory as a site of strategic calculation. On the economic side, the raft of regional free 
trade and investment agreements signed throughout the 1990s provided a form of order to 
capital flows and consumer goods in a world that had globalized under the precepts of 
neoliberal economic policy.157 Alongside this, threats were becoming ever more diffuse 
and unpredictable as the political and economic structures of the Cold War collapsed and 
the logics of neoliberalism were extended and solidified in their place.158 While these 
agreements provided regularity to these new flows and offered a dispute mechanism159 to 
settle conflicts, they also served to alter spatial relations. The penetration of capital 
transformed legal, social, and political frameworks in a manner that favored the 
reproduction of Western hegemony. In doing so, they served to privilege hierarchies 
already present within the international system160 and reordered spatial relations.  
These agreements can thus be read as a strategy of Western states to solidify their 
own economic power, and should be interpreted, as Sparke argues, as a form of 
geoeconomic practice. He states that “…geoeconomics can be understood not just as a 
description of a certain style of economically oriented geopolitics, but also as a form of 
spatial strategy…Geoeconomics is useful as a term insofar as it allows us to name an 
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array of quotidian assumptions and practices that emerge out of the context of free trade 
and the resulting force of borderless economic flows.”161 While the formation of new 
economic forces would impinge upon the contemporary manifestation of space, the 
collapse of the geopolitical boundaries that had defined the Cold War would also have a 
significant impact upon these processes. The end of the Cold War meant the end of the 
bipolar system that had structured and overdetermined international interactions for 
decades. Not only was the old division between East and West surpassed, but also a 
multitude of new states emerged from the collapse of the Soviet Union.162 The 
bewilderment in Western capitals as the full magnitude and speed at which the world was 
changing became clear would soon be matched by an effort to prefigure these changes in 
a manner that aligned with their interests. This would entail not only adjustments in 
defense budgets and the promotion of more technological solutions in the elusive search 
for greater precision in military affairs but a reconceptualization of what security itself 
meant. 
A central concern that occupied NATO in the immediate post-Cold War years was 
whether it should expand to include states formally members of the Soviet led Warsaw 
Pact, retain its current membership, or even if it should still continue to exist.163 Many 
former American policymakers were opposed to NATO’s expansion eastward arguing 
that doing so would violate an agreement the United States had reached with Russia in 
1990 that had promised no expansion would occur. Concerns were also raised that the 
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enlargement of NATO would destabilize the delicate balance of power in Europe by 
angering Russia and threatening its rapprochement with the West.164 These misgivings 
have been borne out as the current hostility of Russia to Western interests largely stems 
from the violation of this agreement. Indeed Russian President Vladimir Putin has 
explicitly mentioned NATO’s expansion as a central reason for Russia’s stridently anti-
Western orientation.165  
     The decision by the Clinton Administration to push for NATO expansion166 was due, 
as Vice President Al Gore argued, to the fear that without a new project for the Alliance 
to engage in it would rapidly become irrelevant and fade away.  
Everyone realizes that a military alliance, when faced with a fundamental change 
in the threat for which it was founded, wither must define a convincing new 
rationale or become decrepit. Everyone knows that economic and political 
organizations must now adapt to new circumstance-including acceptance of new 
members-or be exposed as mere bastions of privilege.167 
The disappearance of NATO was not in the interest of the United States, because without 
NATO, the trans-Atlantic security link between America and Europe would be lost and 
the United States would see its influence sharply decline on the continent. NATO 
enlargement thus became a way to justify its continued existence until the formal 
acceptance of out of area operations and the evolution of the Alliance from a regional to a 
global security organization at the end of the 1990s provided it with a new sense of 
purpose that would carry it into the 21st century. 
     Beyond the debate over expansion two major interlocking trends effected Western 
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defense, sectors and therefore NATO in the years immediately following the end of the 
Cold War. The first was a general cut in defense budgets, referred to as the “peace 
dividend” due to the West’s victory in the Cold War. From 1990 to 1997, NATO saw a 25 
percent reduction in its military strength due to cuts in the defense budgets of member 
states.168 Although this would weaken NATO for a brief period the impact of these 
budget reductions would soon be reversed as the United States and other members 
increased their contributions to NATO’s common fund in order to prepare for its 
expansion into Eastern and Central Europe by the end of the decade.169  
The second factor was what became known as the Revolution in Military Affairs 
(RMA).170 The rapid success of American and coalition in the first Gulf War with their 
application of intense airpower and usage of latest technology were seen as heralding a 
new era of combat.171 While a wealth of discussion occurred about the need to 
continually innovate the armed forces by incorporating new technological developments 
to create nimble forces capable of responding to threats across the globe the effect of 
these discussions upon actual policy was minimal.172 Owens concurs on this issues when 
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he states that “…despite the rhetoric that filled military journals and public 
pronouncements about new eras, peace dividends, and military revolutions, the U.S 
military was quite happy to avoid rapid change. The Pentagon was not really interested in 
pushing a revolution in military affairs, and few in other parts of the executive branch or 
in Congress were either.”173 The manner in which war was conceived may have 
undergone some alterations, but the way it was practiced by the United States and its 
NATO allies remained largely the same.  
Despite the West emerging stronger than ever from the Cold War a deep sense of 
unease permeated amongst academics and policymakers about what lay ahead. 174  In 
contrast to the Cold War era in which the dangers were clearly discernible, the Soviet 
Union and aligned countries, the threats now faced by the West were now more elusive 
and complex. Buzan, reflecting on how the emerging post-Cold War order would differ 
from the previous forty years of Cold War engagement posited that states would face an 
expanding and diverse range of challenges in the future. He claims, “...the new security 
agenda will be considerably less monolithic and global, and considerably more diverse, 
regional and local in character than the one...Although there will be some shared issues, 
in the post-Cold War world the security agenda will vary markedly from actor to actor in 
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terms of both the issues and priorities.”175 The proliferation of a range of non-traditional 
security threats, such as ethnic conflict, state fragmentation, health and environmental 
issues seemed to illustrate that the Cold War had contained and subsumed a wide range of 
issues under the dynamics of great power rivalry.176 This provoked a vigorous debate 
over what the concept of security itself meant in the post-Cold War world with the lines 
drawn between those who favored widening the concept of security to include a vast new 
range of issues and those who sought to limit it to traditional topics of military strategy.177  
This debate was largely settled in favor of those who sought an expanded 
conception of security. Since the end of the Cold War, how security the manner in which 
security has been conceived has both scaled up and broadened out. Academically this 
dynamic has been analyzed under the rubric of non-traditional security challenges.178 
Terrorism, climate change, infectious diseases, transnational crime and illegal migration, 
are all examples of non-traditional security challenges. Although these threats all existed 
during the Cold War, the end of the great power dynamic that characterized that period 
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led to these threats receiving increased attention from security analysts and transnational 
security organizations. These threats are all inherently transnational and highly 
unpredictable. The response to them by security actors has resulted in, as Hameiri and 
Jones note, “…the attempt to rescale security’s spaces, discourses, and management from 
the national level to a range of new spatial, political, and/or institutional arenas, in 
alignment with the interests, strategies, and ideologies of key actors, further transforming 
state apparatuses.”179 This realignment of scales is shaped then by the understandings of 
the actors involved in this process and should be understood as an ongoing and dynamic 
economic and political process.  
This generalized rescaling of security has as two primary elements. First, the 
locus of security has scaled upwards, with the transnational arena, in many instances, 
achieving precedence over other scales. Second, and concurrent to this process, is a 
broadening of what is considered an object of security.180 Transnational organizations 
like NATO were well positioned to take advantage of these shifting dynamics.181 Indeed 
an expansion in the institutional capacities of NATO occurred throughout the 1990s due 
to the seemingly new spectrum of threats that had emerged.182  
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With the waning of the Cold War and the gradual emergence of a new fractious 
geoeconomic order, policymakers were confronted with a multifaceted and complex 
range of challenges. Coinciding with this process governance mechanisms underwent a 
process of change, with the formation of new assemblages of governance that are no 
longer articulated in a singular unified fashion based upon a specific territorial domain or 
a set of rights and duties derived from a national actor.183 Scholars such as Aydinli have 
argued that it is now at the transnational level that the geopolitical tone is being set and 
the interactions with the most wide reaching scope are generated.  Aydinli writes, 
“…arguably the most interest and evolutionary developments in world affairs, leaps in 
global mobility, new organizational formats, the construction of new patterns, rules, and 
forms of engagement between various actors are taking place within the transnational 
space…”184 This ongoing dynamic makes transnational security organization such as 
NATO more relevant than ever.185  The sheer complexity and unpredictability of the 
current period raises the value of institutional architectures that are capable of binding 
together a diverse array of political actors, who on their own may lack the capabilities to 
formulate a coherent strategy to an often-perplexing geopolitical environment. 
NATO has been largely successful in creating a transnational space of interaction 
between its members, through extending and deepening dialogical engagement amongst 
its membership and beyond. In doing so NATO not only generates regularized 
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procedures and institutionalizes a particular pattern of relationships around specific issue 
areas, something common to all international organizations, it also transnationalizes 
concerns that initially were solely national and recasts them within a new transnational 
problematic. NATO did this in its early decades, weaving a transnational security 
discourse and integrating the fractiousness states of Western Europe in the wake of the 
Cold War.186 A similar process occurred after its conclusion in Eastern Europe. Gheciu, 
for example, traces the dynamic that occurred as NATO expanded eastward in the wake 
of the Cold War.  
By encouraging repeated identification with the group within the framework of a 
broad array of activities, NATO sought to create an enduring sense of oneness 
among Western and Eastern civilians and military officers. This was accompanied 
by a similarly systemic effort to perpetuate the sense of collective identity through 
extensive alumni networks…This, it was assumed, would lead students to 
promote those same norms and values in the future, and to work with their 
transnational contacts to overcome domestic obstacles to change.187  
The systemic effort to extend the values of the North Atlantic security community and 
integrate Eastern Europe states within NATO’s security architecture was successful. In 
doing so aspects of the traditional national and international divide were overcome with 
the external security of these new member states now becoming the interest of NATO as 
a whole, and hence transnationalized across the organization. This process continues 
today, with NATO continuing to function as a site of transnational synthesis that 
amalgamates the national and international concerns of its member states.  
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This transition is not a radical break with past practice for NATO. Rather the 
rescaling and a broadening of its security apparatuses emphasize tendencies that have 
been present since its foundation. As a security community, NATO facilitates deep and 
extensive relationships between its members, which succeeded in turning national 
security concerns into collective and hence transnational concerns shared by the entire 
membership. As Thies recounts NATO members, “…gradually found themselves 
enmeshed in a collective effort requiring an unprecedented degree of strategic 
collaboration in peacetime and an unprecedented degree of intrusiveness by various 
NATO committees and planning groups into national policies and plans.”188 This of 
course was not a linear process free of discord,189 but the strength of these relationships is 
demonstrated by NATO’s continued endurance when its original purpose, containing the 
Soviet Union has long since been fulfilled. 
  The ideational strength of NATO means that it is more than just a forum that 
grants its members a wider avenue to pursue their own interests. While NATO is a 
creature of its members, it is does not simply reproduce their disparate national interests 
on a wider stage. Instead, NATO alters the conditions and perspectives of its members, 
generating a new transnational perspective amongst them. NATO then is responsible for 
constituting an expansive intersubjective process. As Kitchen writes, “The Atlantic 
community is intersubjective. It is not simply the sum of the identities of its member’s 
states, but exists in the spaces between them and is constitutive of them.”190 However, the 
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ability of NATO to fashion a collective identity amongst its members is not replicated in 
empirical effectiveness. NATO’s success as a producer of norms and values has not 
allowed to it create governance mechanisms capable of extracting a consistent level of 
resources from its members enabling it defend, on a far greater basis, the interests of 
Western states. NATO is often blocked from achieving these aims by the sovereign 
prerogatives of its members, as will be seen below. 
The trends that have existed since the end of the Cold War and the formation of a 
new geoeconomic order are still in place, even after the attacks of September 11th and the 
start of the War on Terror. These events largely represent the intensification of the post-
Cold war condition, not the emergence of a new world order, as Gheciu points out. She 
notes, “In some ways, 9/11 only served to reinforce transformations that had occurred in 
response to the end of the Cold War…the focus on non- conventional threats and multiple 
security referents has become even more intense.”191 With the acquisition and application 
of knowledge central to geoeconomic practices, 192 the scale of the changes which 
occurred after the end of the Cold War would necessitate the development of new 
radically different epistemological framework in order to comprehend the strange new 
world that had emerged.  In this new environment knowledge crafted to analyze 
structures and actors from the Cold War that no longer existed would naturally decline in 
value and explanatory potential. This was the fate that awaited collective defense. 
NATO’s sole strategic doctrine would become a holdover from a prior era. To remain 
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relevant NATO would have to both significantly modify its epistemological framework 
and explore new forms of partnership and military integration.  NATO’s post-Cold War 
orientation would be greatly affected by the growing influence of risk management 
within the security sector. 
 The Identification of Risk as a New Approach to Security  
The concept of risk itself is an essentially contested concept,193 with its definition 
and application differing sharply depending upon the field in which it is being employed. 
While there may be a large amount of confusion and debate over what a risk actually is, 
that has not prevented it, as Power notes, from becoming a hugely influential concept 
spanning a range of fields. Power writes, “…the concept remains elusive, contested and 
inherently controversial…while expert commentators may bemoan the lack of consensus 
about what risk is and point to the confusions of using it within diverse settings, it has 
become an empirical fact that the concept of risk in its raw form has acquired social, 
political, and organizational significance as never before…”194 The pervasiveness of risk 
and the necessity to quantify and develop responses it to arises from the complexity of 
modern society. The inherent unpredictability of modern life is a consequence of the 
structure of modern society. Institutions that are constructed to regulate the uncertainties 
of contemporary existence often serve to generate new risks.  Modern society, which is 
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obsessed with the identification of risks, ironically ends up producing innumerable risks 
as a condition of its existence. Hence, modern society, as Beck has argued, can best be 
defined as a risk society. He writes, “...the emergence of the risk society designates a 
developmental phase of modern society in which the social, political, economic and 
individual risks increasingly tend to escape the institutions for monitoring and protection 
in industrial society...the institutions of industrial society become the producers and 
legitimators of threats they cannot control.”195 Contemporary societies are reflexive. 
Awareness exists that the problems faced by modern societies are of their own making; 
yet at the same time, the institutional framework that exists is often unable to formulate 
an adequate response to these conundrums.196 The growing predominance of risk 
management in a wide range of social and technical fields is a response to these realities.  
The key drivers of risk today, the main sources of uncertainty, are the economy 
and the geopolitical environment. The manner in which risk analysis has occurred in each 
field has been sharply circumscribed however with a predominate focus upon the 
individual rather than systemic constructions of risk.  The economy as a generator of risks 
is a well-known phenomenon. The initial impetus for wide scale state intervention in the 
economy beginning in the nineteenth century and continuing with the rise of the welfare 
state in the twentieth, which brought comprehensive regulations that protected workers 
and public health was designed to curtail the risk posed by unregulated markets.197 The 
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dominance of neoliberalism in the later part of the twentieth century reconfigured the 
relationship between the individual, society, and risk. With the decline of the welfare 
state, the role of the state in protecting individuals from risk was reduced. Instead it the 
identification and management of risk became an individual responsibility.  
Neoliberalism promoted a new form of subjectivity, one in which, as O’Malley 
argues, everyone is responsible for calculating their own risk, and “…a particular 
alignment of uncertainty and risk has generated a characteristic hybrid of enterprising 
prudentialism in the last quarter century or so. The prudent subjects of neoliberalism 
should practice and sustain their autonomy by assembling information, materials, and 
practices together into a personalized strategy that identifies and minimizes their 
exposure to harm.”198 The good neoliberal subject resembles as closely as possible the 
actualization of the rational individual assumed by neoclassical economic theory.199 The 
growing literature encouraging individual risk and heaping praise on the risk taker is an 
outgrowth of these larger economic shifts.200  
In terms of geopolitics as well the identification and quantification of risk has 
primarily focused upon individual existence. The formation of critical security studies in 
the 1990s and the focus on human security by prominent international organizations are 
illustrative of this development. The United Nations provided one of the first definitions 
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of human security and promoted the trend towards quantifying risk in individual terms. 
The UN report declared, “…safety from such chronic threats as hunger, disease and 
repression and protection from sudden and hurtful disruptions in the patterns of daily 
life—whether in homes, in jobs or in communities.”201 Human security focuses on 
identifying a broad spectrum of threats that individuals face and then striving to mitigate 
them through the promotion of aid and international development202, or in extreme cases 
humanitarian intervention when it is determined that a state is actively threatening the 
security of its citizens.203 What is eluded in the human security approach however is any 
systemic engagement with the structural factors that give rise to the conditions that it 
seeks to ameliorate. As Robert writes, “human security as a concept has always been 
disengaged from causation…In no instance has its causation been traced to power in the 
international system. Indeed, the converse is true: conditions of human insecurity have 
been quite openly dislocated from central causation.”204 Human security then examines 
and seeks to responds to the consequences of risk, while overlooking their actual 
production. 
This myopic focus upon the individual and the ignoring of the wider systemic 
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construction of risk is a trend that extends across analysis of the practice of risk 
management today. The majority of scholarly analysis of risk management has focused 
upon how private actors have conceived and responded to risk; public actors have 
received far less attention. Roberts argues that, “International security risks form an 
under-researched part of an expanding set of risks…Relatively little is known about 
public risk management compared to its private sector equivalent.”205 There has been 
some analysis conducted of how risk management has been incorporated by public actors 
and applied in the areas of criminology206, health,207 and the environment208; but in terms 
of the effect of risk management has had on how public security actors conceive of their 
role and determine threats to stability the analysis has tended to be mechanical and 
formulaic, with an objectified concept of risk predominating.209   
The focus upon the reaction of the individual to already pre-existing risks ignores 
that these risks arise from larger social interactions and institutional frameworks that 
shape the conditions of individual existence. Risks, to put it simply, are socially 
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constructed. They do not have their own essence, but are formed through the interactions 
of different forms of knowledge, with interpretation of an event or phenomenon playing 
the pivotal role in the construction of a risk.210 As Beck noted, “Risks do not have any 
abstract existence in themselves. They acquire reality in the contradictory judgments of 
groups and populations...risks count as urgent, threatening and real or as negligible and 
unreal only as the result of cultural perceptions and evaluations.”211  The identification 
and quantification of risk represents an attempt to establish a procedure of action against 
a perceived threat. Not all actors have an equal ability to declare something a threat 
however. Those identified as security experts or professionals have access to the 
knowledge, credentials, and networks to both claim that something is a risk and to 
propagate these claims.212 
In arguing that the determination of risk is socially constructed with security 
experts playing a key role in this process I am trending on similar ground to Buzan, 
Waever, and de Wilde and their elaboration of securitization acts. In their approach 
securitization  involves a securitizing actor, the one who declares an something to be a 
security issue; a referent object, something that is being threatened and needs to be 
protected; and an audience which needs to be pursued to accept something as a security 
threat.  This is an open-ended process, with the range of potential security issues 
unlimited. They posit that, “Securitization can be seen as a more extreme form of 
politicization. In theory, any public issue can be located on the spectrum ranging from 
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nonpoliticized through politicized to securitized. In principle the placement of issues on 
the spectrum is open: depending upon circumstances, any issue can end up on any part of 
the spectrum.”213 The major focus of securitization is on the discourse that develops 
around a threat and how awareness of it is spread. My main point of differentiation with 
the Copenhagen School, which will be expanded upon below, is that my concern lies with 
the internal calculations that security experts develop to quantify risks as well as the 
organizational transformations that occur when logics of risk management become 
central to an institution. These topics receive only passing reference in the analysis of the 
Copenhagen school.  
Risk analysis serves a double purpose for security actors, providing both a form of 
comprehensive analysis that allows them to act in the world, and at the same time, 
increasing their legitimacy and influence. By positing something as a threat, a measure of 
power, authority, and legitimacy are returned to the actors and institutions that have seen 
it drain away.214 Power notes this process when he argues that, “When objects of concern 
are described in terms of risk, they are placed in a web of expectation about management 
and actor responsibility. The apparent risk-based description of organizational life and 
personal life corresponds to the widespread expectation that organizations must be seen 
to act as if the management of risk is possible.”215 In responding to and containing threats 
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a renewed sense of security is projected as governments are viewed as taking proactive 
measures to curtail potential dangers and protect their populations. While risk analysis is 
useful then because it serves to increase the legitimacy of security actors, it is also 
employed because it is seen as an effective response to actual conditions of contemporary 
uncertainty. As I noted above, with the emergence of the post-Cold War geoeconomic 
order the nature of threats changed and conceivable security concerns vastly widened. 
The collapse of the security arrangement of the Cold War resulted in a vast proliferation 
of potential dangers and a general diffusion of threats. As Heng notes, “In the absence of 
clearly defined Cold War threats, proactive policies come to the fore addressing more 
amorphous concepts of danger…with globalization dangers stem from diffused processes 
rather than traditional premeditated aggression.”216 Risk analysis, at least within the 
security domain, became hugely influential because it offered a coherent response to this 
new reality.  As a mode of thought risk assessment imbues policymakers with the belief 
that through its calculations the predication of a threat can be made before it emerges to 
damage important interests.  
Risk management became increasingly prevalent within the security sector in the 
wake of the Cold War because it was deemed to provide a form of knowledge which 
allowed policy makers and security institutions to both comprehend and respond to the 
new spectrum of threats with emerged after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Whether or 
not risk analysis actually performs these functions is beside the point. It is quite possible 
that risks are vastly over-exaggerated or indeed non-existent. Risk are not an objective 
form of knowledge, but are constructed by fallible risk experts whose unfounded fears 
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may lead to the misidentification of risks. As Williams notes, the constructs created by 
risk experts can be based in completely unfounded fears. He argues that “The West has 
become ever more preoccupied with the what ifs of life, with subverting the potential for 
future risk rather than considering cold, hard facts...Instead a nexus of insecurity 
permeates the minds of policy makers and the public, feeding a dangerous cauldron of 
possible disasters that threatens to dislodge the distinction between the possible and the 
probable.”217 Yet I believe that by serving as a paradigm and a providing a recognized 
form of knowledge and set of procedures risk management has already provided a useful 
function, its actual level of effectiveness is immaterial. Indeed even when the outcomes 
predicated by risk analysis are demonstrably incorrect its influence continues to grow 
simply because it is seen, rightly or wrongly, as elaborating a persuasive vision of the 
world that corresponds to the reality observed by security actors.218   
The permeation of risk analysis throughout the security sector was a result of the 
new factors that arose with the formation of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. 
NATO was not immune to this dynamic. In the decade and a half following the end of the 
Cold War, NATO, in the word of its Secretary General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, underwent 
a paradigm shift, a shift that was further solidified after the events of September 11th.  
During the Cold War, the prevailing security paradigm went something like this: 
security is about safeguarding your territorial integrity, and this is something that 
can be accomplished by deterrence…Over the past fifteen years however, that 
paradigm has been challenged to the point of obsolescence. Developments since 
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the end of the Cold War have been increasingly at odds with our established 
worldview…In my view September 11th dealt the final blow to the old, Cold War 
paradigm with its Eurocentric view of the world.219  
In the place of the deterrence-based approach of collective defense, NATO would 
gradually adopt the proactive posture inherent within risk management approaches to 
security.220 
 Central to the logic of collective defense is the belief that the world is the largely 
static and predictable. In contrast, for risk management the world is chaotic and 
unpredictable. Collective defense assumes that the world will remain largely the same, 
while for risk management the future is indeterminate. The shift in NATO between 
strategic logics would result in a fundamental change in its behavior. Operating under the 
logic of collective defense during the Cold War, NATO would never strike first, but 
would only respond to a direct attack against one of its members. As Yost notes during 
the Cold War, “Preventive war against the Soviet Union was always out of the question 
for NATO. Moreover, the allies did not use the word pre-emption, because they had no 
intention of initiating the use of force.”221 When viewed through the lens of collective 
defense NATO’s 1999 intervention in Kosovo makes no sense. NATO’s engagement 
there only becomes possible once the shift to risk management is well underway. Pivotal 
to this shift was an expansion of NATO’s strategic field beyond its membership and 
outside of its traditional area of operations.  
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Fashioning A Coherent World Order: NATO’s Expansive Array of Partnerships and 
Growing Military Integration in the 1990s  
During the 1990s in response to the end of the Cold War and the emergence of a 
new unpredictable geoeconomic order, NATO launched an array of partnerships and its 
first multinational rapid reaction military force.  These initiatives would begin to provide 
NATO with the institutional capacity to carry out preemptive interventions outside of its 
traditional European area of operations. However, the effectiveness of these programs 
would be sharply curtailed until the out of area debate within NATO was definitively 
settled its 1999 Strategic Concept. The programs discussed in this section are important 
because they pushed NATO away from a sole concern with collective defense and down 
the path towards a global security nexus. They form an important precursor towards 
NATO finally determining that out of area operations were a central function of the 
Alliance in 1999. The discussion in this section will set the basis for the next section that 
will examine the parameters of NATO’s out of area debate and the factors that led to its 
conclusion. The following penultimate section of this chapter will examine the range of 
new agreements that formed in wake of NATO’s successful conclusion of the out of area 
debate and detail the overall state of the Alliance prior to the 2007 Global Financial 
Crisis.  
The partnership arrangements that NATO offers, as Flockhart and Kristensen 
argue fall under three different categories depending upon the objective they are meant to 
achieve. The most complex agreements are for countries viewed as potential members. 
This format of agreements provide for extensive institutional linkages that are designed to 
prepare the participating countries for potential membership. The second set of 
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arrangements are for countries not viewed as potential members, but where an ongoing 
dialogue and the formation of limited partnerships outside of NATO’s traditional sphere 
of operations can serve to improve its geopolitical position. The final grouping of 
partnerships are NATO’s relationships with other liberal democracies whom NATO 
shares fundamental values and strategic orientation with. This set of partnerships only 
took shape in the early years of the twenty-first century.222 The Partnership for Peace 
Program falls under the first category, while the Mediterranean Dialogue occupies the 
second category; states who are members of the Contact Country group comprise the 
third category and will be examined in a later section of this chapter. 
NATO offers a range of potential options for engagement to a country depending 
on its geographical location and that level of interaction that both NATO and the country 
in question deem suitable to their mutual security interests. Freed from the geopolitical 
confines of the Cold War and seeking to spread its influence outside of its traditional 
European base of operations these partnerships provide NATO with the ability to engage 
in regions and with countries outside of its historic North Atlantic domain. They allow 
NATO to project its power and shape developments in areas viewed as crucial to its 
strategic interest. The role of partnerships within NATO has continued to grow in 
importance as the global interests of the organization continue to multiply. The United 
States has consistently been a major advocate for the growth of NATO’s partnership 
programs and has sought to utilize them as a supplement to American power.  As Kay 
argues, the expansion of NATO partnerships occupy a prominent role in American 
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foreign policy. He argues, “Partnerships can be a grand scheme for managing systemic 
change but they may also simply be used by diplomats to work out grey areas of 
international relationships. American officials value the concept’s lack of clarity because 
partnerships can justify flexible bilateral and multilateral architectures.”223 The scope and 
scale of the interactions that occur within these arrangements can be expanded or 
contracted depending upon the perceived strategic significance of the state in question 
and its geopolitical position visa via member states. NATO’s partnerships can be thought 
of as a sort of transnational deployment, along the lines elaborated by Latham.224 
Although a NATO partnership does not solely determine the strategic priorities of the 
state in question, it does generate a new set of social relations that may prefigure the 
actions available to a state in the future.  
The Partnership for Peace (PfP) is the most senior and advanced of NATO’s 
partnership plans. Originally created in 1994 to gradually integrate the recently 
independent countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia within the security sphere of 
NATO. Today PfP has 22 members. PfP countries are able to choose from a toolkit of 
available options provided by NATO that determine the level of coordination and 
interoperability they will have with the organization. Activities on offer under the aegis 
of PfP program touch on virtually every field of NATO activity including defense-related 
work, defense reform, defense-policy and planning, civil-military relations, education and 
training, military to military cooperation and exercises, and scientific and environmental 
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cooperation.225 The PfP program offers six different tiers of commitment depending upon 
the depth of engagement that the member country seeks with the rest of NATO, these 
range from tier one which is simply low level cooperation and confidence building, to tier 
three at which an intensified dialogue of enhanced cooperation with the aim of possible 
membership in the future begins to occur, countries that successfully pass through tier 
three become part of the Membership Action Plan at tier four, where a formal offer to 
join NATO is extended. Tiers five and six comprise the final steps and verification 
procedures before a state becomes a full NATO member.226 
PfP offers a broad set of options and points of contact with states that NATO has 
identified as contributing to its strategic interest and which its hopes to develop a closer 
relationship with. While in its earlier stages PfP served primarily as a forum that prepared 
European states for future membership in NATO227, in the last ten years the focus of PfP 
has changed as it has shifted its orientation to Central Asia and the Caucuses, a move that 
was made explicit in NATO’s 2004 Istanbul Summit. The document declares that “…in 
response to the changing international environment, the Alliance will put special focus on 
engaging with Partners in the strategically important regions of Caucasus and Central 
Asia…NATO will refocus existing resources toward these two regions, consistent with 
NATO’s long term strategy to enhance stability across the Euro—Atlantic area by 
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encouraging and supporting reform.”228 Part of the impetus behind this move was no 
doubt due to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan that ended in 2014.  
The Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) was initiated in the same year as PfP, 1994, 
yet it remains a far less developed program. Due to the region that the countries involved 
in MD are based, outside of the North Atlantic Area, formal membership within NATO 
was never an option for them. Instead the MD was developed as its founding document 
declares, “…a forum for confidence-building and transparency in which Allies could 
learn more about the security concerns of Dialogue countries as well as dispel 
misperceptions about NATO’s aim and policies.”229 The MD includes Egypt, Israel, 
Mauritania, Morocco, Tunisia, Jordan, and Algeria. In its early stages the MD simply 
provided for regular bilateral meetings between member countries and NATO and 
occasionally multilateral meetings involving all seven-dialogue countries. In contrast to 
the PfP in which a plethora of activities and points of contact were on offer, the MD 
provided for a sharply limited set of interactions. This state of affairs persisted until 2004 
when the functions of the MD were greatly extended to encourage out of area operations, 
a topic that will be returned to below. 
Alongside the plethora of partnership, arrangements that NATO launched during 
the 1990s it also initiated the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) program, the first in 
what would become a series of initiatives that were designed to increase the functionality 
of Alliance by providing it with the capability to rapidly deploy a range of forces 
depending upon the geopolitical environment. The CJTF represents an early effort by 
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NATO to generate more extensive trans-scalar linkages between its members and 
establish a reliable coercive capacity that it can draw upon as necessary in order to 
respond to threats.  
The Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) arose in response to the changed 
geopolitical environment after the Cold War. Officially launched at NATO’s Brussels 
Summit in 1994,230 the CJTF was developed in order to increase the effectiveness and 
coordination of European military forces. The CJTF concept creates a set of regulations 
and procedures that establish a command and control framework for multinational and 
multiservice task forces that are quickly generated and tailored to fulfill specific NATO 
operations.231 Adm. Paul Miller, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic 
characterizes CJTF as “…both a process and a structure: as a process, it enables us to 
assemble and groom the forces and capabilities to operate together; as a structure, it 
provides the command and control architecture to direct and employ a coalition 
operation.”232 CJTF then represents an early experiment by NATO in creating a 
command and control mechanism capable of responding to complex security 
environments, a process that continues today.  
 The effectiveness of the CJTF concept relies upon successive changes to 
NATO’s military command structure. The rapid response and speed by which a CJTF can 
be generated is based upon the creation of CJTF nuclei within NATO. These nuclei will 
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have permanent staff tasked to them. If directed to do so by the political leadership of 
NATO, these staff members will provide the basis through which resources can be 
coordinated, improving the speed at which forces can be put in the field.  NATO itself 
details how this process would work, under ideal circumstances. “CJTF headquarters 
nuclei or core staffs are being established on a permanent basis within selected parent 
headquarters of the NATO military command structure. Together with augmentation 
modules and support modules generated for the purposes of a specific operation they will 
form a headquarters to command a CJTF structured to meet the requirements of the 
operation in question.”233 CJTF Headquarters would be tasked with the assimilation and 
dissemination of intelligence planning, receiving and committing forces, and maintaining 
communications between NATO and a diverse array of relevant local authorities, non-
government agencies, and private actors.234 However, internal political divisions have 
served to undermine the potential effectiveness of the CJTF and prevented its 
mobilization in situations where it is was clearly called for. 
The first opportunity to utilize the CJTF concept came soon after it was formerly 
announced in the summer of 1995 as the breakup of Yugoslavia accelerated and the 
situation in Bosnia began to spiral out of control. Yet, as Kaplan recounts, a lack of 
political will by Europe’s leaders prevented the activation of a CJTF for Bosnia. In his 
opinion, “…the summer of 1995 should have been the occasion for the Europeans to 
mount a CJTF, it was unable to act. The trouble at this point was not about the 
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mechanism; the CJTF offered a genuine means of fulfilling the European partner’s 
aspirations to manage crises of greater concerns to them than to the American partner. 
Rather, it was a lack of will on the part of European leaders that inhibited them in the 
Bosnian War.”235 In fact although CJTF was first proposed in 1994, it was not actually 
implemented until over two years later due to disagreements between France and the 
United States over how the CJTF would be deployed. France opposed fully integrating 
the CJTF within NATO command structures. At the time France was still maintaining its 
thirty year boycott of NATO’s political and military structure and argued that placing the 
CJTF under NATO military command, rather than establishing a new political framework 
to govern its actions would ultimately place it under American oversight, as the Supreme 
Allied Command for Europe, who is by tradition always an American, would have an 
implied veto over NATO’s military actions.236 This impasse was finally resolved in early 
1996 when a change in French policy led it to rejoin NATO’s military command and the 
United States assuaged French concerns over the command structure of the CJTFs.237   
While political disagreements plagued the early years of the CJTF, 
disorganization over how the CJTF was going to be implemented within the NATO 
command structure, specifically what the total number of CJTF headquarters should be, 
resulted in the impairment of long-term planning and made clear that the CJTF would be 
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beset by the inertia typical of NATO. The number of CJTF headquarters have historically 
been in flux; reduced from an initial 65 to 20, and then altered again on successive 
occasions.238 Thus, as is all too common within NATO, a promising concept was 
undermined by divisions within the organization. Jones shares this assessment when he 
notes that “NATO’s CJTF concept fits a long-standing pattern in which political 
imperative and goals are often incompatible with military concerns and capabilities. 
Consequently, the viability of the CJTF concept is stretched between meeting the 
demands of the changing strategic and security environment, shifting political goals of 
Alliance members, and the military’s desire for an integrated and viable command and 
control structure.”239 The CJTF was designed to provide a predictable and regularized 
format that would quickly allow the formation of NATO expeditionary forces to carry out 
approved operations. These forces would be unified at the command level for a 
temporary period in order to complete a specific mission and would then return to 
autonomous national control upon completion of the mission.  
The CJTF concept is a set of procedures that governs the integration, under a sole 
command, of national military forces for a limited duration. The CJTF thus assumes that 
a level of interoperability exists between these forces. The military assets committed by 
member states would, in all likelihood, be under the command of non-national 
commanders, raising questions of sovereign control. This trans-national synthesis 
effected through the unification of command represents a sharp break from past multi-
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national engagements such as the First Gulf War, where a coalition command was 
created, but national forces retained their own separate command under national 
commanders.240 While the initial implementation of the CJTF was a rocky one, the 
importance of this concept would be greatly elevated within NATO with the definite 
settlement of the decade long out of area debate. 
Kosovo and the end of NATO’s Out of Area Debate  
 Although it was during the course of the 1990s that the out of area debate in 
NATO was finally definitively concluded, discussions concerning whether NATO should 
intervene outside of its member states were a reoccurring issue within the organization. 
Tensions arose in the Alliance around whether it should intervene during the Suez Crisis 
of 1956241, if it should formally support America's war in Vietnam during the 1960s and 
70s242 and over its role in the First Gulf War.243 In each instance, NATO declined to 
formally commit itself collectively to conflicts in which its members had embroiled 
themselves. These refusals to expand the role of NATO beyond its European area of 
operations were based on the concern that doing so would lessen the role of collective 
defense as the underlying principle of the organization and draw attention away from 
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NATO's countering of the Soviet threat in Europe. The sudden end of the Cold War 
however removed this dynamic, made collective defense seemly obsolete, and left NATO 
struggling to find a reason for its continued existence.244  
The decision to go out of area and proactively respond to threats to its 
membership as they arose would provide NATO with a renewed sense of purpose. NATO 
eventually decision in favor of out of area operations, paving the way for its first ever 
intervention in Kosovo. This intervention would lead to the adoption of risk management 
as one of NATO’s central strategic principles and elevated the importance of new forms 
of analysis.  
In the immediate aftermath of the Cold War US Senator Richard Lugar declared 
that, “NATO had to go out of area or go out of business.”245 This starkly crystallized the 
options available to NATO with the disappearance of its major adversary and seemly sole 
reason for existence. During the 1990s NATO would eventually chose to go out of area 
and gradually redesigned itself to engage in operations that were outside of its initial 
mandate. This process did not occur without significance internal debate however. The 
United States was the foremost advocate for this process, pushing for a broadening of 
NATO's concept of security that would justify an expanded basis for interventions. It was 
resisted in this attempt most strongly by Germany, who sought to restrict NATO, as much 
as possible, to its original purpose as a defense alliance.246 In this debate, Germany would 
                                                     
244 Bertram sums up the thinking during this period writing, “NATO is not on track for the 21st century. 
Instead, it is in deep, enduring crisis and may not even reach the end of the decade. The reason for this 
disturbing state of affairs is not just the familiar and now banal one that NATO's old reason for existing is 
no longer there. It is, more profoundly, that this unique Western security club... has a common memory, but 
no longer a common purpose.” Christoph Bertram, “NATO on track for the 21st century?,” Security 
Dialogue 26 (1995): 65-71. 
245 Richard Lugar, “NATO: Out of Area or Out of Business,” press release, 2 August 1993. 
246 For greater detail on the basis of German opposition see Stephanie Hofmann, “Debating Strategy in 
NATO: Obstacles to Defining a Meaningful New Strategic Concept,” Politique Etrangere 1 (2008): 7. 
96 
 
seem to have the NATO charter on its side.  The geographical basis for NATO operations 
was clearly set by article six of the NATO treaty and defined as “...Europe or  North 
America, on the territory of or on the islands under the jurisdiction of any of the parties in 
the North Atlantic area north of the Tropic of Cancer.”247 NATO's first strategic 
concept248 in 1991 did allude to new security challenges and risks which faced the 
alliance in the post-cold war environment along with the possibility that NATO could 
engage in the management of crises at an early stage,249 but a firm stance on out of area 
operations were deferred to a later date. 
 However, the reluctance of NATO to engage in out of area operations began to 
erode soon afterwards as the new configuration of the post-Cold War geoeconomic order 
became increasingly clear.  This necessitated that NATO adapt to these circumstances in 
order to remain relevant. This adaption, as NATO Secretary General Jaap de Hoop 
Scheffer notes, is one that continues to this day. As he argues, “The Cold War belongs to 
a distant past. Globalization is accelerating. As a result, our security environment is 
becoming ever more complex. We are forced to reconsider established approaches, and 
we must have the courage to jettison those ideas that no longer correspond to today’s 
world.”250 The early stages of this reconsideration, and the first step in the erosion of the 
relevance of collective defense, occurred in April 1992 when NATO provided aircraft to 
support the UN declared no-fly zone over Bosnia. NATO further escalated its 
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involvement in December 1996 with the deployment of a Peace Implementation Force 
under the authorization of the United Nations.251 
  While contributing to each of these efforts Germany expressed deep concerns that 
the proliferation of such operations in the future would lead to an overstretching of 
NATO.  However, German reluctance over NATO’s move towards out of area operations 
was not met with any alternatives. According to Keller, during this period German policy 
towards NATO was in favor of the status quo simply because it lacked a coherent security 
policy. Keller argues, “...German security policy is not focused on a clear strategic goal. 
Without a strategic goal, the drive to accomplish change or to optimize current tools and 
processes gets lost. Maintaining the status quo becomes the most attractive strategy.”252 
Maintaining its Cold War posture, with collective defense as its sole strategic foundation 
would have resulted in a slide into irrelevance and eventual dissolution; doing so was not 
an option if NATO wished to survive the decade.  The continuing crisis in the former 
Yugoslavia, combined with American pressure would eventually conspire to force NATO 
to directly resolve the issue of area deployments once and for all. 
 Despite NATO's deployment in Bosnia the situation in the former Yugoslavia 
continued to deteriorate. Massacres of ethnic Albanians by Serbian forces in Kosovo and 
attacks by the Kosovo Liberation Army upon Serbian army positions and civilians led to 
an escalating cycle of violence.253 On September 23, 1998, the UN issued Resolution 
1199 that called for Yugoslav forces to cease all action against civilian populations and to 
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allow of international monitors in the disputed territory of Kosovo. Resolution 1199 
notably, did not authorize the use of force in any of the Yugoslav republics.254 The NATO 
bombing campaign in Serbia, which began on March 23 1999 and ended on June 10, 
1999, was precipitated by the failure of the Rambouillet conference, which set a hard line 
to the Serbian government calling for complete military occupation and substantial 
political control of Kosovo by NATO. This tough policy towards Serbia was largely set 
by the United States, which seemed to be striving to effectively box NATO in, so it would 
have no choice but to commit to a bombing campaign.255 Secretary of State Madeline 
Albright’s remarks on the eve of Rambouillet illustrate this tactic. “If the Serbs are the 
cause of the breakdown, we’re determined to go forward with the NATO decision to carry 
out air strikes.”256 The American determination that NATO attack Serbia was driven by a 
number of factors, but one of them, I believe, was the desire to force the issue of out of 
area operations within NATO and have the organization finally accept them as legitimate 
part of its functions. This would, in American eyes, keep NATO viable as it entered into 
the 21st century. As will be seen in the next chapter, the United States, despite frequent 
frustration, sees NATO as an important tool for projecting and organizing Western power.  
NATO’s intervention in Serbia would not only set a precedent in regards to out of 
area operations, it would also mark the first time NATO acted militarily without explicit 
UN authorization. As Daadler and O'Hanlon explain, “As a defensive military alliance, 
NATO has traditionally considered using force only if one or more of its members were 
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attacked. The case of Kosovo was different...this was not a question of self-defense. 
Accordingly, under one interpretation of international law, the alliance could use force in 
this instance only with the explicit authorization of the UN security council.”257 Such 
authorization was highly unlikely however, with both Russia and China signaling their 
willingness to veto any resolution that authorized the use of force. NATO intervention 
within Serbia then would both violate international law258 and induce a landmark shift 
within NATO, transforming it from a defensive alliance to a proactive one that sought to 
aggressively intervene and manage crises as they emerged. In doing so, it would also 
finally settle the out of area debate in favor of those who supported an expansion of 
NATO activities beyond its territories.  
  Why were European states, which had initially appeared to be reluctant to 
intervene in Serbia, drawn along by the United States? The case of Germany, which 
sought a limited role for NATO throughout the 1990s, is representative of the Continental 
European position on NATO. As Leithner argues, Germany's eventually support for the 
Serbian operation and its commitment of military forces to it was based on a number of 
factors, particularly a strong desire to protect human rights and prevent a perceived 
genocide that was occurring on their doorstep. Perhaps the central factor however, was 
the deep integration of Germany within NATO and belief that preserving NATO as a 
viable mechanism for international security in the post-Cold War world was a strategic 
and political necessity.259 In this context then, with the United States pushing for a 
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bombing campaign over Serbia, coupled with the driftlessness of NATO throughout the 
1990s, the failure to intervene and to do so successfully had the potential to make or 
break NATO.260 As one commentator at the time put it, “...the debate about intervention is 
no longer a dispute over the means to an end. It is a debate over abandoning NATO and 
the American claim to international leadership. If there is no NATO victory over 
Serbia...there will no longer be a NATO.”261 NATO's intervention in Serbia set the mold 
that the organization would assume in the 21st century. It became in effect, as Shea 
argues, “...the proving ground, where the alliance could adapt to its major post-Cold War 
role...”262 Serbia was where NATO finally figured out its post-Cold War role,263 one that 
was proactively focused on confronting crises outside of its traditional area of 
operations.264 Establishing standards for how NATO would determine what actually 
constituted a crisis as well as the mechanisms that it would follow once this identification 
had occurred would be elaborated in its 1999 and 2010 Strategic Concepts as well other 
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as internal documents.  
With the Serbia intervention making out of area, operations a viable prospect for 
NATO, its 1999 Strategic Concept sought to formalize these developments. Approved in 
the midst of the campaign in Serbia in April 1999, NATO’s second post-Cold War 
Strategic Concept greatly expanded NATO's definition of security along with the range of 
potential threats that could challenge the Alliance in the future. The document argued 
that, “The security of the Alliance remains subject to a wide variety of military and non-
military risks which are multi-directional and often difficult to predict. These risks 
include uncertainty and instability...that could evolve rapidly. Some countries in and 
around the Euro-Atlantic area face serious economic, social and political difficulties. 
Ethnic and religious rivalries, territorial disputes, inadequate or failed efforts at reform, 
the abuse of human rights, and the dissolution of states can lead to local and even 
regional instability.“265 The NATO Intelligence Warning System (NIWS) was created 
following the 1999 Strategic Concept in order to assess risks that fell under these 
categories. The manner in which NIWS assesses risk differs sharply from the largely 
quantitative forms of analysis conducted during the Cold War under the rubric of 
collective defense.  
The NIWS was designed to be a much more inclusive warning system that its 
predecessor and to take account of the risks identified in the Alliance’s 1999 
Strategic Concept…it covers not only threats to NATO, but also a wide variety of 
military and non-military risk indicators…NIWS methodology calls for analysts 
to decide well in advance which events can serve as decision points for any given 
warning problem…By focusing on these critical indictors, analysts no longer 
based judgments on a mathematical, mechanical and quantitative approach to 
indications and warning. Instead, they can provide qualitative, forward-looking, 
predictive assessments for the outcome of a clearly defined situation. 266 
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The NIWS provides a regularized mechanism for the gathering and processing of 
information and the identification of risk. Its employment of a different methodology 
along with the consideration of different events as threats is indicative of the new 
strategic frame created by the 1999 Strategic Concept. 
The 1999 Strategic Concept was also notable because it lifted the formal 
restriction on NATO that limited it to a defensive alliance simply concerned with 
responding to an attack against one its members, to one that proactively sought to manage 
and intervene in world affairs. As Article 31 of the 1999 Strategic Concept declares, 
“NATO will seek, in cooperation with other organizations, to prevent conflict, or, should 
a crisis arise, to contribute to its effective management, consistent with international law, 
including through the possibility of conducting non-Article 5 crisis response 
operations.”267 Non-article five out of area operations were now recognized as an 
acceptable action by NATO. A centerpiece of NATO strategic thinking for fifty years was 
downgraded in the process. As Carpenter argues, “The Alliance's 1999 Strategic Concept, 
reflected an unmistakable shift of emphasis from the traditional mission of collective 
defense to the new mission of crisis management and out of area interventions, in that 
sense it was a crucial defeat for Article 5 traditionalists.”268 The 1999 Strategic Concept 
was therefore a landmark event for NATO, one that altered its strategic foundations and 
greatly expanded the range of activities that NATO would seek to engage in the future. It 
also set off an internal process within NATO that was concerned with elaborating 
techniques of risk management and modeling that would allow NATO to perceive and 
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respond to the wide range of potential threats to the Alliance.  
New Partnerships and New Possibilities: NATO in the early years of the Twenty-
First Century 
 Following its 1999, Strategic Concept NATO created new forms of partnerships 
and new force coordination projects that provided the Alliance with the capacity to 
preform out of area operations. Some of these initiatives built directly built upon pre-
existing arrangements, while others were created entirely new patterns of relationships 
with states that had never engaged with NATO in a significant manner.  While NATO’s 
new partnership agreements extended the reach of the Alliance and would transform it 
into an organization with truly global reach, its efforts at force coordination through the 
NATO Response Force and NATO Special Operations Headquarters ran into considerably 
greater difficulties.  
As I recounted above the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) provides a flexible 
model of coordination across multi-national and multi-service units that can be employed 
during NATO operations. However, it was not until the activation of the NATO 
Response Force (NRF) in 2003 that the relevance of CJTF could be demonstrated on a 
consistent basis.269 The concept of the NRF was formally endorsed at NATO’s 2002 
Prague Summit.270 NATO defines the NRF as, “A coherent, high-readiness, joint, 
multinational force package of up to 25,000 troops that is technologically advanced, 
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flexible, deployable, interoperable and sustainable."271 While it was formally inaugurated 
in 2003, the NRF actually became operational in 2006. The purpose of the NRF is to 
provide a rapid reaction force to support NATO missions as required. The NRF is 
designed to be deployed anywhere in the world within five days and remain operational 
for thirty days without resupply.272 Forces contributed to the NRF initiative by member 
countries train together and then are deployable for six-month rotations.273 While the 
NRF program has been critiqued both for the caliber of forces made available to it by 
member countries,274 as well as for the short six-month rotation, which greatly impedes 
unit cohesiveness275, it is the closest NATO has come to establishing a permanent 
military force of its own. This attempt at trans-scalar force projection has however been 
severely undermined by national concerns.   
While the NRF is formally overseen by Allied Command Operations, with the 
actual decision to deploy made by the North Atlantic Council, the command structure of 
the NRF is based upon the CJTF model. As Mariano argues, “…in many ways the NRF is 
the son of the CJTF…”276 The NRF command and control structure consists of a 
Combined Joint Task Force Headquarters, with subordinated Land, Air, and Maritime 
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Component Commands. The CJTF’s ad-hoc and flexible command structure is thus 
utilized to connect together a NRF, which by its operational mandate comprises regularly 
shifting unit formations. The NRF is significant because for the first time NATO has 
access to permanent force projection capabilities. Instead of cobbling together an 
intervention, force from member states in response to a crisis having the NRF allows for 
a rapid reaction to emerging events. While it is only capable of being deployed for a short 
length of time, it provides the opportunity for NATO to immediately engage when it sees 
its interests as being negatively impacted and creates the time for a more significant force 
to be organized during the NRF’s deployment. The NRF in theory should be a major 
progression for NATO and once that its membership should largely support as in the 
future the frequency which NATO will be called upon to engage in crisis response 
operations is likely to rise.  
On paper, the NRF appears to have significant potential benefits for NATO. Yet a 
lack of long-term planning has served to create large gaps in the NRF’s capabilities. 
Bialos and Koehel detail the impacts of these planning oversights. As they note “…there 
has been little longer-term focus to date in NRF force planning on explicitly linking the 
NRF’s long-term development to its underlying capability acquisition goals…there is no 
clear plan to facilitate NRF interoperability.”277 The diverse composition of forces made 
available to the NRF necessitates a comprehensive interoperability program in order for 
the NFR to be able to function together effectively; the inexistence of such a program is a 
major oversight. A related issue is that the forces that compose the NRF are totally 
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dependent upon donor countries. There is no mechanism in place for the NRF to request 
specific unit types, which would complement the overall cohesiveness of it. Finally, there 
remains a particularly unwillingness on the part of states that are members of the NRF to 
share intelligence gathering capabilities.278 Perhaps these deficiencies should not be 
surprising as states have historically been reluctant to share the intelligence they have and 
the methods by which they have acquired it, viewing this information as crucial to 
maintaining their sovereign prerogatives.  
A far more successful force coordination initiative due to both American support 
and its direct relation to the War on Terror is the NATO Special Operations Headquarters 
(NSHQ), whose formation was first announced at NATO’s Riga Summit in 2006.279 The 
NSHQ falls under the auspices of the ACO and is designed to provide support and 
training to member military forces and promote interoperability across them. The tasks 
that the special operations forces that are organized under the NSHQ can be called upon 
to take part in are broad and multifaceted.  The principal tasks expected of contributing 
nations and how well or poorly Alliance members have done to date have not been made 
public. Nevertheless, it is possible to gain a reasonable overview of the sorts of 
operations that the NSHQ is likely to engage in through reference to the Allied Joint 
Doctrine for Special Operations. These include providing human intelligence that places 
eyes on targets in hostile, denied or politically sensitive territory280 engaging in decisive 
tactical operations,281 and providing a broad spectrum of measures in support of friendly 
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forces in the field.282 Taylor elaborates on the benefits, but also the potential limitations 
that these possessing these capacities would provide to NATO. As he explains, “Such 
forces would provide NATO vastly improved capabilities to respond to combat and crisis 
contingencies wherever they may arise, and to eliminate the potential for crises to emerge 
at all…political factors may act as a constraint in practice as a result of the luxury each 
Alliance member has in limiting the roles that its forces play in NATO operations.”283 
Coordination and interoperability within the NSHQ is of a far greater degree when 
compared to the NRF. These can be seen by the dramatic rise in the number of Special 
Forces deployed to Afghanistan. Within its first six years of operations, NSHQ has 
managed to standardize special operations practices across Europe, resulting in a fivefold 
increase in the number of Special Forces deployed to Afghanistan.284 This is due to the 
central role played within the NSHQ by the United States.  
The United States is the framework nation within the NSHQ, providing 
implementation, administration and IT infrastructure and support.285 With strong support 
from the major funder of NATO, the NSHQ has experienced a degree of success that has 
eluded the CJTF and NRF. As Gompert and Smith argue, “It is certainly in the interest of 
the United States to increase the availability and quality of allied SOF for 
counterterrorism missions. While some allied SOF may compare well with U.S. SOF in 
specific skills and tasks, the U.S. capabilities may be viewed together as a gold 
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standard…”286 Since the start of the War on Terror in 2001 the United States has come to 
greatly rely upon its special forces in order to achieve its foreign policy objectives.287 The 
budget for United States Special Operations Command has quadrupled since 2001,288 
while the number of personal employed has doubled.289  American Special Forces now 
operate in over hundred countries worldwide. Their reach is so pervasive and 
encompassing that it has resulted in, as one commentator chilling put it, “…the 
development of a precision-killing machine unprecedented in the history of modern 
warfare, one whose scope and genius will be fully appreciated only in later decades, once 
the veil of secrecy has been removed…”290 With the increasing dependence by the United 
States upon its special forces it has sought to use NATO as the coordinating mechanism 
to link its special forces to those of allied countries. NSHQ then represents a classic 
instance of burden sharing through improving the interoperability of Special Forces from 
different states, an act of burden sharing that because of the units that comprise it, is 
under a far heaver veil of secrecy than usual. While the NSHQ will no doubt be helpful in 
achieving the shared objectives of alliance members, Special Forces will be retained for 
the pursuit of particular national objectives, which may not be shared with other 
members. There are limits, in this instance, to the coordination and sharing of burdens. 
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In contrast to direct military-to-military interactions, NATO has made more 
progress since 1999 at the level of political collaboration. At the 2004, Istanbul Summit 
NATO elevated the Mediterranean Dialogue, which has previously existed as simply a 
forum between it and other Mediterranean states, to the level of a genuine partnership and 
sought to utilize it as a framework to contribute to regional security. Using the 
Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as a model, the MD would now extend military 
cooperation to its members. 
Active participation in selected military exercises and related education and 
training activities could improve the ability of Mediterranean partners’ forces to 
operate with those of the Alliance in contributing to NATO-led operations. These 
could include non-Article 5 crisis response operations…a more ambitious and 
expanded framework for the MD should be developed by making extensive use of 
lessons learned and as appropriate, tools from PfP with special emphasis on 
enhanced practical cooperation.291 
 Similar to the drive to expand the reach of PfP this move by NATO to deepen its 
relationship with countries in the MD and establish regularized military contacts between 
them is occurring because NATO is seeking new partners for what it sees as its primary 
function in the future: out of area operations that are rapidly organized based upon a risk 
assessment.292 NATO needs to expand the number of outside countries that it can draw 
upon in these scenarios as its own resources dwindle under the impact of budget cuts. 
Another grouping of outside NATO member countries was established at the 
same Istanbul summit in 2004. The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) is composed of 
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four Middle Eastern Countries: Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait, and the United Arab Emirates. 
The ICI is far less developed than even the MD was in its early stages. No formal 
meetings at the level the head of state, foreign or defense ministers have been held 
between ICI countries and NATO. Further the ICI is not a collective grouping, meetings 
only occur between individual member states and NATO, undercutting the potential for 
the ICI to serve as a coherent collection of states, along the lines of PfP that can be drawn 
upon by NATO if circumstances call for it. While NATO has been largely successful in 
drawing key regional countries into its framework with the PfP and MD the two Western 
aligned countries in the Middle East, Oman and Saudi Arabia, have steadfastly refused to 
participate in the ICI. This, as Razoux argues, fundamentally weakens the ICI. He notes, 
“All researchers and analysts agree that the absence of these two key countries is a major 
obstacle to the future of the ICI. Between them the two states own 70% of the Gulf 
Cooperation Council’s military potential and their armed forces are considered the most 
credible on the Arabian Peninsula.”293 NATO’s stymied attempts to build linkages in the 
Middle East are reflective of historic Western foreign policy in the region, which has 
been riddled with missteps and miscalculations. Whether the ICI will be able to evolve 
past its current stillborn state remains doubtful at this point, especially as hostility to 
Western power in the region rises due to the ramifications of the Arab Spring. 
The final set of states that NATO has formalized arrangements with since 1999 
are not part of any set group and are referred to either as Contact Countries or Global 
Partners. They comprise states situated far outside of NATO’s traditional sphere of 
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operations. Despite this, the level of coordination and integration that exists between 
these countries and NATO often approach those of senior PfP members, indeed in many 
instances these states are de-facto members of NATO, prevented by article 10 of the 
NATO Charter, which restricts new NATO membership to Europe from being recognized 
as formal members of the organization. NATO’s relationship with these states most 
clearly demonstrates its evolution into a global security organization. NATO currently 
considers Afghanistan, Australia, Iraq, Japan, Pakistan, South Korea, New Zealand, and 
Mongolia its global partners, although as will be seen NATO has a far deeper level of 
commitment with some of these countries than others.294 The path towards NATO 
establishing a formal and regularized framework to engage with these countries has been 
a long and complex one that remains incomplete at present. The United States, more than 
any other NATO member, has been the driving force behind the formation and extension 
of these arrangements. 
In 2006 at NATO’s summit in Riga, the United States pushed for the creation of a 
new category of partners with more formal ties to NATO.295 The American view was that 
extension of NATO was necessary in light of new geopolitical realities of the War on 
Terror. A more expansive and coherent interface of power, capable of easily aligning 
itself with and supporting more aggressive American force projection was sought. NATO 
offered a historically tested apparatus of power through which these aims could be 
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achieved. The usage of NATO by the United States in pursuit of its own strategic 
interests should not be surprising. Indeed NATO has always been a key part of the wider 
hegemonic articulation of American power. American interaction within NATO can be 
considered as a form of nested politics, a multilevel set of interactions in which a global 
organization is utilized to more effectively carry out national interests, Braumodler places 
this process within the international system. He posits that “…different levels of politics 
are nested within each other like Russian dolls…this is the nested nature of international 
politics-sovereignty nested within hierarchy nested within anarchy is the engine of 
change in international security politics.”296  As larger forum underpinned by American 
power the United States has its own sets of interests that it pursues in NATO. NATO is 
seen as a useful mechanism that expands the scope of American power by providing a 
sustained and regularized means through which it can interface with aligned states, thus 
reducing the costs imposed upon it in maintain global order. 
Having NATO serve as a strong collective and coercive apparatus serves 
American interests. Although the United States engages with NATO in order to 
strengthen and maintain its own power the exact manner in which it goes about doing so 
is modified depending upon the respective power positions of other states within NATO 
and how their own perceived interests align or clash with the United States.297 While the 
United States is often able to get its own way within NATO, due to its apex position, the 
achievement of its aims is not without impediment. The difficulty with which the United 
                                                     
296 Bear Braumodler, The Great Powers and the International System (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2012), 16. 
297 This form of multilateralism and the arrangement of power which it seeks to secure runs against the 
hope that Cox held out for a more equitable and just world order. Robert Cox, “The Crisis in World Order 
and the Challenge to International Organization,” Cooperation and Conflict 29 (1994): 99-113. 
113 
 
States in reaching agreement on an enhanced partnership program is a testament to this. 
This plan was strongly opposed by NATO’s European members at the Riga Summit, who 
were wary of overextension and a shift in focus away from Europe and was eventually 
shelved.298 Only a vague statement that “…enabled the Alliance to call ad-hoc meetings 
as events arise with those countries that contribute to or support our operations and 
missions,”299 was included in the final declaration. How to approach relations with these 
countries remained an unresolved issue until the 2010 Lisbon Summit and the 
proclamation of its current Strategic Concept.300  
The number and scale of NATO’s partnerships have continued to grow because 
they are viewed as useful tool that provides malleable mechanisms of engagement 
between NATO members and countries with whom it believes that having a regularized 
and formal relationship with would be beneficial to both parties. The proliferation of 
various forms of partnership agreements is due to the ever-expanding strategic interests 
of NATO. No longer restricted to the European continent by the dynamics of the Cold 
War, it had a freer hand to influence world affairs. NATO’s relations with partner states 
may be one that reinforces the subservient position of a state, Georgia for example, to 
NATO, or one that increases the prestige of a state, i.e. Mongolia. Regardless NATO’s 
partnership arrangements grant it allies far outside of its traditional area of operations and 
provide it additional points of contact that both expand and deepen the scope of the 
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alliance. These flexible arrangements from diffuse to concentrated, grant the 
contemporary global security nexus manifestation of NATO a variety of methods by 
which it can interact with the world. These partnerships are the clearest signal of NATO’s 
evolution from a regional into a global security organization. 
The transnationalization of security after September 11th 
The uncertainty of the post-cold War period only intensified after September 11th, 
as the zone of conflict, the form of combat, and even the actors that were being 
confronted were further muddled. 301  While the state is still the central participant in 
modern warfare, it is now forced to share the stage with a variety of combatants residing 
within states and able to strike at a variety of points unexpectedly.302 The idea of a 
battlefield as a clearly delineated territorial space in which all participants are known to 
one another is declining in relevance. This is not to say the role that territory plays in 
determining conflict vanishes completely, as Latham reminds us, “Whether or not land as 
a reason to go to war is less relevant, states, even in the developed world, are still 
organized to fight wars across territory and to seize and hold it if necessary.”303 It does 
mean however, that control over territory is no longer the sole reason underlying 
contemporary warfare. This is an outgrowth of the trend, post September 11th, of a 
growing prevalence of transnational, rather than national or international security threats.  
This new security environment has changed both the calculation of risk and the apparatus 
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constructed to respond to it. 
  Although some risks, such as natural disasters, have always been transnational in 
origin, an entirely new set of risks, at the transnational level, are now confronting states 
and security agencies. This development is eroding the distinction between national and 
international as security actors construct new forms of governance to evaluate and 
respond to these new dynamics. Kahl recounts how this new security context challenges 
the ability of single states to adequately respond to emerging threats. He argues that 
“...firmly established boundaries between the actions of national and international actors 
are being called into question. The prevention and management of transnational risks of 
violence generally necessitates comprehensive problem solving...single nation-states are 
increasingly unable to reconcile the risks established by transnational actors with their 
own resources and within their sphere of responsibility.”304 The spread of violence 
outside the container of the nation-state, leads to an ever greater meshing of the security 
apparatus of aligned states, as they struggle to comprehend the complexity of the world 
that confronts them. Risk management techniques play a key role in allowing states to 
analyze this process, but the creation of an institutional apparatus capable of overseeing 
these actions, facilitating the sharing of information, and drawing states closer together is 
necessary to provide order and consistency to this process.  
The development of an increasingly complex array of global governance 
mechanisms is underlying and supporting this process.  As Sinclair argues, global 
governance mechanisms fulfill a valuable role by assisting in coordinating between actors 
and generating forms of knowledge that can be utilized to comprehend contemporary 
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developments.  
The process of global governance can be thought of as elevating global 
knowledge and the sorts of intelligence and communication that contribute to and 
help coordinate other aspects of globalization. This process can be thought of, 
first, as aimed at coordination and risk abatement in a context of intensified global 
competition and, second, as dependent on the creation of new forms of epistemic 
authority…The process of reorganizing relationships in this way gives rise to new 
transnational fields of authority.305 
NATO should be seen as an important part of this wider global governance, due to its 
creation of new epistemological frameworks and its ability to coordinate amongst a 
diverse set of actors, as I have noted at length above.  Unsurprisingly as the world's 
premier security organization NATO is a central element of what I see as an emerging 
transnational security apparatus.306  
Earlier I noted that epistemic communities have a tendency to promote the 
transnationalization of the forms of knowledge that they develop. This forging of 
transnational links is not only carried out through knowledge production but extends to 
the concept of security itself, generating a growing sphere of transnational security 
concerns. As Beck notes, NATO has replaced national security concerns with 
transnational issues that intersect and penetrate the state apparatuses of its members. He 
argues that “…NATO has provided answers to national security questions in a 
transnationally organized form...it has simultaneously denationalized and 
transnationalized issues of national security and thereby renationalized them through 
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cooperation.”307 This reformulation of security onto a transnational scale has wide-
ranging repercussions, spawning a situation of which I refer to as scalar flux, where the 
traditional distinctions between the national, international, and local erode. A major 
consequence of scalar flux is that the clear delineation of political space becomes 
increasingly difficult to maintain. This trend began after the end of the Cold War, 
intensified after September 11th, and has been deeply impacted by the contemporary 
extension of austerity and its reworking of security relationships within and between 
states.  
Engaging with the expanded spectrum of threats that now confronts NATO 
requires a reinvention of its organizational apparatus; a task that it has only recently 
embarked upon. This chapter sought to examine how NATO responded, in a conceptual 
manner, to the immediate post-Cold War period and on into the War on Terror. The next 
chapter will carry through this analysis to the present day and explore the material and 
organizational changes that NATO has undergone in response to an ever more uncertain 
world. These changes have transformed NATO into what I label as a global security 
nexus; a new formation is uniquely suited to operating in the contemporary conditions of 
scalar flux. Yet while the commitments of NATO have grown ever larger, its capacity to 
adequately respond is imperiled, as the logic of austerity curtails the material resources 
available. 
 The need for NATO to develop the partnerships and military arrangements traced 
above along with its de-emphasis of collective defense and elevation of risk management 
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arose out of the complex and uncertain environment that it faced with the end of the Cold 
War. The choice NATO confronted in the 1990s was to either evolve or perish. NATO’s 
decision to adopt an expanded conceptualization of security and move outside out its 
traditional European area of operations, both in terms of interventions and institutional 
linkages indicate that it chose survival over irrelevance. The trends that NATO 
confronted in the years after the Cold War have only deepened in the wake of the 2007 
Global Financial Crisis. The global instability in the wake of the crisis was compounded 
by the pursuit of austerity, the way chosen by governments as the means out of the crisis. 
The current conjecture, one that is characterized by the weakness of capitalism 
economically, but the persistent strength of ruling classes globally308 has resulted in the 
extension and intensification of NATO’s global security apparatus in order to provide the 
space and time for necessary for the reordering of global capitalist accumulation.309 The 
acceleration since 2007 of the project to transform NATO into a global security nexus 
forms the central topic of discussion in the next chapter.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE DENOUEMENT OF 2007 
The impact of the 2007 Global Financial Crisis on NATO and the continued 
viability of a Western led world order is difficult to overstate. The crisis threw into 
disarray the architecture of power that had been constructed in the immediate Post-Cold 
War period. It marked a sharp decline in both the desire and the ability of the United 
States to provide its traditional role of global leadership. Since 2007, the global economy 
has been buffeted by instability and anemic growth. Coinciding with the weakened state 
of the global economy has been a shift in geopolitical power away from the West that has 
yet to manifest itself in any coherent alternative governance mechanisms. The 
contemporary world situation is best characterized by a lack of any clear leadership 
where no state or collection of states has the capacity to guide the global economy 
through its present turbulence. Bremmer and Roubini are correct when they state that, 
“We are now living in a G-zero world, one in which no single country or bloc of 
countries has the political or economic leverage or the will to drive a truly international 
agenda.”310 The experience of Bretton Woods, where a new project to guide and manage 
the global economy was forged after the Second World War, is unlikely to be duplicated 
today. 
While 2007 caused a facture in the postwar liberal order, it did not represent a 
sharp break from past practice for NATO. The Alliance had already undergone a decade 
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of intense debate prior to the crisis that had culminated in the 1999 Strategic Concept that 
set forth a new direction for NATO. Instead, 2007 for NATO was a denouement that 
accelerated and solidified trends that were already in place. While the acceptance of out 
of area operations and a broader conceptualization of security within NATO predates the 
2007 Crisis, the intensification of neoliberalism that followed encouraged a fixation on 
operational and organizational efficiency within the Alliance. This renewed focus led to 
the expansion of NATO’s global partnership agreements and a greater emphasis on risk 
management; sparking a wide ranging institutional transformation that sought to make 
knowledge production and information sharing the centerpiece of NATO’s transition into 
a global security nexus. This chapter will examine the root causes of the 2007 Global 
Financial Crisis, and demonstrate its impact upon the global economy and geopolitical 
order. It will then discuss the effect of the crisis upon the institutional structure of NATO 
and the format of its operations. The chapter will conclude by explaining why the 
dominant research approaches in International Relations are inadequate for 
comprehending the alterations that have occurred in NATO since 2007 and present my 
own alternative approach.  
The Centrality of Risk in Modern Financial Markets  
In contrast to previous financial crises, the Global Financial Crisis of 2007 began 
in the heartland of Western capitalism, the United States, and spread rapidly outwards.311 
The major preceding crises of the 1990s and 1980s began in South East Asia and Latin 
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America respectively.312 While American corporations and the American economy 
certainly suffered from these crises, the United States was not at the epicenter of these 
downturns. The 2007 crisis was different in this respect as the crisis began due to 
widespread foreclosures in the American housing market. While a run on the American 
housing market was the actual event that precipitated the crisis two factors affected the 
speed at which it spread and the scale of its impact. First, the financialization of the world 
economy since the advent of neoliberalism in the late 1970s resulted in the dense 
interconnection of financial markets across the globe; a failure in circuits of 
accumulation, particularly in the world’s largest economy would quickly have a far-
reaching impact. Second, the 2007 Crisis was marked by a breakdown in the ability to 
quantify financial risks. This failure fuelled a growing sense of panic that was responsible 
for the dramatic scenes that occurred in the Fall of 2008, when following the collapse of 
Lehman Brothers; it appeared that the entire American financial system, the linchpin of 
the global economy, was teetering towards a complete meltdown.313  
While financial processes are central to the mechanisms of accumulation within 
neoliberalism, it is important to note that financial capital, in the neoliberal era, did not 
claim ascendancy over an older and less adaptable industrial capital replacing it as the 
dominant form of capital. The classic critics of finance capital, Hilferding and Lenin, 
argued that finance capital had come to dominate industrial capital. Hilferding argued: 
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“The mobilization of capital and the continual expansion of credit gradually brings about 
a complete change in the position of the money capitalists. The power of the banks 
increases and they become founders and eventually rulers of industry, whose profits they 
seize for themselves as finance capital, just as formerly the old usurer seized, in the form 
of 'interest', the produce of the peasants and the ground rent of the lord of the manor.”314 
Yet, finance capital, in its contemporary manifestation cannot be viewed as sitting atop of 
a hierarchical arrangement of different forms of capital. Finance in the present era is no 
longer largely contained within vast cartels with the surplus exported to low investment 
markets. Instead, finance shapes every aspect of modern life. Finance as Martin argues, 
“...has become a means, a machine for living whose architecture is at once international 
and intimate. What was meant to finish a process, to close a deal, now lies everywhere in 
the midst of everything.”315 The prerogatives of finance capital have subsumed the 
processes of contemporary capitalism, determining the manner in which it presently 
operates. With finance pervading every aspect of modern life, it becomes difficult, if not 
impossible, to impose a separation between financial and non-financial forms of capital. 
This pervasive financialization was set in motion in the late 1970s, becoming a central 
component of an emergent neoliberalism. 
 The United States was responsible for leading the way in integrating financial 
processes and calculations within every aspect of the global economy.316 Contemporary 
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capitalism then is not a competition between efficient financial capital and inefficient 
industrial capital; instead, as Marazzi argues, financialization has become the primary 
form of value production today. Marazzi’s view is that “...financialization is not an 
unproductive/parasitic deviation of growing quotas of surplus-value and collective 
saving, but rather the form of value production symmetrical with new processes of value 
production.”317 Arguing that a competition exists between industrial and financial capital, 
is to posit that a “pure” form of industrial capital exists, one that is capable of challenging 
a diametrically opposed financial capital.318 Rather there is no form of capital that has not 
been touched by the logic of financialization. Peet, surveying the effect of thirty years of 
neoliberalism, echoes this point. He notes, “Over the last thirty years, capital has 
abstracted upwards, from production to finance; its sphere of operations has expanded 
outwards, to every nook and cranny of the globe; the speed of its movement has 
increased, to milliseconds; and its control has extended to include everything. We now 
live in the era of global finance capitalism.”319 One of the most profound impacts of this 
financialization of everyday life are the ever-expanding set of calculations concerned 
with the identification and assessment of risk. 
 Risk, in financial terms, is defined by McNeil and others as, “...the risk of a 
change in the value of a financial position due to changes in the value of the underlying 
components on which that position depends, such as stock and bond prices, exchange 
rates, commodity prices, etc.”320 The ability to profit in financial markets is dependent on 
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one's level of knowledge about the perceived or actual risk as it relates to a particular 
corporation, product, or service and the manner in which this risk will impact upon 
profitability. The identification and measurement of risk is not simply restrained to 
markets however. The production of risk, has, as Cutler notes, become one of the central 
elements of modern society. She argues that “... the manufacture of risks is possibly one 
of the most dynamic and expansionary characteristics of modern capitalist activity... the 
concept of risk becomes fundamental to the way both actors and technical specialists 
organize the world.”321 These calculations effect a wide range of social processes outside 
of the financial domain and explain why the failure to properly calculate risk was a key 
precipitating factor of the current crisis, an event that has continued to reverberate in 
unexpected ways and shape the security environment within which NATO operates. 
 Of course, the calculation of risk is not unique to the neoliberal period. Indeed, it 
has a long history that predates the current neoliberal era by centuries. The measurement 
of risk originally developed out of the necessity to provide a reliable method for 
determining the premium that should be charged to insure marine cargo as it was shipped 
across the Atlantic Ocean in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.322 Reliable and 
standardized methods for the identification of risk were developed, as Levy argues, as a 
method to stabilize and provide some regularity to the processes of capital accumulation. 
He notes that “…in the end capitalism itself assumes the risk. It assumes, in other words, 
that financial instruments of its own making can adequately stabilize its own 
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unpredictable rhythms.”323 This ability to quantify risk is central to the process of capital 
accumulation, yet it has broken down on numerous occasions, most recently and 
spectacularly during the 2007 Global Financial Crisis. Although the present crisis had 
multiple causes, an important prerequisite to its onset was an unawareness of the high 
levels of systemic risk present in modern financial instruments. A large part of the 
problem lay in the financial models employed. The value at risk model, (VaR) which 
forms the foundation for determining the structure of many of the transactions that Wall 
Street financial institutions engage in,324 possessed a fundamental flaw. This is because, 
as Nocera explains, “VaR uses a normal distribution curve to plot the riskiness of a 
portfolio. However, it makes certain assumptions. VaR is often measured daily and rarely 
extends beyond a few weeks, and because it is a very short-term measure, it assumes that 
tomorrow will be more or less like today. Even what’s called “historical VaR” a variation 
of standard VaR that measures potential portfolio risk a year or two out only uses the 
previous few years as its benchmark.”325 Thus, the model in which financial firms based 
their understanding of risk, induced blindness to any events that occurred outside of the 
narrow range of the model. This short-term overview may have been useful in conducting 
millisecond trades,326 but in terms of comprehending the financial system as a whole VaR 
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was not only useless, but also dangerous.  
 Risk, or rather the inability to properly perceive it, has played a key role in 
sparking the present crisis. Financial institutions failed to identify and adequately 
measure systemic risks in the global economy.327 The securitization of subprime 
mortgages, combining them with other financial products, and adding a further level of 
risk by taking out credit default swaps and other derivative options on top of these 
instruments led to, as the United States Senate report examining the causes of the crisis 
recounts to “...an explosion of so called innovative financial products with embedded 
risks that are difficult to analyze and predict...U.S financial institutions reached 
unprecedented size and made increasing use of complex, high risk financial 
products...”328 The size of the market in which these financial transactions occurred was 
astronomical. On the eve of the Crisis, the combined total value of financial derivatives 
was nearly $200 trillion US dollars, approximately five times the estimated GDP of the 
entire planet.329 Thus, what began as a crisis in the American mortgage market in 2007 
quickly spread and became global on August 9, 2007. Major European investment funds 
froze, as it was impossible determine the value of their portfolios, which included 
unknown quantities of U.S securitized subprime mortgages.  
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The Global Financial Crisis and the Turn to Austerity 
The full cascading effects of the crisis would be seen in the Fall of 2008 with the 
buyout of Bear Sterns by JP Morgan, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the rescue of AIG 
by the American government, and the subsequent launch of the $700 billion Troubled 
Asset Relief Program in a desperate bid to restore interbank lending and unfreeze global 
credit markets.330 The core of the problem was that with financial instruments so 
complex, and the market now so unpredictable, banks and other financial institutions no 
longer had any way to calculate the value of their assets. As Germain recounts, “Financial 
assets which had been given a particular (book) value found these to be irrelevant to their 
working value, or what is often called market to market value. In fact, simply establishing 
the market value of many of these assets was impossible because the market had vanished 
and count not be recreated.”331 The ability of financial firms to calculate the risk and 
hence the value of their assets simply evaporated. The loss of this central component of 
market operations nearly caused the collapse of global financial system. Lack of 
government oversight compounded the problem. In the decades prior to the current crisis, 
governments systemically abandoned their regulatory oversight of financial markets. 
Adherence to many regulations was made voluntary and the Security and Exchange 
Commission, tasked with overseeing Wall Street, was underfunded, lacked proper 
investigative tools, and suffered regulatory capture.332   
                                                     
330For a succinct summary of the major events of the financial crisis see Vincenzo D'Apice and Giovanni 
Ferri,  Financial Instability: Toolkit for Interpreting Boom and Bust Cycles, (Houndsmills: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 124-7. 
331Randall Germain, Global Politics and Financial Governance, (Houndsmills: Palgrave Mcmillan, 2010), 
72. 
332See Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission, The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report: Final Report of the 
National Commission on the Causes of the Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States 
(Washington D.C: United States Senate, 2011), 53, 96, 414, 430 for greater detail on each of these points. 
128 
 
  A new Great Depression was only narrowly averted through not only flooding the 
American domestic market with credit to flush out the toxic assets that had caused the 
crisis, but through a coordinated response by the G20 and central banks to stimulate the 
global economy. In October 2008 the Federal Reserve, the European Central Bank, the 
Bank of England, the Bank of Canada, the Swiss National Bank, and the Swedish 
Riksbank, working in concert for the first time, all agreed to cut their interest rates by half 
a percentage point.333 At the April 2009 London Summit of the agreement was reached on 
an unprecedented 5 trillion dollar global stimulus package.334 This sustained bout of 
stimulus spending and heavy government intervention in the economy led many to 
believe, incorrectly, that this crisis marked the death of neoliberalism and would lead to 
the emergence of a new financial model.335 
This brief Keynesian revival was to be short lived however.336 Only 14 months 
later the 2010 Toronto G20 summit marked the end of coordinated stimulus programs and 
the adoption of austerity. The intellectual basis for austerity is based upon contradictory 
and questionable arguments. The foremost academic and policy advocates for austerity, 
or expansionary fiscal consolidation, as it is referred to in economics journals, have been 
Alberto Alesina along with Carmen Reinhart and Kenneth Rogoff. Alesina's work has 
been highly influential in EU policy circles337 while Reinhart and Rogoff have been 
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frequently cited by Republicans in the United States in support of deficit reduction.338 
Alesina's argument for austerity is based on several assumptions. First, on the demand 
side, if the enactment of austerity now is seen as removing the possibility for sustained 
and greater levels of austerity in the future, then customer spending will rise as a result. 
Further austerity should serve to convince bondholders that the economy is stabilizing, 
reducing government bond yields and hence the real interest rate. On the supply side, 
reducing the government labor force increases the size of the general labor pool, driving 
down wages and increasing profits, investment, and competitiveness.339 Yet bond rates 
and unemployment continue to reach record levels in Europe, where governments are 
pursuing austerity with a determined single-mindedness.340 Austerity is far more likely to 
provoke a prolonged economic contraction, rather than an expansion.341 As King argues, 
“The economic fundamentals that the proponents of austerity point to as drivers of 
economic recovery are absent. Worldwide customer and business confidence is severely 
depressed, and households and companies are prioritizing debt repayment over 
expenditure. Despite historically low interest rates, unemployment is high and increasing 
as consumption and investment are languishing.”342  Reinhart and Rogoff share Alesina's 
fixation with deficit reduction, arguing that when debt to GDP levels for an economy 
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reach over 90% median growth rates fall by an average of one percent.343 However, an 
analysis of their claims by Herndon, Ash, and Polin found that, “...coding errors, selective 
exclusion of available data, and unconventional weighting of summary statistics lead to 
serious errors that inaccurately represent the relationship between public debt and 
growth.”344 The intellectual case for austerity then appears to be based upon either a 
misunderstanding of how the public or investors will view the pursuit of fiscal 
consolidation or on faulty data. 
 Empirically as well, the case for austerity is lacking. While unemployment has 
been dropping in both the United States and the United Kingdom, the jobs that are being 
creating are primarily part-time and low wage.345 Further this drop in the unemployment 
rate masks record low labor participation, as many simply abandon the search for 
work.346 The picture in the rest of Western Europe is even bleaker as unemployment 
remains at record levels.347 Even on its central goal of reducing government deficits 
austerity has failed. Debt to GDP ratios for the 17 Euro area countries, where austerity 
has been enacted to the greatest extent, have grown from 70.1% in 2008 to 93.4% in the 
second quarter of 2013 according to Eurostat.348  
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 Rather than turning the corner the global economy has instead entered a long 
period of stagnation, characterized by short sputtering spurts of growth followed by 
renewed periods of contraction.349 Foster and McChesney describe this as a stagnation- 
financialization trap.  They note: “Characteristic of this phase of accumulation is the 
stagnation- financialization trap, whereby financial expansion has become the main fix 
for the system, yet is incapable of overcoming the underlying structural weakness of the 
economy. Much like drug addiction, new, larger fixes are required at each point merely to 
keep the system going. Every crisis leads to a brief period of restraint followed by further 
excesses.350 Although no single factor can be pointed to as definitively causing the 
current crisis,351 a key underlying cause of the crisis that has perpetuated it is the lack of 
demand in advanced capitalist countries. One important indicator of this lack of demand 
are the stagnant wages for the majority of American workers, the economy whose 
consumer demand is crucial for the continued growth of global capitalism.352  
While wages for the top 1 percent of income earners in the United States rose 275 
percent between 1979 and 2007 income only grew 65 percent for the next 19 percent, 39 
percent for the next 16 percent and 18 percent for the bottom 20 percent.353 This 
deepening inequality with the over-concentration of wealth in a tiny minority and slow 
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income gains in the rest of the society was an important condition that underlaid the 
current crisis.  Dumenil and Levy share this perspective noting that, “...the rate of 
consumption, notably on the part of the upper income brackets, is at the center of the 
mechanisms the led to the crisis. Thus the crisis must not be interpreted as the outcome of 
overaccumulation or underconsumption, but rather overconsumption paralleling under-
accumulation.”354 The explosion in consumer debt in the past twenty years355 was an 
attempt to maintain consumption standards, while real wage gains remained stagnant. 
This response to low wage growth eventually proved to be unsustainable over the long 
term.  
The connection between growing levels of inequality and slowing economic 
growth was noted in a recent IMF report, which found that persistent and high levels of 
inequality are correlated with lower levels of overall growth.  Its analysis of the income 
distribution of a number of countries found that “…inequality has a statistically 
significant negative relationship with the duration of growth spells. A one-Gini-point 
increase in inequality is associated with a 6-percentage point higher risk that the spell will 
end the next year… the overall effect of redistribution is pro-growth, with the possible 
exception of extremely large redistributions. There is no negative direct effect, and the 
resulting lower inequality seems to be associated with longer growth spells.”356 Highly 
unequal income distributions lead to an ever-greater dependence upon the increased 
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consumption of an ever-smaller segment of the population, in order to maintain economic 
growth.357 Austerity then is not a viable strategy for sustained economic growth.358 
Especially when the central problem in the American, as well as the global economy, is a 
lack of demand, along with a correlated lack of private investment 
  This reduced level of demand has in turn reduced investment. Many corporations 
and business are unwilling to invest because the prospects for future growth are 
extremely uncertain. Confidence in future growth is low from both CEOs of large 
corporations359 and small business owners.360 While in the early stages of the crisis states 
pumped trillions of dollars into their economies, these funds were largely horded due to 
future economic uncertainty. As McNally recounts, in the United States, “...the base 
money underpinning the system may have tripled, but the money circulating throughout 
the economy did not. Instead, rebuilding of reserves by banks, hoarding of cash by 
corporations, a decline in the velocity of money, depressed demands from loans from 
over-stretched consumers, and the reticence of banks to lend all combined to thwart any 
dramatic expansion of the real money supply.”361  Austerity has contributed to this 
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uncertainty and perpetuated the weakness in the global economy. Because of these 
conditions, trillions of dollars of corporate reserves sit awaiting the return of profitable 
investment opportunities.362  
While austerity is not solely responsible for the present economic malaise, its 
pursuit by Western governments is preventing the return of sustainable growth to the 
global economy.363  Beyond a simple failure of economic policy, austerity is also 
symphonic of a wider intellectual bankruptcy. Instead of exploring alternative economic 
arrangements and attempting to forge a more equitable social order, a difficult task that 
would require wide ranging structural reforms364 and the creation of a new institutional 
framework policymakers365 have instead chosen to salvage a retrograde neoliberalism.366  
However, the resuscitation of the ideology and policy prescriptions that failed so 
spectacularly in 2007 and 2008 not only has economic consequences but also geopolitical 
ramifications.  
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Austerity’s Geopolitical Impact: The 2010 Strategic Concept 
The turn towards austerity is negatively impacting NATO’s ability to guarantee 
Western security in both a general and a direct sense. Austerity has directly affected 
NATO by spurring a series of budget cutbacks after the 2007 Crisis and the subsequent 
intensification of neoliberalism as I recounted in the first chapter. These reductions have 
reduced the capacity of NATO when the tasks it is expected to perform are increasing. 
Austerity is eroding Western security in two ways. First as austerity begins to bite 
tensions and instability are elevated, potentially serving as a catalyst that sparks new 
international conflicts that may eventually require a response from NATO.367 Second 
austerity has solidified the weakness of the West by curtailing the ability of both the 
United States and NATO to intervene abroad in order to achieve their foreign policy 
interests.368  
The present crisis and the continued weakness of the American economy are 
beginning to place constraints upon American foreign policy.369 As Miandelbaum argues, 
“What the world's strongest power faces in the conduct of its foreign policy is not only 
weakness in relation to others but also, where foreign policy resources are concerned, 
scarcity.”370 While the United States remains, without question, the world's strongest state 
and the sole superpower, its ability to shape global dynamics in its favor is declining. 
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Zakaria echoes this argument, pointing out that while the United States remains 
predominant, current trends point to a gradual weakening of American power.  He 
declares that, “At the military economic and political level, we still live in a unipolar 
world. But along every other dimension-industrial, financial, social, cultural, the 
distribution of power is shifting, moving away from American dominance.”371 Germain 
shares this assessment, arguing that, “There is no question that the relational power of the 
U.S is eroding: firms from emerging market economies are challenging American firms 
in some areas, while the ability of the U.S state to dictate preferences onto a pliant world 
no longer holds.”372 Yet, despite the ravages of the most recent financial crisis, and a 
decline in the economic strength of the United States, American corporations and 
American based finance capital continue to greatly influence the course of the global 
economy. As Starrs observes, when the commanding heights of the global economy are 
examined, “...the United States leads in a remarkable eighteen of the twenty-five broad 
sectors of the top 2000 corporations in the world, the crème de la crème of global 
capitalism”373 America and the West as a whole still lead the globe in a number of crucial 
areas. The continuing crisis has however exposed weaknesses in the foundations of this 
power. The turn towards austerity, chronicled above, is only serving to exacerbate these 
weaknesses.   
 Ironically, while the pursuit of austerity was formulated as a policy to consolidate 
Western power it is having the opposite effect, degrading the mechanisms of control and 
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governance necessary for the reproduction of this power across the globe. As the 
overarching security, architecture of the West NATO has not been immune to the effects 
of austerity. NATO is only as strong as its members are and cuts in their defense budgets 
have reduced the ability of NATO to carry out the increasingly large tasks that are being 
set for it. As Gordon details, “Many cuts have been made with little intra-Alliance 
coordination. If this uncoordinated process of reduction continues, NATO risks losing 
critical capabilities, which could seriously erode its ability to meet the rapidly changing 
security challenges it will face in the second decade of the twenty-first century.”374 To 
meet the new challenges that were set in motion by the current economic crisis and the 
highly unpredictable and fluid geopolitical situation that followed NATO accelerated a 
transformation that it first embarked upon with its 1999 Strategic Concept, culminating in 
its current Strategic Concept adopted in 2010.  
 The impetus for a new Strategic Concept came from a panel of experts chaired by 
Madeline Albright, who issued a report arguing that NATO was still struggling to 
comprehend the world around it and need to adapt in order to retain its effectiveness. She 
wrote: “NATO must find its place within a less centralized and more complicated 
international order. Its new role will be influenced by the emergence of specific threats 
form a diverse spectrum of possibilities...they could arrive in forms with which we are 
familiar or in hybrid variations...”375 NATO's response was to greatly elevate the 
centrality of risk management within its strategic calculations. While NATO's new role in 
risk management and its enshrining of non-Article 5 crisis response operations as official 
policy occurred in the 1999 Strategic Concept, they only formed a small part of a much 
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larger document. It is in NATO's present strategic concept, adopted at its 2010 summit in 
Lisbon, that crisis management is elevated to form part of NATO's core tasks and 
principles.376 NATO, as one of the section headings states, will now seek “security 
through crisis management”.377 This requires that NATO develop the capacities to 
“...continually monitor and analyze the international environment to anticipate crises, and 
where appropriate take active steps to prevent them from becoming larger conflicts.”378  
NATO has done so by developing a comprehensive set of procedures that allows it to 
quantify and react to risk. 
The Identification and Treatment of Risk in NATO 
Although access to a number of NATO documents concerning its risk based 
planning, procedure is restricted,379 from the documentation available to the public it is 
possible to discern the impact that the incorporation of these procedures have had upon 
NATO's strategy. As a 2008 report states, the ability to identity risk has been elevated to a 
top priority with NATO and is being utilized to link together a variety of disparate 
activities together.380 The report details that, “The capability to continuously assess and 
manage risk has been identified as a priority 1 measure...this activity can be linked with 
the following requirements from NATO strategic commands. Intelligence support, the 
need to develop intelligence collection and analysis tools, the need for advanced 
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analytical tools for threat assessment.”381 NATO’s approach to risk assessment is as a 
continuous and cyclical process, the geopolitical environment is constantly assessed as 
threats can emerge at any time from a variety of areas. This style of risk assessment 
allows for an improved understanding of the situational environment as further 
information become available.  NATO's risk management process comprises four steps: 
establish scope, identify risks, analyze risks and treat risks. After these four stages have 
been completed, the creation of a risk management plan in a specific area of analysis 
becomes possible. These assessments are shared throughout NATO's institutional 
framework and influence its policies.382 
The first step is to determine the scope and issue areas from which potential 
threats may arise. Workshops conducted by NATO on risk assessment concur that 
narrowing the spectrum of threat is critical to allowing it to target its resources and 
formulate an appropriate response. A major priority then is “…reducing the problem 
space by finding clusters of similar threats…the clustering of threats are based on 
similarities in the function requirements that each threat imposed on a detection system, 
threats with similar functional requirements for detection are grouped together.”383 In 
order to determine the seriousness of a threat, a number of indicators and variables are 
generated.384 Multiple flagging of these indictors moves a particular target up the 
spectrum of threats with further analysis conducted. This serves to improve the efficiency 
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of NATO as it does not have to analyze and respond to every potential threat, but only 
smaller selected subsets.    
Once the scope of the issue area to be examined the next step is for the identity of 
the risk to be ascertained. It is here then that the actual risk is formulated. Stages two and 
three, identification of a risk and analysis of it, are usually conducted simultaneously. 
This is because actual creation of a risk occurs through analysis and the gathering of 
information. Surveillance plays a key role in laying the foundation for any preventative 
actions that NATO may have to take in the future.  
The final stage of NATO’s risk assessment procedure is the treatment of risk. At 
this point NATO has four different responses available; it can chose to either avoid, 
reduce, transfer or retain the risk in question.385 Retain is the most common response as 
no further resources are expended, NATO simply learns to live with the identified risk. 
Avoiding requires that NATO has excellent forecasting of a potential event and is capable 
of altering its policies before this potentiality becomes a reality. Reducing a risk occurs 
once a risk has already become a reality and a crisis has begun to emerge. After taking 
stock of the situation and determining that it poses, a threat to its interests NATO would 
intervene as rapidly as possible in order to mitigate the damage. The transferring of a risk 
happens once it is clear that the situation has devolved into a full-blown crisis, at this 
stage a military intervention by NATO becomes increasingly probable. Indeed NATO’s 
interventions in both Serbia and Libya have been characterized as risk transfer wars.386    
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In addition to its risk assessment, procedures NATO has also established modeling 
and simulation programs to build upon the information gained through risk assessment. 
This increases, in the mind of NATO policy makers, their ability to predict and rapidly 
respond to threats as they emerge. A summary of a NATO conference held to discuss new 
modeling and simulation programs, illustrates their centrality to current NATO 
operations. As Tolk summarizes,“...for the continuing transformation of military 
capabilities and for promoting interoperability of proposed implementations modeling 
and simulation has been recognized within NATO as a key element in addressing these 
new requirements and challenges of the NATO transformation process.”387 Elaborating a 
clear set of procedures through which the quantification of risk can occur and creating 
modeling programs to predict future crises are a part of the steps that NATO has taken in 
response to global uncertainty. 
A Global Alliance: NATO’s New Partnerships 
Beyond creating the ability to identify risk NATO must also have the capability to 
react curtail the threat posed by a risk. Engaging in crisis management operations requires 
that NATO prepare for a far wider range of operations and learn to work with broad array 
of actors. The current 2010 Strategic Concept recognizes this with its call to “Further 
develop doctrine and military capabilities for expeditionary operations, including 
counter-insurgency, stabilization, and reconstruction operations...enhancing integrated 
civil-military planning throughout the crisis spectrum.”388 NATO has sought to develop 
these capabilities by developing relationships with new states and deepening already 
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existing ones. 
 The 2010 Strategic Concept places a great emphasis upon forging relationships 
with states across the globe that share NATO’s general strategic interests with a firm 
pledge to, “…develop political dialogue and practical cooperation with any nations and 
relevant organizations across the globe that share NATO’s interest in peaceful 
international relations.”389 This commitment led NATO to extend the privileges for states 
that were members of its Partnership for Peace (PfP) program and create a new category 
of relationships for states that lacked any prior formal relationship with the Alliance. At 
its Lisbon Summit in 2010, NATO launched a comprehensive review of the political-
military framework for NATO-led PfP operations. This review eventually resulted in the 
creation of a Political- Military Framework that allowed PfP members the ability to shape 
decisions on the operations and missions that they contribute to.390  These changes were 
made with the aim of increasing PfP member involvement in future non-Article 5 out of 
area operations. This is made clear in the text of the framework itself. “From a NATO 
perspective this Political-Military Framework forms part of a wider framework of 
conceptual and practical documents and arrangements developed for the Alliance’s new 
missions beyond collective defense.”391 Since the ratification of the framework, NATO 
has aggressively pursued countries in the Caucasus and Central Asian region for PfP 
membership. By doing so NATO is laying, the foundations that would allow it to more 
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effectively intervene in these regions in the future by drawing important regional players 
within its sphere of influence.392 
The Lisbon Summit also laid the groundwork for the creation of the Individual 
Partnership and Cooperation Program (IPCP) a year later, in 2011, at a foreign ministers 
meeting in Berlin.393 The IPCP provides a standardized format of engagement for 
countries that are not part of NATO’s existing regional groupings. Countries that have an 
IPCP agreement with NATO are now able to select from the same set toolkit that is 
provided to PfP countries, they are also able, like PfP countries, and to influence the 
direction of any NATO led operation that they contribute to.394 Utilizing this strong and 
coherent foundation NATO has rapidly formed IPCP agreements with Mongolia395, New 
Zealand,396 Australia397, and South Korea.398 NATO has also finalized an accord with 
Columbia,399 and signed a joint political declaration with Japan.400 These burgeoning 
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partnerships are a clear indication that the strategic frame of NATO has expanded to 
encompass the entire globe, marking a dramatic change in priorities for the Alliance.401  
The global environment that NATO confronts has altered substantially since the 
end of the Cold War, the sources and type of threats that the Alliance confronts have 
become increasingly difficult to discern. This is due, in large part, to the ever expanding 
and deepening interconnectedness of the world’s population that has been central to 
period of accelerated neoliberal globalization that has characterized existence since the 
late 1970s.402 With the end of the Cold War, these processes have come to encompass the 
entire planet, affecting geopolitical dynamics and spawning a new geoeconomic order as 
I noted above. The Global Financial Crisis only served to add a further level of 
complexity to an already convoluted world. An outgrowth of this process has been what 
Cha and others403 refer to as a reconfiguration and recombination of social forces, which 
challenge traditional conceptions of space and the organization of political power. As 
they argue, “Globalization is best understood as a spatial phenomenon. It is not an event, 
but a gradual and ongoing expansion of interaction processes, forms of organization, and 
forms of cooperation outside the traditional spaces defined by sovereignty. Activity takes 
place in a less localized; less insulated way as transcontinental and interregional patterns 
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crisscross and overlap one another.”404 The current geoeconomic order then marks the 
collapse of the state as a bordered power container;405 indeed, it is doubtful that such a 
conceptualization of the state was ever appropriate.406  
The spatial uncertainty and constantly shifting interactions that are characteristic 
of the contemporary period have impinged upon the ability of states to pursue their 
security objectives in a variety of ways. Kirshner, for example, notes three principal 
impacts: reduced state autonomy, a reshuffling of relative capabilities, and the creation of 
new sources of conflict.407 As an inter-state organization, NATO has been simultaneously 
drawn up by these dynamics and forced to adapt in response but it also plays an important 
role in reinforcing particular aspects of the current geoeconomic order, namely the 
geopolitical dominance of the West. NATO’s partnerships are a reaction to the 
uncertainties of the current period that seek to provide the material basis through which 
interventions can be launched to contain threats as they arise. While NATO’s 
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proliferating, partnerships clearly illustrate its aspirations to mold global security 
dynamics in the interests of its members they represent only a portion of the 
transformation that the Alliance has undergone since the Global Financial Crisis. 
Alongside expanding its external connections NATO has also redesigned its institutional 
structure to prioritize the production and sharing of knowledge. 
 While NATO’s new partnership programs provide the ability for it to react to 
events, implementing knowledge production and sharing procedures allow for the 
comprehension of the factors that lead to crisis and provide the ability to determine when 
and in what form to intervene. This combination of an expanding web of external 
connections and internal alterations to improve the coordination and governance 
capabilities of NATO mark its emergence as a global security nexus. While this section 
explored the external network of arrangements that NATO has concluded in response to 
the Global Financial Crisis the next section will examine the internal effects of the crisis 
and the impact that NATO’s strategic shift towards crisis management has had upon its 
institutional architecture.  
Rethinking War: The Science and Technology Office and the Elaboration of a New Model 
Command and Control 
 A major outcome of the elevation of risk management in NATO’s 2010 Strategic 
Concept has been a fixation upon promoting and deepening processes of knowledge 
development across its entire institutional apparatus. Knowledge development within 
NATO is not simply an abstract inclination, rather its actualization demonstrates the 
inter-relation between the framing of knowledge, the production of specific types of 
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knowledge as a result, and institutional innovation. The influence of knowledge 
development has been far reaching, leading to the creation of a new model of command 
and control model, the formation of new institutions, such as Allied Command 
Transformation, and a greater importance for already existing institutions like the Science 
and Technology Organization.  These new models and structures result in greater combat 
efficiency by deepening the linkages between military actors and dramatically improving 
reaction time and battlefield awareness. The Science and Technology Organization and 
Allied Command Transformation are perhaps the most dynamic and innovative 
components of NATO’s far-reaching organizational apparatus, providing both the 
analytical rigor and the guidance required as NATO embarks upon its path of reinvention 
as a global security nexus. Central to the operations of both institutions is their promotion 
and extension of knowledge development, the conceptual manner by which NATO has 
incorporated the logic of risk management within its operations. However, there is a 
paucity of academic analysis on both institutions. This dearth of commentary is curious 
especially in light of the wider impact that the analytical framing and concepts that these 
two institutions have developed have had upon NATO as a whole.  
Allied Command Transformation and the Science and Technology Organization 
each seek to improve NATO’s flexibility and responsiveness in a unpredictable world, 
taken together they should be considered as the nexus component of NATO’s formation 
as a global security nexus. While the ever-expanding set of agreements and interactions 
that NATO is engaging in with non-member states that seek to expand the scope of its 
influence amount to the global security portion of NATO as a global security nexus. The 
Science and Technology Organization (STO) is located within the civilian side of NATO 
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and was established shortly after NATO itself was founded in 1949. NATO’s Chief 
Scientist heads STO and its members, appointed by their respective national governments 
can be drawn from government, industry, or academia. While given a wide degree of 
independence as a subsidiary body having the same official legal standing as NATO 
itself, the STO is formally overseen by North Atlantic Council, NATO’s highest political 
body.408 The creation of Allied Command Transformation (ACT) is a far more recent 
event, occurring in 2002. ACT lies firmly on the military side of NATO, a military 
officer directs ACT, all of its leadership are drawn from member militaries and it follows 
standard military chain of command. Alongside Allied Command Operations, ACT is 
one of two NATO Supreme Commands that report directly to NATO’s military 
committee.409  
The STO and ACT are engaged in complementary and at times overlapping 
functions. Each is dedicated to increasing knowledge sharing and connectivity between 
NATO’s diverse organizational components. However, important differences, in addition 
to their chain of command and organizational culture exist between them. The STO 
concerns itself with conceptual innovation and seeks to develop a new apparatus of 
knowledge that deepens NATO’s understanding of the contemporary geopolitical 
environment. ACT, in contrast, engages in more focused endeavors by creating military 
doctrine that governs Alliance activities. Both organization are central to understanding 
the current orientation of NATO and where it is headed in the future. 
                                                     
408 NATO Science and Technology Organization, “About the STO,” 
http://www.sto.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=18 accessed September 13th, 2013. 
409 For an overview of NATO’s military and civilian structure and the role of semi-independent 
organizations like the STO in NATO see NATO, “NATO Organization” 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/structure.htm accessed September 13th, 2013.  
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In its early years the main focus of the STO was upon aerospace research and 
armament research. Indeed one of the first major actions taken by the STO in 1952 was to 
establish the Advisory Group for Aerospace Research and Development,410 which created 
a series of subordinate areas such as flight combustion and wind tunnel and model 
testing.411 In 1967 the NATO Defense Research Group was established, its purpose was 
to foster cooperation on research and new technology that could lead to future defense 
equipment.412 These two organizations merged in 1996 to form the Research and 
Technology Board, (R&T) under the oversight of the STO.413 Since its inception, the 
R&T has regularly issued technical reports that seek to generate new concepts that can be 
applied by NATO to understand a complex contemporary strategic environment and 
develop a common knowledge base between NATO members to ensure that a shared 
understanding exists regarding NATO’s priorities. The R&T also conducts reviews of the 
military doctrine of NATO members and attempts to align them on key points. An in-
depth examination of several recent technical reports provides an excellent overview of 
the current direction that NATO policy, in terms of its organizational framework, is 
heading. 
NATO’s shift to a risk-centric strategy has necessitated that it increase the 
knowledge gathering and reflexivity of its own institutions. The R&T acknowledges this 
when it argues for, “The need to shorten learning cycles and implement lessons learned 
                                                     
410 NATO Science and Technology Organization, Collaboration and Support Office, “Advisory Group for 
Research and Development,” http://www.cso.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=24 Accessed September 13, 2013. 
411 NATO Science and Technology Organization, Collaboration and Support Office, “From AGARD to 
RTO,” http://www.cso.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=27 Accessed September 13th, 2013. 
412 NATO Science and Technology Organization, Collaboration and Support Office, “NATO Defense 
Research Group,” http://www.cso.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=26 Accessed September 13, 2013. 
413 NATO, “NATO Establishes New Research and Technology Board,” December 9, 1996. 
http://www.cso.nato.int/Main.asp?topic=28 Accessed September 13, 2013. 
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are imperative in contemporary military operations. It will only become more so in the 
future. Thus, we must learn, preserve and enhance real time learning mechanisms and the 
methodology of managing knowledge, before, during and following operations for the 
future.”414 This perspective is echoed in another related report by NATO, which attempts 
to outline a model by which NATO should respond to future crises. The management of 
crises is a difficult endeavor as, “The characteristic of a crisis is that it is unpredictable, 
out of frame, that it exceeds the existing means, and that it cannot be anticipated by 
scenarios.”415 Although the techniques of risk management may provide an overarching 
framework of action and understanding for NATO, on their own they are not sufficient, 
as they do not contribute the actual tools and concepts required in the specific 
circumstances encountered by NATO. The imperative that NATO has set for itself to 
rapidly access and respond to emerging situations necessitates the emergence of new 
forms of analysis.  Risk management serves to impart only a general level of 
understanding, the particular elements that will actually guide NATO’s policy and 
actions, must be generated within NATO itself. With risk management serving as the 
methodology, what remains is its utilization in an effective manner that allows for the 
discernment of reality in a way that assists NATO in achieving its objectives.  
As an R&T report noted, the contemporary production of knowledge is a complex 
task. “Generating knowledge is increasingly about practical usefulness and tends to 
require a larger, more diverse system of epistemic communities, actors, stakeholders and 
                                                     
414 Gil Ariely, “Operational Knowledge Management as an International Interagency Interoperability 
Vehicle,” NATO: Research and Technology Board, RTO-MP-IST-O86, 5-2 (2006) 
415 Florence Aligne, “Which Information and Decision Support System for Crisis Management?”, NATO: 
Research and Technology Board, RTO-MP-IST-O86, 12-7 (2006) 
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participants involving a continuous negotiation. Research priorities must adapt to a 
constantly shifting landscape and the research enterprise must embrace more 
uncertainty.”416 The overwhelming sum of information available and the diversity of 
sources from which it arises confront policymakers, makes their distilling into useful 
concepts that can serve as the basis for action a difficult one. NATO has sought to 
overcome this conundrum through the development of filtering mechanisms that bring 
important information to the forefront, while disregarding superfluous data. Social radar 
is an example of such a tool. 
Social radar seeks to use social media and the internet to provide insight into 
current threats as well as assist in predicting future trends that may threaten NATO’s 
interests. Based upon a pre-set selection of key indicators a wide net is cast in order to 
determine the nature of the contemporary political environment. While the actual content 
of the social radar program employed by NATO remains classified, Costa and Boiney, 
provide an overview of what is necessary to establish a successful social radar program 
that is worth quoting at length. 
Success of social radar depends on continuous access to global data on general 
population perceptions, attitudes, opinions, sentiments, and behaviors. Much of 
the most timely and valuable data will be found through a variety of increasingly 
Internet-based sources, including, of course, social media. Analysts must use all 
relevant data, in conjunction with current and emerging technologies, to support 
an analysis of non-kinetic messages, forecasting of messaging effects, course of 
action planning and measurement of effects. This combination of data and 
technical capabilities will enable improved situation awareness and decision 
support for anticipating instability, countering violent extremism, and building 
partner capacity.417  
                                                     
416 John Verdon, “The Wealth of People: How Social Media Re-Frames the Future of Knowledge and 
Work,” NATO: Research and Technology Board, RTO-MP-HFM-201, (2015):1-11. 
417 Barry Costa and John Boiney, “Social Radar,” NATO: Research and Technology Board, RTO-MP-
HFM-201, (2015):3-5. 
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Social radar does not represent a new source of information; rather it is an encompassing 
mesh, which highlights the relative importance of already existing sources of 
information. It is an example of the new forms of analysis that NATO is developing to 
increase its comprehension of an ever more complicated and unpredictable world. These 
new analytical tools are being utilized as the foundation for the creation of a new 
conceptual apparatus, an apparatus that provides the impetus for alterations to NATO’s 
mechanisms of command and control.418 Information gathering programs, such as social 
radar are central to these new command and control models as they provide a wealth of 
data that can then be analyzed to offer heightened strategic awareness. This data is 
processed through new command models with threats generated and actions taken as a 
result. The incorporation of logics of risk management, which has spurred the elaboration 
of these new models, are responsible for radically reshaping how NATO approaches 
battlefield management. 
 NATO’s command and control mechanisms are not often the subject of wider 
discussion. Stares’ complaint, made in the immediate aftermath of the Cold War, remains 
relevant today. He wrote “…NATO’s command system has attracted little attention…and 
has rarely, if ever been questioned let alone systemically studied.”419 On the rare 
occasions when NATO’s command and control mechanisms have been studied, the 
predominant concern has been how NATO would respond to or initiate a nuclear 
                                                     
418 Although no specific examples can be found that in which a social radar program developed by NATO 
is connected to its new command and control models, it is easy to envision situations in which it would be 
useful to link them together. The analysis of trends conducted by a social radar program could be 
incorporated into the new command and control framework presently being elaborated by NATO, greatly 
improving the situational awareness of this model.  
419 Paul Stares, Command Performance: The Neglected Dimension of European Security, (Washington 
D.C: Brookings Institution, 1991), 2. 
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attack.420 This analysis speaks to an earlier era where collective defense was the sole 
strategic doctrine of NATO. The unpredictable geopolitical environment and 
consequentially the elevation of risk management to a central strategic doctrine has had 
an impact this shift has had upon how NATO approaches battlefield engagements have 
yet to be rigorously examined. This oversight is surprising, as two STO working groups, 
SAS-050 and SAS-065, have conducted an in-depth internal re-examination of NATO’s 
command structures. Their reports have elaborated a dynamic new form of command and 
control that seeks to increase the availability, speed and range of knowledge that can be 
acquired and processed by NATO. With their focus upon access and disbursement of 
knowledge, these models represent the latest iteration of a long historical process, one 
that, following van Crevald, extends to the earliest forms of military organization. “The 
history of command can be understood in terms of a race between the demand for 
information and the ability of command systems to meet it. That race is eternal; it takes 
place within every military organization, at all levels and at all times.”421 While the 
foundations of NATO’s new command and control mechanisms may be ancient, the 
solutions proposed are original and creative. 
In order to capture as broad a spectrum of relationships as possible and allow for a 
rapid reaction, NATO has relied upon modeling software to capture developments as they 
emerge.422 NATO is particularly interested in the creation of programs that can assist its 
                                                     
420 Bruce Blair. Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat, (Washington D.C: 
Brookings Institution, 1985). Shaun Gregory, Nuclear Command and Control in NATO: Nuclear Weapons 
Operations and the Strategy of Flexible Response. (Houndsmills: Macmillan, 1996). 
421 Martin van Creveld, Command in War, (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1985), 265. 
422 To be deemed valid and useful a conceptual model must met a long list of requirements. These include: 
supporting the testing and refinement of casual and influence links, suggests points of influence and 
pressure, helps in rapid generation of ideas, supports studies and analysis, identifies gaps in knowledge, and 
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command and control mechanisms in developing a more network centric approach that 
increases communication between different institutions and assists in the spread of 
knowledge concerning the current strategic environment amongst all relevant parties.423 
In this regard, NATO working group, SAS-050 was struck to, “…support the exploration 
of new, network-enabled approaches to command and control and compare their 
characteristics, performance, effectiveness, and agility to traditional approaches to 
command and control.”424 This resulted in the creation of a complex model consisting of 
over 300 variables.425 This model was designed to analyze information provided about 
ongoing events, classify these events into one of seven possible categories, and then 
suggest a framework of action.426 The working group on this project created two distinct 
case studies to test the parameters and effectiveness of the model. The first envisioned a 
complex peacekeeping and warfighting scenario, while the second case sought to test the 
broader tenets of network centric operations.427  The result of these case studies was 
positive, as the report notes they, “…demonstrated that, even in its immature state, the 
Conceptual Model went a long way towards providing the kind of support envisaged. The 
case study was of great value in informing the further development of the model; if a 
similar exercise were carried out now with a more mature model it would be of 
                                                     
supports customized views for different audiences. NATO: Research and Technology Board, “Exploring 
new command and control concepts and capabilities,” RTO-TR-SAS-050, 2007, 10-2-1-10-2-2. 
423 NATO succinctly states its reasons for engaging in these projects as follows, “The tenets that form the 
intellectual foundation for these ongoing transformations are: A robustly networked force enables the 
widespread sharing of information. Widespread information sharing and collaboration in the information 
domain improves the quality of awareness, shared awareness and collaboration. This, in turn, enables self-
synchronization. This results in a dramatic improvement in operational effectiveness and agility.” Ibid., 1-
1. 
424Ibid., 2-3 
425 Ibid., 1-3. 
426 These include track, target, engage, assess and anticipate events. Ibid., 10-2-2. 
427 The actual content of the case studies is not elaborated further. Ibid., 10-2-3. 
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significant benefit in further validation.”428 The lessons learned from the analysis 
conducted and the data provide through this model would be utilized by a later working 
group to create a model of greater complexity.429 
This later working group, SAS-065 worked in conjunction with the United States 
Department of Defense Command and Control Research Program. The direct 
involvement of the Department of Defense illustrates the elevated gravity with placed 
upon the analysis being conducted. The key innovation of this report, entitled the NATO 
NEC2 Maturity Model, when compared to the efforts of the previous SAS-050 group, 
was that it developed and incorporated a scalable model of command and control that 
utilized the complex modeling system created by the SAS-050 group. NATO’s 
understanding of command and control is an explicit critique of what it sees as the static 
and prevailing conceptualization of these concepts. Hence, before delving into the actual 
components of the scalable model of command and control that is developed in this 
report, it is useful to explore how NATO defines command and control as well as how it 
seeks to break with the contemporary framework. Doing so is not only useful not only in 
terms of understanding what the SAS-050 working group sought to achieve, it has a 
larger applicability as it prefigures and assumes a specific mission format and set of 
interactions with other political actors in the future that differs from the one historically 
assumed by NATO. 
                                                     
428 Ibid., 10-2-4. 
429 The executive summary of the SAS-050 report notes that the model will be further refined in the future 
by SAS-065 which has been created as a follow up effort. Ibid., ES-1. 
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NATO views its engagements in the 21st century as far more fluid and extending 
beyond the traditional organizational boundaries that have confined it in the past. Future 
operations will require a collective approach in order to be successful. As Alberts argues 
“The challenges faced by NATO and its member nations in the 21st century require the 
creation of a coalition; a collection of disparate entities who are pursuing related but not 
identical goals. This collective is composed of contributing entities, both military and 
non-military from the various NATO nations. This coalition will likely include 
contributions from non-NATO countries and international organizations…”430 To be an 
effective security actor in the future NATO will have to break out its institutional 
boundaries, through networking and integrating with a diverse range of actors with 
aligned, if not matching interests.431 It is through this process that NATO takes on the 
characteristics of a global security nexus as it weaves together a diverse group of states 
together and attempts to coordinate their efforts in an effective manner. Indeed the 
framework of command and control that NATO elaborates in this report is an explicitly 
collective one, which seeks to provide a means of linking together an ever-alternating set 
of actors. If fully enacted this model could provide a coherent framework of command 
and control as NATO assumes, to an ever-greater degree, its role as a global security 
nexus. 
                                                     
430 David Alberts, Reiner Huber, and James Moffat, NATO NEC2 Maturity Model, (Washington D.C: DOD 
Command and Control, 2010), 7. 
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 The scalable nature of this model contains within it a conceptualization of space 
that violates traditional territorial boundaries, cutting across traditional scalar and spatial 
and hence governance boundaries. Such a capability is not unprecedented for a 
hegemonic state like the United States, whose military seamlessly spans the globe. 
Indeed, as early as the first Gulf War, the declining impact of territory in strategic and 
tactical calculations was noted by Virilio. He posited that, “…we can no longer 
legitimately speak of a battlefield or of a localized war…they are overshadowed, totally 
dominated by the scope of a global capacity, of an environment in which the spatio-
temporal reduction is the essential characteristic.”432 While the overcoming of territory as 
a limit upon contemporary battlefield engagement is not a recent development, the 
attempt to achieve this level of situational dominance by an organization which binds 
together a multitude of states of highly varying military capabilities like NATO is a 
project of a starkly different magnitude, one this is highly contingent and prone to 
collapse, but if successful would provide coherence to and renewal to a Western-centric 
constellation of power. This is goal of the command and control modeling currently 
underway within NATO.  
The overriding critique that NATO has concerning traditional methods of 
command and control is that they adopt a commander centric viewpoint. This approach to 
command adopts a singular focus, where the role of single individual representing a 
single institution is evaluated above all others. This model is unhelpful as a method of 
organizing 21st century operations, because, as noted, for NATO these will be primarily 
collective endeavors. In these circumstances, “The commander-centric view of what is 
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after all a set of functions required for mission success is totally antithetical to the way in 
which these functions need to be accomplished in 21st century complex endeavors…For a 
variety of reasons no single entity will be in command. Hence, a commander centric view 
makes no sense.”433 Indeed the extent to which traditional  new models of command need 
to be rethought is so great, which such a radical departure required that the research 
group ponders whether it would be best to abandon the terms command and control in 
favor of focus and convergence, ultimately deciding for the sake of clarity to retain them, 
for the time being.434 In the place of a commander, centric model SAS-050 offers a 
scalable five level model of command and control suitable to managing the diverse set 
institutions of institutions that NATO is likely to oversee as they seek to obtain their 
objectives within a complex security environment. The convergence of scale, space and 
the elaboration of systems of command and control within this model is not a unique 
development. Indeed the British Empire and the United States in the 19th century both 
engaged in similar projects.435 What separates NATO’s configuration from those earlier 
eras is a matter of scope and speed.436 The near instantaneous knowledge of battlefield 
developments and the shared field of vision available to all relevant actors dwarfs these 
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earlier endeavors that possessed a far more circumscribed amount of knowledge that was 
limited to a narrower range of participants.  
The five levels of increasing command and control maturity levels that have been 
elaborated are from one to five: stand-alone (disjointed) operations, de-conflicted 
operations, coordinated operations, integrated operations, and transformed (coherent) 
operations.437 NATO’s new command and control maturity model explicitly incorporates 
a scalar and spatial approach. In terms of scale each, “…specific level of command and 
control maturity is associated with a specific set of capabilities that focus an entity or set 
of entities and converge on a desired set of outcomes… The command and control 
maturity model is a layered framework with levels of increasing maturity as the levels 
increase.”438 This layered model, which offers expanding capability sets scalable to the 
specific mission type being confronted and the costs willing to be incurred. The 
conceptual model developed by the prior SAS-050 working group fits into this 
framework by providing guidance as to the appropriate level of command and control 
maturity required for the current task. This scalar model of command and control 
presented by NATO possesses an important spatial component that is utilized to judge the 
effectiveness of each subsequent level as the scale of command and control maturity is 
expanded or contracted. It is important however not to confuse these command functions 
with the scalar itself. This command framework is a response to, not a generator of scalar 
uncertainty. The scale, properly conceived, is the plane of interaction, not the interaction 
itself.  
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Information and cognition are the crucial elements that are empathized in the 
command and control maturity model presented in this report. Information and cognition 
are conceived together as part of a social domain, NATO’s understanding of these 
domains is expressed in spatial terms, as is the impact that they have upon command and 
control. Improving the flow of information between relevant actors and improving 
cognition of it allows for a spatially expanded command and control framework capable 
of accessing and analyzing ever-greater amounts of information and acting upon this 
information in a useful manner. The report claims that “Achieving a significant amount 
of shared understanding enables a collective to be more agile and span more of the 
command and control approach space, which is needed to realize higher levels of 
command and control maturity.”439 Thus, information and cognition serve as the primary 
variables whose existence affects the portion that other secondary variables will be 
present. NATO identifies these secondary variables as agility, patterns of interaction, and 
allocation of decision rights.440 The extent to which these values are present allows for 
movement up the scale of maturity. From the first, conflicted level of maturity, where all 
interactions take place within individual entities and no collaboration exists, to the fifth 
level where entities within the collective are capable of self-synchronization that is 
predicated on a robustly networked set of connections that enables extensive sharing of 
information and rich, continuous interactions.441 
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   This new model of command is necessitated by the new emerging format of 
missions that NATO sees itself as contributing to in the future. Within this new format of 
missions, interoperability and efficiency are of paramount importance, due to the 
demands of austerity. Wider economic conditions are serving to alter how NATO 
approaches its operations.  In contrast to the sustained peacekeeping operations of the 
1990s and early 2000s, future operations will more closely resemble NATO’s relatively 
brief operation in Libya. The conceptual framework developed through the reports issued 
by the RTO, which I have analyzed above represent a thinking through of the challenges 
confronting NATO and the attempt to pattern of thought and action that sharply diverges 
from its historical legacy.  They form the basis of the policy shift presently underway 
within NATO towards an organization that favors knowledge-sharing, networking, and 
the adoption of a collective form of command and control. Yet these reports remain 
largely abstract and do not offer practical steps to translate their analysis into actual 
doctrine and institutional changes. This work falls to Allied Command Transformation 
(ACT). Its projects demonstrate the promise of NATO’s current transformation, but also 
the constraints placed upon innovation within the Alliance.  
 
Allied Command Transformation: The Declining Relevance of Territory and the 
Militarization of Knowledge 
ACT was established alongside Allied Command Operations (ACO) at NATO’s 
Prague Summit in 2002 as part of a generational reorganization of NATO’s command 
structure. This reorganization occurred as NATO faced an uncertain future of declining 
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resources and fluid requirements brought about by the spatial uncertainty characteristic of 
the post-Cold War geoeconomic order. This redesigning of NATO was designed to 
create, in the words of the Alliance defense ministers at the Prague summit, “…a leaner, 
more efficient, effective and deployable command structure, with a view to meeting the 
operational requirements for the full range of Alliance missions.”442 The salience of these 
elements has only heightened since the 2007 Crisis. Despite the claims of reinvention, 
however these two strategic commands, ACT and ACO, were not original creations; 
rather they evolved from prior strategic commands that were given new names and 
provided with new mission parameters. Allied Command Atlantic and Allied Command 
Europe, both established in the early 1950s become Allied Command Transformation and 
Allied Command Operations, respectively. Regardless of their prior history, the renaming 
of these commands was more than simply a cosmetic change but represented a 
fundamental shift in NATO’s strategic approach.  
The renamed commands lacked reference to a geographical region, illustrating the 
sharply reduced impact that territorial space has upon setting the terms of NATO policy. 
Instead, as ACT itself argues, the focus is now upon functionality, regardless of 
geography. In the early 21st century “…Alliance thinking fundamentally shifted: The 
NATO Command Structure was to be based on functionality rather than 
geography.”443 This shift represents a dramatic reassessment of NATO’s Cold War 
positions in which a static geographical framing underpinned its strategic orientation. 
This foundation has been largely removed and replaced with a concern with functionality, 
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regardless of the territorial space within which these processes are occurring. Inherent in 
this new approach is a move towards a global scale of interactions and away from the 
overarching regional concern that defined NATO in its first five decades.  
The explicit degrading of the importance of territory demonstrates the immersion 
of ACT and NATO more broadly within the current geoeconomic order. The declining 
role of territorial space as a prefiguring factor can be observed both for capital and for the 
military forces of advanced states. Territorial and capitalist logics have historically been 
intertwined in a dialectic relationship with one another, simultaneously confronting and 
merging together with one another.444 However, in the contemporary period of intensified 
neoliberalism a fully functioning state that blankets its domain with an extensive 
governance apparatus that reproduces itself in a uniform manner is not necessarily a 
prerequisite for capital accumulation. As a result, sovereignty becomes far more elastic, 
taking on the characteristics of what Ong has called graduated sovereignty. She explains, 
“I use the term graduated sovereignty to refer to the effects of a flexible management of 
sovereignty, as governments adjust political space to the dictates of global capital, giving 
corporations an indirect power over the political conditions in zones that are differently 
articulated to global production and financial circuits…graduated sovereignty is an effect 
of states moving from being administrators of a watertight national entity to regulators of 
diverse spaces and populations that link with global markets.”445Only specific spaces or 
particular nodes are important for a time, not an entire territorial space.  
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This logic is not restricted to capital accumulation but can be extended to some 
forms of military operations today. The linkage of the geopolitical and the economic with 
the military mirroring capital flows is at the heart of the present geoeconomic order. 
Many of the activities of the American military today, whether it is special forces 
operations446 or drone strikes447 are informed by this logic, indeed this appears to be fast 
becoming a prevalent tendency in modern warfare.   
Knowledge development, the institutional project that ACT is engaged in, 
represents an extension of this understanding of warfare to NATO. As opposed to the 
RTO, which was limited to offering only a conceptual framework, ACT seeks to 
implement institutional changes that are beginning to actualize many of the elements first 
envisioned by the RTO. In doing so ACT is leading to the way towards ever more 
network centric modes of organization within NATO. Although achieving greater levels 
of knowledge development will require wide-ranging institutional transformation, these 
changes at seen as part of a natural progression, not a radical break with past practice. In 
the Alliance’s thinking, “Knowledge development is an evolution, not a revolution in 
thinking. Processes and information already exist within NATO that support decision-
                                                     
446 The violation of traditional conceptions of space and scale by American Special Forces is noted by Niva. 
“Shadow warfare in which hybrid blends of hierarchies and networks combine through common 
information and self-synchronization to mount strike operations across transnational battle spaces.” Steve 
Niva, “Disappearing violence: JSOC and the Pentagon’s new cartography of networked warfare,” Security 
Dialogue 44 (2013): 185. 
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Kahn, “Imagining Warfare,” European Journal of International Law 24(2013): 199-226. Further analysis 
of the geopolitical ramifications of drone warfare can be found in Ian Shaw, “Predator Empire: The 
Geopolitics of US Drone Warfare,” Geopolitics 18 (2013): 536-559.  
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making. The problem is that this information or isolated knowledge often resides in the 
heads and offices of subject matter experts across the organization; it is not fused, de-
conflicted, or shared, at least not in a formal, well established manner.”448 ACT then is an 
attempt to graft a new set of functions upon an older core structure. The heart of the 
NATO, its military committees, North Atlantic Council, and international staff 
bureaucracy, despite the rhetoric of change and transformation sweeping across the 
Alliance will remain largely immutable. The old Cold War apparatus of NATO will stay 
in place; but it will exist alongside a new framework, one that better responds to the 
demands of the current geoeconomic order.  
ACT, along with the programs it is responsible for overseeing, is not a case of old 
wine in new bottles, as many of these programs are altering NATO in crucial ways, but 
the embrace of deep radical change is circumscribed by its institutional legacy. ACT is 
organized into four main branches: Strategic Plans and Policy, Resource & Management, 
Capability Development, and Joint Force Training. ACT also works in conjunction with 
eighteen centres of excellence. These centres seek to improve NATO’s capabilities in 
areas as diverse as cold weather operations and energy security.449 ACT has sought to 
promote knowledge development in three major ways. First, through the gradual removal 
of barriers between internal NATO actors and external academic and industry groups 
through the Framework for Collaborative Interaction; second, through developing new 
metrics that measure the innovative potential of different projects, and third through 
                                                     
448 NATO: Allied Command Transformation, “Bi-Strategic Command Knowledge Development,” 2010, 2. 
449 For a full list of all centres of excellence see Allied Command Transformation, “Centres of Excellence,” 
http://www.act.nato.int/centres-of-excellence Accessed September 22, 2013.  
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establishing new centers and initiatives, like the Lessons Learned Centre and the Network 
Enabled Capability initiative that encourage knowledge sharing across NATO.  
In comparison to the RTO, which seeks to produce new forms of knowledge and 
generate conceptual frames that can provide a coherence to NATO’s actions ACT is 
illustrative of how the altered strategic priorities of NATO has effected its interactions 
with outside institutions and promoted the militarization of further areas of knowledge. 
This occurs through what I see as ACT’s employment of an open innovation model. 
Open innovation, as it was initially developed, assumes a corporate framework, with 
firm-to-firm interactions occurring only between private entities, yet I argue that it can 
also be applied as a means to understand the manner in which ACT has sought to engage 
with outside actors. ACT adoption of an open innovation is highly significant, because 
not only does it represent a departure from the compartmentalization of knowledge 
historically common to military organizations but it also demonstrates the militarization 
of outside areas of practice and knowledge by ACT. By doing so, ACT provides an 
example of the incorporation of processes usually associated with the accumulation of 
capital, not military organization. ACT’s usage of open innovation models along with 
innovation metrics, tools that were initially created for and utilized by private enterprise, 
offers an example of how intensified neoliberalism and austerity, with its demand for 
quantitative measurements of increased efficiency gains, is impacting the internal 
organizational logics of NATO and hence its wider behavior.   
Open innovation is a concept that was originally developed by Chesbrough to 
analyze how inter-firm cooperation occurred on research and development projects.  
Chesbrough defined open innovation as, “…a paradigm that assumes that firms can and 
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should use external ideas as well as internal ideas, and internal and external paths to 
market, as the firms look to advance their technology”450 Fully adopting open innovation 
as a framework for knowledge development requires the breakdown of vertical fully 
integrated modes of innovation and their replacement with more dynamic mechanisms 
capable of absorbing external information and applying it to the internal processes within 
the organization. West and Gallagher outline the characteristics required for the 
successful actualization of this process. They note that “Under this paradigm, internal 
innovation is supplemented by systemic scanning for external knowledge facilitated by 
firm investments in absorptive capacity…Such strategies require firms to realign 
innovation strategies to extend beyond the boundaries of the firm, while creating 
mechanisms for appropriating value from the combined innovation.”451 The model of 
open innovation should be extended then in this case to include patterns of interaction 
between intergovernmental, public, and private actors. ACT has in fact fulfilled the basic 
requirement of an open innovation model, according to West and Gallagher by 
elaborating its own open innovation strategy and plan for engagement with academia and 
industry with its Framework for Collaborative Interaction (FFCI), a key part of NATO’s 
integrated knowledge strategy established in 2009. 
ACT is clear that the FFCI is not a program in the traditional sense. The FFCI 
does not provide financial incentives to outside actors to engage in collaborative projects; 
instead, the incentive that the FFCI offers its partners is based simply upon the 
                                                     
450 Henry Chesborough, Open Innovation: The New Imperative for Creating and Profiting From 
Technology, (Cambridge: Harvard Business Review Press, 2003),xxiv. For further analysis see Ellen 
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collaborative form of interactions that it generates. “FFCI is not a program; it is an 
enabler to achieve results similarly to the way contracting supports projects. Academia 
and Industry have engaged in many FFCI projects without directly receiving any 
financial contributions. These organizations find benefits beyond the financial aspect, a 
collective benefit perspective. This action brings awareness of the current capabilities 
within industry to NATO.”452 Outside actors benefit from their engagement with this 
process because they gain a greater understanding of the objectives that NATO is 
currently pursuing and its preferred means of achieving them. These actors are then able 
to reorient themselves based upon this knowledge and deepen their connection with 
NATO, increasing the potential that they will receive lucrative projects or be provided 
with other lines of funding in the future. For NATO, it gains an awareness of 
contemporary developments in a wide range of fields and can then utilize this knowledge 
to set the parameters of its own path of innovation. This interaction represents a 
militarization of knowledge as the actors that are part of the FFCI process tailor their 
information and the activities they engage in to suit the priorities of NATO. 
The success of the FFCI in fostering connection between industry, academia, and 
NATO can be seen not only in the wide range of projects that have occurred under the 
auspices of the FFCI, from cloud computing to medical support for operations,453 but also 
in the large numbers of organizations that attend ACT’s industry and academic 
gatherings. ACT’s last academic conference in Bologna in October 2012 brought together 
over 50 academics from nearly every NATO member state and resulted in the publication 
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of a monograph analyzing NATO’s current strategic trajectory.454ACT’s last industry 
forum took place in Istanbul in November 2013 and brought together representatives 
from technology and defense firms with members of NATO’s military command.455 
These regularized forums provide an opportunity to ground the process of interactions 
between NATO and outside actors allow for reflection upon the events of the past year, 
and assist in elaborating NATO’s future strategic direction. The expanded field of 
knowledge that FFCI generates is central to the new strategic frame of risk management, 
which NATO has developed over the last decade and a half.  The generation and 
assessment threats and preparation for future engagements necessitates a greater depth of 
knowledge and connection with outside actors that open innovation projections such as 
the FFCI provides. FFCI then improves the situational awareness of NATO allowing for 
the possibility for more effective action by the Alliance.  
The overarching knowledge apparatus that NATO has constructed extends 
beyond engagements with corporate actors and universities, to integration with the civil 
apparatus of member states.  This has occurred under the oversight of civil-military 
fusion centers project. Established in 2008 the Civil-Military fusion centre is an 
experiment to test how effectively of open-source, unclassified information could be 
shared amongst civilian and military stakeholders during a crisis. This blurring of the 
lines between civilian and military tasks, while seemingly innocuous, as ACT itself notes, 
this project was an attempt to push the boundaries of the limits traditionally placed upon 
                                                     
454 This document, Dynamic Change: Rethinking NATO’s capabilities, operations and partnerships, ed., 
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Affairs website at http://www.iai.it/pdf/dynamic-change.pdf 
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civil-military interaction. An internal ACT report declares, “…the implementation of the 
fusion centre concept was an effort to influence a paradigm shift towards creating an 
environment where information can flow freely between civilian and military actors 
engaged in complex crises.”456 The only active civil-military fusion is in Afghanistan, 
where its presence has served to promote the militarization of aid within the country. 
However, regular analysis is also conducted of specific countries throughout Africa and 
the Middle East, providing an indication of countries that NATO deems particularly 
important to have an easily accessible base of knowledge and perhaps suggesting possible 
sites for future interventions.457 These civil-military fusion centers are part of a much 
larger trend that is serving to blur, to an ever greater degree, the line between the 
domestic and external security services of states.  
Military-fusion centers provide another example, in addition to the FFCI, of 
NATO programs of which promote the greater militarization of knowledge. Although the 
militarization of knowledge is not in itself, a recent development, indeed it can be traced 
back to the era of early state formation,458 NATO’s attempts to influence the research 
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agendas of outside actors only began to occur in earnest with the onset of the Global 
Financial Crisis in 2007. The first military-fusion centre became operational in 2008, 
while the FFCI was created in 2009. Thus, it is the crisis that is the key event that links 
together and can explain the emergence of these elements. These programs should be 
understood then in light of the incorporation of the logics of austerity within NATO.  
After covering the mechanisms which ACT has developed to allow it to access 
external sources and expand the scope of its knowledge development I will now turn to 
the second way that ACT has sought to encourage knowledge development by examining 
the internal processes that it has created in order to facilitate innovation and promote 
creative solutions to the challenges that the contemporary geopolitical environment poses 
to NATO. In this regard, ACT has also sought to create a system of metrics to measure 
the level of innovation that its various programs are fostering. Innovation metrics are 
commonly used in the corporate world to measure, encourage dynamism, and hence 
increase profitability.459 In this area, a wealth of perspectives exists with no single 
approach enjoying universal acclaim.460  ACT’s interest in employing innovation metrics 
does not lie with a concern of profitability, rather it is seeking to refashion these tools in 
order to achieve greater levels of institutional flexibility, allowing it to more effectively 
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respond to an uncertain geopolitical environment. Once again then ACT is seeking to 
pattern the functioning of NATO upon the template of capital accumulation, providing 
yet another example of the intertwining of capital and the generation of coercive force 
that is occurring under the pressures of intensified neoliberalism.461  
ACT’s innovation metric system, which is still in the early stages of development, 
relies heavily upon the nine-step process elaborated by Morris.462 For Morris innovation 
can be conceptualized as moving from an initial stage of strategic thinking, through 
successive stage of portfolio management, research, ideation, insight, targeting, 
innovation development, market development and finally sales. Morris’ innovation 
metric was explicitly written for and targeted to private sector innovation. In seeking to 
measure innovation Morris provides a comprehensive and detailed framework that views 
innovation as equally qualitative and quantitative. Innovation starts as a diffuse and 
uncertain process and gradually solidifies into a more coherent sense of understanding. 
The initial soft metrics that Morris proposes eventually lead to hard metrics, which 
provide a more rigorous measurement of the innovation process. Morris writes, “The soft 
metrics are qualitative, sometimes in the form of proactive questions that are intended to 
get people to think more deeply and effectively about the work they’re doing. The hard 
metrics are quantitative, and amenable to statistical analysis.”463 This process mirrors the 
one that NATO is presently engaged in where it is attempting to translate new conceptual 
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apparatus and ways of framing knowledge into a coherent framework that can serve to 
guide institutional changes within NATO that make it more responsive to world events. 
While innovation metrics provide a mechanism that supports the creation of new 
projects and initiatives NATO is also seeking to develop the means to allow it more 
effectively learn from the success and failures of past experiences as well as create new 
standards that encourage knowledge sharing across NATO. These projects comprise the 
third way in which ACT has sought to promote knowledge development. The Secretary 
General formally initiated the Lessons Learned process in April 2011 in reaction to the 
Libyan campaign. NATO’s Operation Unified Protector in Libya and the new format of 
intervention that it represented posed a number of challenges for NATO.  
Lessons Learned was created in order to judge how NATO responded to events in 
Libya and what the wider ramifications of the operation would have for NATO in the 
future.464 The initiative for Lessons Learned came from the very top, demonstrating the 
importance of this process for NATO. ACT however took a leading role in actually 
implementing this process, developing a handbook465 that elaborated a six-step procedure 
that served as the foundation for how NATO as a whole enacted lesson learned. 
Additionally ACT sent staff members educated in these procedures throughout NATO to 
ensure that they were implemented correctly. Lessons Learned then creates a feedback 
loop that closes the circle of knowledge development and institutional innovation that 
NATO has engaged in since the start of the Global Financial Crisis in 2007. Lessons 
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Learned generates an institutional memory of events as well as set of information from 
past NATO activities. This data can then be fed into future irritations of its risk models, 
allowing for the creation of both risk and command and command models of 
progressively greater effectiveness and hence offer a more accurate picture of the current 
geopolitical environment along with possible future trends. The Lesson Learned process 
illustrates the emphasis that NATO is now placing upon increasing its reflexive capacities 
and how it regards past experience as a source for guidance for the future. 
The proliferation of ways in which ACT has sought to engage with outside actors, 
create procedures that encourage and measure innovation, along with its attempts to 
foster a culture of contemplation are all in jeopardy if the individuals who are involved 
within them remain isolated from one another. If knowledge is not shared amongst 
individuals and between institutions, within NATO then all of the effort expended to 
promote knowledge development and hence a more responsive and proactive security 
organization will be undermined. To avert this outcome ACT has embarked upon its most 
extensive and transformative project, NATO’s Network Enabled Capability program 
(NNEC). Indeed the success or failure of NNEC will have a great impact on the future of 
ACT itself. 
 The NNEC program was begun shortly after ACT’s inception and has continued 
ever since, thus the fates of ACT and NNEC are tightly intertwined. Yet the ramifications 
of NNEC extend beyond the confines of ACT to encompass the entirety of NATO. A 
conference report on NNEC declares, “NNEC is defined as the Alliance’s cognitive and 
technical ability to federation the various components of the operational environment 
from the strategic level down to the tactical level through a networking and information 
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infrastructure…”466 NNEC then is the centerpiece of ACT’s knowledge development 
strategy, it seeks to link all elements of NATO together within a cohesive framework that 
will allow an individual or institution within NATO to rapidly gain access to the crucial 
information necessary to complete their current objectives. NNEC represents a dramatic 
shift in how knowledge is viewed in military organizations, which have traditionally been 
secretive and sought to compartmentalize information. Indeed this shift is apparent in the 
NNEC’s slogan, “share to win”.467 NNEC marks a transition point from past “need to 
know” organizations of knowledge that have been predominant in the military sector 
towards a more open understanding of knowledge. 
At its core, NNEC is about aiding in the sharing breakthroughs and unique 
experiences that may prove relevant to future engagements. Moving from theory to actual 
practice however requires a large degree of standardization. Fundamental to the success 
of NNEC, as ACT notes, are the harmonization of information repositories and the 
deployment of common forms of technology and interfaces across NATO and its partners 
to ensure the easy dissemination of relevant and timely data.468 NNEC is not a framework 
unique to NATO. Indeed the British military is just one of a number of NATO members 
that have begun to implement their own network enabled capability strategy in 
coordination with NATO.469 The scope of NNEC extends far beyond simply sharing 
knowledge. NNEC, if it were fully realized, would establish the basis for a common 
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system of command and control through NATO and across its member states. “With 
NEC joined up coalition operations become possible. Members are operating within a 
single command and control architecture, with the same picture and the same access. 
Everyone is therefore more responsive: subordinate units are much more inside the mind 
of the commander, which in turn means greater agility and tempo on the ground and 
greater speed of response.”470 If this envisioned framework were, achieved NATO and its 
aligned military forces would share amongst them the fifth or highest-level command and 
control maturity as identified above by the STO.  
Making this vision, a reality is the goal of the command and control centre of 
excellence, which seeks to promote common NNEC criteria across affiliated parties, 
leading to the achievement of greater levels of command and control maturity. NNEC is 
the fulcrum that directly connects knowledge development to lines of command and 
control and hence operations. NNEC then is the link between the strategic and the tactical 
and the basis upon which the emergent mission format of NATO will rest. It is the 
medium through which the modifications of the RTO and ACT will actually be 
implemented. Were the NNEC to fail it would threaten the entire architecture of 
knowledge that NATO has constructed following the Global Financial Crisis.  
This failure is a real possibility, as the vision of NNEC projected by NATO and 
actual reality remain quite separate with reports and analysis issued by the command and 
control center of excellence admitting that actually achieving, let alone approaching these 
goals, remains elusive. Problems with implementing NNEC across NATO include 
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diffused and conflicting lines of command and control, shortages of key personal and 
numerous failures to share information amongst national intelligence agencies.471 
Evaluations of how effectively military units under NATO command have implemented 
NNEC criteria have not been well received. In response, the command and control center 
of excellence has launched a number of further assessments that are ongoing at this time 
in an attempt to improve the implementation of NNEC.472 
 The theorization of knowledge development, through the creation of new 
conceptual apparatuses, alongside the establishment of new centres and initiatives, which 
were both traced above, are all designed to make NATO a more efficient and effective 
calculator of risk. NATO’s recent initiatives, however innovative and groundbreaking 
they may be, have only served to alter NATO on the margins with the viability of the 
most ambitious program in this regard, the NNEC, being questioned by its most steadfast 
proponents. NATO’s shift in organizational form, the nexus portion of NATO as a global 
security nexus remains a work in transition at present. Where NATO has been far more 
successful is in the global security aspect through the array of partnerships it is has 
formed with non-member states. Yet while greater efficiency and influence is an outcome 
of these programs, they are being undercut, as key components necessary for their 
successful realization are not being fully implemented due to the demands of austerity. 
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Ironically, an ideological project that advocates greater efficiency subsequently imperils 
it through subsequent cutbacks in NATO member budgets.   
The Constraints of Austerity upon NATO’s Transformation  
NATO’s transformation into a global security nexus represents an attempt to 
provide a more coherent and extensive global governance arrangement with more states 
sharing the burden of maintaining the overarching geoeconomic order in wake of the 
largest crisis since the 1930s.473 The reinforcing role that military power plays in 
upholding the structural foundations of the contemporary American-centric expression of 
global capitalism, has even been recognized, in a rare burst of insight, by the normally 
obtuse Thomas Friedman. He observes: “The hidden hand of the market will never work 
without a hidden fist, McDonald’s cannot flourish without McDonnell Douglas…”474  
NATO serves effectively as the security and defense arm of the current epoch of 
globalization,475 however it is often examined purely from a security or institutional 
perspective not as an organization immersed in and contributing to the articulation of a 
particular mode of political economy.  
At the present moment, NATO is involved in the complex task of upholding a 
generalized regime of austerity while being negatively impacted by this same process.  I 
believe that austerity, in the manner it has been reproduced in the defense sector 
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generally and NATO particularly, can be understood as a dialectical contradiction in the 
current workings of capitalism along the lines elaborated by Marx and Engels. They 
argued: “What constitutes dialectical movement is the coexistence of two contradictory 
sides, their conflict and their fusion into a new category.”476  While austerity is seen as 
sacrifice necessary to create the conditions which will allow for the stable reproduction of 
capitalism, it undercuts the possibility for the realization of these conditions by 
potentially increasing social tensions through the heightening of exploitation477 and 
simultaneously reducing the resources available to the coercive apparatuses responsible 
for containing any sustained outbreak of dissent.478 
This same interaction is playing out at the international level; as the crisis has 
weakened the position of the West visa vie its main geopolitical rivals Russia and China. 
Expanding the reach of NATO is central to reducing any shifts in geopolitical power. 
Hence, the push by the United States for a larger and more elaborate partnership program. 
Yet the viability of this endeavor along with NATO’s drive to create an intricate internal 
network of communication examined above that prioritizes knowledge development is 
threatened by a lack of funding  resulting from the condition of austerity. Austerity then 
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is a determining factor of contemporary existence, but it is not shaping reality in a direct 
linear fashion, rather it is doing so in a manner that is laden with contradictions. How 
these contradictions are resolved will determine the contours of the future political 
economy that NATO, in addition to other actors, will be forced to confront.   
Returning to the problems of the present, the vast range of military exercises, 
educational opportunities, and options for institutional reform available to states that are 
members of any of NATO’s expanding range of partnerships outlined above all require 
the expenditure of funds, with most of the cost bore by NATO. In effect, this means that 
American funding to NATO has been largely stable, although reviews have been recently 
conducted of how the Department of Defense allocates funds to the PfP,479 which could 
suggest cuts may be forthcoming in the future. Former American Defense Security 
Robert Gates in his last speech to NATO warned that,  
The blunt reality is that there will be dwindling appetite and patience in the U.S. 
Congress – and in the American body politic writ large – to expend increasingly 
precious funds on behalf of nations that are apparently unwilling to devote the 
necessary resources or make the necessary changes to be serious and capable 
partners in their own defense… Future U.S. political leaders– those for whom the 
Cold War was not the formative experience that it was for me – may not consider 
the return on America’s investment in NATO worth the cost.480  
American exasperation with the continual high levels of funding it must provide to 
support NATO is a long standing compliant, but in an era of austerity with the strategic 
focus of the United States shifting, with the ongoing pivot to Asia, and a consequently 
declining focus on Europe the potential for cuts in American funding to NATO is 
                                                     
479 United States Government Accountability Office, “NATO Partnerships: DOD Needs to Assess U.S 
Assistance in Response to Changes to the Partnership for Peace Program,” (Washington D.C: GAO, 2010) 
480 Robert Gates, “The Security and Defense Agenda, (Future of NATO),” Brussels, June 10, 2011. 
http://www.defense.gov/speeches/speech.aspx?speechid=1581 
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magnified.481 Broadening funding avenues is the one of the major reasons why NATO 
has offered countries like Australia and Japan an increased role within the 
organization.482 NATO has also launched a range of innovative programs, such as Smart 
Defense that are designed to promote interoperability, increasing efficiency and reducing 
costs that will be explored in the next chapter.  
Regardless of the threat of funding shortages in the future, the global security 
aspect of NATO is far more developed than its nexus portion. This is not surprising as the 
majority of NATO’s partnerships have long histories; PfP is approaching its twenty 
anniversary. Agreements between political actors concerning cooperation and security 
matters are regular and accepted parts of the international system. In contrast, the 
programs and conceptual apparatuses that ACT and RTO are in the process of creating 
are far more challenging to implement as they are seeking to alter longstanding 
institutional practices. NATO as a global security nexus then remains a work progress. 
With this caveat in mind however, it is clear that NATO, because of its partnerships and 
expanded strategic frame is now a global security organization. On this point, 
policymakers and academics agree both, although opinion differs on the causes and 
consequences of this development.  
 
                                                     
481 Analysis of the effect of the pivot on American funding of NATO is provided in Barry Pavel and Jeff 
Lightfoot, “The transatlantic Bargain after the pivot,” Atlantic Council Issue Brief, March 2012. 
482 Australia has contributed over 1,000 troops to NATO’s mission in Afghanistan, more than many NATO 
members. From 2009-2013 Japan has extended 5 billion US dollars to support NATO operations in 
Afghanistan. NATO: “International Security Assistance Force: Key Facts and Figures,” 
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Hribernik, “Toward a global perspective: NATO’s growing engagement with Japan and South Korea,” 
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The Limitations of the Global NATO Debate 
There are two major streams of argument in the Global NATO debate. The first 
draws upon liberal theories of international relations and proposes that a Global NATO 
should serve as a stepping-stone on the path to a worldwide concert of democracies. This 
approach envisions a Global NATO as potentially marking the start of an institutional 
reordering of world affairs. As Bunde and Noetzel explain: “… [NATO] can be seen as a 
first step towards a more ambitious reorganization of the institutional structure of world 
politics or the nucleus of a potentially universal community of liberal democracies.”483 
Freed from the ideological combat of the Cold War and with liberalism now recognized 
as the best form of governance,484 NATO should transition from a defensive alliance to 
take up the mantle as the champion of liberal values across the globe. Values that are, 
after all, prevalent in the preamble of NATO’s founding charter. This is a case, as 
Daadler and Goldgeier argue, of values triumphing over geography. They argue, “…a 
shared commitment to shared values should be a more relevant determinant of 
membership than geography. Any like-minded country that subscribes to NATO’s goals 
should be able to apply for membership in the Alliance.”485 These sentiments appear to 
be in line with the current American policy towards NATO.486 The United States, it will 
                                                     
483 Tobias Bunde and Timo Noetzel, “Unavoidable Tensions: The Liberal Path to Global NATO,” 
Contemporary Security Policy 31 (2010): 298. 
484 The liberal argument for a global NATO appears, on some accounts, to be steeped in the Fukuyama 
tinged triumphalism that was prevalent in the years immediately following the end of the Cold War and 
dissipated with the start of the War on Terror. In echoing this bygone era in the present when the 
capabilities of liberal states to intervene as they choose around the globe is no longer an option the 
imagination of these liberal critics outstrips actual material capabilities. For an extended retrospective see 
Francis Fukuyama, The End of History and the Last Man, (New York: Free Press, 1992). 
485 Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, “Global NATO,” Foreign Affairs 85 (2006):111. 
486 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton declared that, “NATO should be the hub of a global security 
network with a group of willing and able nations working side-by-side with us…our shared values are the 
bedrock of our community. We need to vigorously promote these together around the world…” Hillary 
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be recalled, has been one of the major advocates of a more globalized NATO.  However, 
the rhetorical promotion of liberal values is revealed as just that, rhetoric, as NATO 
draws closer to Middle Eastern autocracies through the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative.  
The Istanbul Cooperation Initiative provides another example of how the pattern 
of interaction between liberal states differs sharply from the manner in which they engage 
with non-liberal states. Although a pacific zone of liberal peace487 was created following 
the Second World War and extended after the end of the Cold War, the demilitarization 
of the internal interactions of the West has been matched by an ever-greater militarization 
of its relations with external states. While liberal states have generated a thick 
institutional framework with allows for interaction to occur between them in a multitude 
of issue areas488 they pursue a far narrower set of relations with non-liberal states, one in 
which military interactions are clearly the predominant factor. As Latham argues this is 
actually to the benefit of liberal states as the resources they have to deploy are limited 
while non-liberal states remain entrapped in a subservient position to liberal states. As he 
observes “…the authoritarian military rule of unstable societies may represent an 
efficient regime in the context of international liberal order. It has tended to minimize the 
scope of the political engagement of liberal hegemony with such societies to the military 
                                                     
Clinton, “Remarks at Euro-Atlantic Security Community Imitative and Keynote Session,” Munich, 
February 4, 2012, http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2012/02/183326.htm 
487 The idea of a liberal zone of peace is well established in international relations literature. See Emanuel 
Adler, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations,” Millennium 26 
(1997): 249-277. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Alliances, Contiguity, Wealth and Political Stability: Is 
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267. Zeev Maoz and Bruce Russett, “Normative and Structural Causes of the Democratic Peace,” American 
Political Science Review 87 (1993): 624-638. Spencer Weart, Never at War: Why Democracies will never 
fight one another, (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998).  The Pentagon has even recognized the 
strategic utility of this concept. See Thomas Barnett, The Pentagon’s New Map: War and Peace in the 
Twenty First Century (New York: Penguin, 2004). 
488 Robert Latham, “Democracy and War-Making: Locating the International Liberal Context,” Millennium 
22 (1993): 146.  
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sphere, thereby avoiding the necessity of building more comprehensive hegemonic 
political institutions to help achieve domestic order. Furthermore, military collaboration 
has appeared to provide a sufficient basis for the loyalty of such states to the liberal 
order.”489  Yet the construction and maintenance of the liberal world order is not simply 
due to progressive cycles of international militarization. Rather military-to-military 
connections provide the initial avenue that allows for the further internationalization of 
capital, the penetration of non-liberal states by the major capitalist economies of the West 
and the promotion of processes of transnational class formation.490 
This occurs because of the nature of international militarization, as it exists within 
a liberal capitalist world order where it is deeply rooted within wider geopolitical and 
economic process and serves to solidify particular mechanisms and practices of 
governance. NATO is involved at both ends of this process, serving as an agent of 
militarization that further extends the reach of the liberal world order and as an apparatus 
of global governance that provides coherence to the coercive architecture that underpins 
this very world order. The interrelation between the economic and coercive aspects in 
production and extension of a Western led liberal world order is a dynamic which has 
been analyzed by Barkawi and Laffey. They argue: “The project of liberal ordering 
evident in recent Western policy can be framed as the production of liberal spaces, 
democratic subjects and institutions to administer them. In this new geostrategic and 
political economic context force is used in the service of defending and expanding 
                                                     
489 Ibid., 149. 
490 The interaction of these factors and how they sustain a liberal world order is recounted in Kees van der 
Pijl, Transnational Classes and International Relations, (London: Routledge, 1998). Robert Cox, Power 
Production and World Order: Social Forces in the Making of History (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 1987).  
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economic and to a lesser extent political liberalism beyond the liberal capitalist core.”491 
Liberalism, as it exists within the discipline of international relations, is silent on these 
factors. It has been left to scholars of materialist international political economy to offer a 
sustained elaboration and critique of these processes. Ironically, liberalism provides only 
a superficial and highly ideological analysis of liberal world order.     
Other authors, relying upon the realist tradition, propose that the Global NATO 
we have today is simply the result of states bandwagoning into a successful organization 
that is closely aligned with the world’s sole remaining superpower.492 They see the drive 
to extend NATO membership past its traditional Euro-Atlantic region as occurring 
because the United States can afford to loosen the restrictions placed upon NATO when it 
was arrayed against another alliance, the Warsaw Pact. Mowle and Sacko fit this 
categorization when they argue, “Two effects of this unipolar structure are particularly 
relevant to NATO. The first is that a unipolar power has less interest in maintaining a 
tight alliance structure than a bipolar one does. The second is that weaker states have an 
incentive to bandwagon with the unipolar power, rather than balance against it.”493 Yet 
this approach removes any sense of agency from NATO, which as I have sought to show 
above, has aggressively pursued partnerships with other states across the world. This is 
not a case of countries piling into NATO, but rather NATO seeking, in a sustained 
manner, to extend its reach across the globe. The realist approach does however provide 
                                                     
491 Tarak Barkawi and Mark Laffey, “The Imperial Peace: Democracy, Force and Globalization,” European 
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492 Another line of argument based in realism argues that NATO has survived in the post-Cold World 
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an explanation of why the United States have been the foremost advocate for a Global 
NATO. Having a coherent constellation of power that is aligned with American interests 
and can be drawn upon if necessary to provide a coalition willing to assist is a useful tool 
to have at one’s disposal. 
What both liberal and realist approaches elude, indeed what no academic analysis 
of NATO conducted so far has done, is examine how effect that a Global NATO is 
having upon reworking the dimensions of space and scale and how this expands or limits 
wider political economic process and impacts upon the construction of a liberal world 
order. This omission is even more surprising when one considers that the 
conceptualization of space and scale and its utilization to analyze their own activities has 
been employed by ACT and RTO to inform their approaches towards NATO’s 
transformation. Not only does NATO in its present form as a global security nexus 
transgress many of supposedly firm boundaries that are central to the study of 
international relations, but the manner in which is intervening in the world challenges 
many of these assumptions as well. Yet it should not be surprising that this crucial aspect 
of NATO’s transformation remains unexamined. The discipline of international relations 
has failed to engage with these developments in a meaningful manner because it 
possesses a historic blindness to questions of space and scale. When these concepts have 
been examined, it has been indirectly, through the levels of analysis debate and later 
arguments concerning questions of agency and structure. 
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The Inadequacy of Both Levels of Analysis and Agent-Structure Methodologies for 
Comprehending NATO as a Global Security Nexus 
Although Waltz, as I noted in the first chapter, provided the initial foundation for 
how international relations should be conceived with his three images of the international 
system, the state, and the individual, it was Singer who first determined what the terms 
and parameters of levels of analysis, the dominant methodological model494 of the 
discipline would be. Singer argued that in order for a level of analysis to be an effective 
model of research three requirements had to be fulfilled. It had to be highly accurate, 
explain the relationships under investigation, and offer the promise of reliable 
prediction.495 Singer’s level of analysis model prioritized scientific analysis and 
precision. 496  He identified only two appropriate levels of analysis, the state and the 
international and argued that each study conducted under the rubric of international 
relations should only adopt a single level of analysis at a time.497  
                                                     
494  Buzan however argues that Singer’s model, despite its professions of analytical clarity does not provide 
a useful framework of analysis. “It is not clear whether levels of analysis is more an epistemological 
construct or whether it is ontological. It is not at all clear what the rules are for designating something as a 
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are for the study of international relations.” Barry Buzan, “The Level of Analysis Problem in International 
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495 J. Singer, “The Level of Analysis problem in International Relations,” World Politics 14 (1961): 78-79. 
496 As Singer argued, “…any description of national behavior in a given international situation would be 
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87-88. 
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our orientation in the midst of a study.” Ibid., 90. 
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Singer’s methodological model trades parsimony for depth. The international 
level is limited to the study of systematic patterns such as the creation and dissolution of 
coalitions and the frequency and duration of specific power configurations.498 Utilizing 
the state level approach restricts one to the decision making process of states. By seeking 
to maintain the isolation between his two levels of analysis in his approach, Singer 
greatly undermines the usefulness of his model.499 In doing so a wide range of 
interactions are dismissed as irrelevant. The state and the international are simply 
assumed with no accounting for the social forces that give rise to them.500 The state for 
example, the central political actor for international relations impacts and influences 
events both at the domestic and international levels. Yet restricting analysis of the state to 
a single level excludes a large set of its interactions and engagements simply for the sake 
of maintaining methodological purity. Despite its shortcomings, Singer’s rigid and 
minimalist model would have a great impact upon how international relations scholars 
approached their area of study.501 
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See William Moul, “The Levels of Analysis Problem Revisited,” Canadian Journal of Political Science, 6 
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 In addition to levels of analysis, the disciple of International Relations has also 
confronted ontological issues through discussions of what became known as the agency-
structure problematic. Writing several decades after Singer, Wendt argued that 
ontological and methodological concerns were interrelated. 
The level of analysis problem, in other words is a problem of explanation: of 
assessing the relative importance of casual factors at different levels of 
aggregation in explaining the behavior of a given unit of analysis…the unit of 
analysis, the phenomenon to be explained, changes; first it is the behavior of state 
actors, then the behavior of the international system. This is a problem of 
ontology: of whether the properties or behaviors of at one level can be reduced to 
those at another.”502 
Questions of agency and structure are therefore inextricably linked to concerns over 
levels of analysis. The levels of analysis debate in international relations is concerned 
with at what plane of interaction should a particular political unit, usually, but not always 
the state, reside in. Levels of analysis poses the problems of method then, by privileging a 
specific set of interactions that an identified political unit is engaging in. Conversely, the 
agent-structure dynamic is concerned with how a structure, the international system most 
prominently, shapes the range of possibilities available to the political actors that dwell 
inside its web and vice versa.503 This dynamic is ontological as it is internal to the unit 
being considered.  Levels of analysis then is external, as it seeks to examine interactions 
                                                     
502 Alexander Wendt, “Bridging the Theory/Meta Theory Gap in International Relations,” Review of 
International Studies 17 (1991): 387-388. Hollis and Smith also extend this discussion of Wendt in Martin 
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as they occur, not the limits that may have given rise to a certain set of interactions over 
others.   
Wendt’s initial contribution to the agent-structure debate in international relations 
occurred in his 1987 article in International Organization. Here he sought to incorporate 
developments in other social sciences concerning agency and structure within 
international relations to build towards a more informed and substantive understanding of 
these relationships in the discipline. For Wendt, the major problem with approaches in 
international relations was that they forced either the agent or the structure to be 
ontologically primitive to the other; they reduced one unit of analysis to the other.504 
Wendt went on to criticize both neorealism and world system theory as performing this 
function from a different angle. Contrary to the claims of neorealism, that it offered a 
structuralist understanding of international relations through the logic of anarchy, Wendt 
argued that neorealism served to privilege agency over structure. “Despite its strongly 
systemic focus, neorealism’s view of the explanatory role of system structures is 
decidedly state or agent centric. It sees the system structures in the manner in which they 
appear to states, as given external constraints on their actions, rather than as conditions of 
possibility for state action.”505 World systems theory was guilty of the opposite crime, of 
privileging agency over structure. In Wendt’s opinion, “…the world system in effect 
seems to call forth its own reproduction by states…world systems theorists treat the 
world-system as at some level operating independently of state action, in practice they 
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reify the world-system.”506 Wendt saw both formulations as troublesome, because in 
privileging one side of the agent-structure problematic over the other, world systems 
theory and neorealism were each forced into certain patterns of thinking that privileged 
some assumptions while ignoring other elements in order to maintain their framework of 
understanding. World systems theory did this by viewing system structures as separate 
from the activities of state and class agents, this leads it towards static and functional 
explanations for state action.507 While neorealists, despite identifying the state as the 
primary political actor, lack an explicit theory of the state that is able to explain its 
powers and interests. This omission means that neorealists’ efforts to build compelling 
systemic theories of international relations are seriously compromised.508 
 The solution that Wendt proposed to overcome this dilemma was to place agent 
and structure on an equal plane, identifying each side of this dynamic as equally able to 
influence and shape the other. To do so in a coherent fashion he reached outside of the 
domain of international relations and into the realm of social theory.509 Through applying 
developments in scientific realism510 and structuration theory Wendt argued that it 
became possible to view the relationship between structures and agents in a new light. 
“As a set of possible transformations, social structures are, by definition, not reducible to 
                                                     
506 Ibid., 347. 
507 Ibid., 348. 
508 Ibid., 344. 
509 The inability of international relations to formulate its own unique theoretical perspectives and its 
tendency to lag behind the debates occurring within other social sciences is a long-standing concern in the 
discipline. The classic article in this regard is Martin Wight, “Why is there no international relations 
theory?” International Relations 2 (1960): 35-48. For a more current engagement with these issues see 
Chris Brown, “The poverty of Grand Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 19 (2013): 
483-497. 
510 In its most basic sense scientific realism is an epistemological position within the philosophy of science 
that claims that the entities described by scientific theory exist objectively and that the claims made by 
theory can be determined to be either true or false, within the confines of the theory. 
192 
 
the relationships between a structure’s elements that are observed in a given concrete 
context. Structures make a given combination or instantiation of elements possible, but 
they are not exhausted by whatever particular manifestation is actual.”511 Wendt believed 
that he had resolved the issue at the heart of the agent-structure problematic by providing 
a method through which the interactions of each element, agent and structure, could be 
examined without the existence of one prefiguring and solely determining the potential of 
the other.  Other scholars however remained unconvinced.512 
 The most valuable comment on Wendt’s structuration solution to the agent-
structure dynamic and the one most directly relevant for the following discussion was 
made by Doty.513 Doty argued that the solution posed to the problem of agent-structure 
by Wendt and others who relied upon a structuration solution were inherently 
deterministic.514 The crux of the problem for Doty was that an oppositional relationship 
between agency and structure was simply presumed. “The agent-structure issue in 
International Relations has been framed within an oppositional logic that presumes 
structures and agents, or some combination of the two, are the only alternatives, i.e. the 
only significant forces that are operative in social/political life. Far from resolving the 
issue, this presumption merely replicates it.”515 For Doty the central question was, why 
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should the interactions that occur in the international sphere be reduced to either agent or 
structure? Establishing this dichotomy creates an oppositional dynamic between these 
two social entities. This opposition remains implicit as long as this form of categorization 
exists, regardless of Wendt’s claim that he had succeeded in placing agent and structure 
on equal footing.516 For Doty then the solution of the agent-structure dilemma was to be 
found, not in modifying its terms, but in disengaging from the terms of the debate itself. 
 In place of agent and structure Doty proposed a focus upon practice. This 
provides a means of illustrating the constraints that employing an agent-structure 
dynamic places upon social interaction. For Doty the full range of practices cannot be 
contained by the debate over agent and structure. As she argues, “Practices overflow that 
which can be accounted for in purely structural or agentic terms. Practices contain a 
surplus of meaning which exceeds these two things.”517 This is not to state that prior 
contributions to the agent-structure debate do not account for practice Doty recognizes 
this. However past analysis and engagement with questions of agency and structure have 
placed limits on the role of practice because they assume a pre-existing agent that exits 
outside of the processes of social construction that occurs in the relationship between 
agent and subject. This results in the creation of a deformed view of subjectivity.  She 
argues, “Subjects maintain a point of agency that is never identifiable with the categories 
of their social construction. This preserves the notion of a pre-discursive, pre-socially 
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constituted agency that is at odds with attempts not to take agency as given and certainly 
ushers in an element of identity that is exogenous to practice.”518 However, while Doty 
critiques the limits of the agent-structure dynamic in international relations her approach, 
with its highly abstract and circumscribed formulation, actually serves to demonstrate the 
limits placed on the interplay of agent and structure within the traditional methodological 
framework of international relations.  
Doty never actually connects practices to real material processes. In her analysis, 
they exist in a vacuum removed from the considerations of political economy. Nor does 
she explore the tensions internal and external to practices, they are assumed to move 
seamlessly across the social frame; a problematic assumption in world characterized by 
proliferating tensions. This apolitical framing is not Doty’s failing alone but reflective of 
the dominant approaches to research in the discipline itself.519  Yet despite its deficiencies 
Doty’s focus on practice, offers the beginning of a way out of the conundrums presented 
by relying upon either of the dominant research approaches in International Relations to 
comprehend NATO.  
 A simple reliance on practice, as Doty presents it is inadequate. Wight rightly 
criticizes Doty for not actually defining practice and employing a circular logic when 
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describing how practices operate. As he points out “…what in Doty’s account enables 
practices? What are the conditions of possibility for practices?...Doty cannot simply 
explain practices in terms of practices.”520 Practice, in the abstract sense with Doty details 
it, is not a useful concept that can be utilized for the formation of research agendas or as 
part of a larger methodological framework. Practice here serves as a useful source of 
critique, but lacks any positive content of its own.  
Spatial Creation as Practice: NATO as a Site of Spatial Production 
What I propose is to examine NATO’s current practice of space creation and how 
this practice is intertwined with current dynamics of political and economic power. In 
doing so, I am not claiming that this is the only practice that NATO is presently engaged 
within, as a complex and multifaceted organization I recognize that NATO is engaged in 
an expansive range of practices, indeed my conceptualization of NATO as a global 
security nexus demonstrates this. In linking the practice of space creation to NATO in 
this manner, I am also declaring that NATO is the originating site for these practices. 
This undermines Doty’s conceptualization of practice as inherently decentering and 
incapable of being fully contained within a coherent social space.521 Indeed it is not 
practice, in the abstract sense which Doty presents it, which is responsible for 
decentering, rather it the social fabrication of reality, a reality that is brought into 
existence by and interspersed with the relations of capital accumulation, where the 
                                                     
520 Colin Wight, “They Shoot Dead Horses Don’t They? Locating Agency in the Agent-Structure 
Problematique,” European Journal of International Relations 5 (1999): 123. 
521 Roxanne Doty, “Aporia: A Critical Exploration of the Agent-Structure Problematique in International 
Relations Theory,” European Journal of International Relations 3 (1997): 376. 
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responsibility for decentering lies.522 However, my formulation retains an element of 
Doty’s idea of decentering as the practice of space creation and collapse is one that 
challenges many of the regimented methodological notions present within international 
relations. 
 Why focus on the practice of space creation? Adopting an approach that 
privileges spatial dimensions is important because it poses a challenge to the foundations 
of both levels of analysis and conceptions of agent and structure, the deficiencies of 
which I identified above. These frameworks of understanding are each predicated upon 
the notion of stable territorial space. In the levels of analysis tradition, each level contains 
within it a set of political actors operating within a static political space. For example, at 
the international level, the primary actors are states, each state is assumed to have 
dominion over a defined territorial space, their interactions give rise to a global space, 
which is different in scale, but generally reflective of the spatial qualities ascribed to 
states. Similarly, within the agent-structure debate it is the interactions between these two 
entities that is the central focus. The spatial dimensions that agent and structure are 
operating within and the impact that their relationship has upon the formation and 
evolution of space are often overlooked.  Each of these approaches then internalizes a 
static notion of space, one that dramatically overemphasizes the actual impact of territory 
upon contemporary political processes. This is problematic because as a global security 
nexus that is able to project its power across the planet the confines of territory have an 
ever-declining impact upon the strategic calculations of NATO. By internalizing a 
                                                     
522 In this sense at least I profess to be a structural Marxist as I view capital, following Althusser, as in the 
last instance determinative of the pattern of social relations. Louis Althusser, For Marx (London: Verso, 
2005) 111-117. 
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territorial biases both levels of analysis and discussions of agent and structure fall into 
what Agnew termed “the territorial trap”. 
 Agnew argued that the social sciences, including international relations, have 
historically viewed space through the lens of the state. This results in a sharply delimited 
perspective on the nature of space. In Agnew’s perspective, “…space is viewed as a 
series of blocks defined by state territorial boundaries. Other geographical scales are 
disregarded. The usually taken for granted representation of space appears dominant in 
fields of political sociology, macroeconomics, and international relations.”523 In this 
conceptualization, the state becomes an ideal-type or a logic object rather than a site of 
contestation. The space occupied by the state, its territory, is simply assumed. 
International relations then does not lack a conceptualization of space, rather its 
understanding of space is a static one, determined by the territorial boundaries of the 
state. This state-centric approach results in a narrow understanding of political 
interaction.524 In this framing, the state becomes sole political actor, as it is the state, 
through providing a regularized framework for interaction and the extension of various 
security guarantees to its citizens that makes engagement in politics possible. This 
conceptualization of the state, politics, and space is not limited to the discipline of 
international relations, but has served as one of the foundational percepts for Western 
political philosophy.525 
                                                     
523 John Agnew, “The territorial trap: the geographical assumptions of international relations theory,” 
Review of International Political Economy 1 (1994): 55. 
524 For further discussion of the detrimental effects that a spatial approach rooted in a state centric logic can 
have upon contemporary analysis see Neil Brenner, “Beyond state-centrism? Space, territoriality, and 
geographical scale in globalization studies,” Theory and Society 28 (1999): 39-78. 
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This vision of the state as a self-contained space, a container for social 
interactions has long been recognized as problematic within the discipline of international 
relations. Indeed as early as 1957 Herz authored an authoritative piece illustrating how 
the advent of ballistic nuclear missiles had shattered the notion of states as self-contained 
territorial entities.526 Yet the framing of space in this manner has persisted. 
 The persistence of what Agnew called the territorial trap, is due to the existence 
of three factors.  First, a reification of state territories as fixed units of sovereign space 
that serves to decontextualize processes of state formation and disintegration. Second, the 
division of the national and international into separate polarities that obscures the 
interaction between processes operating at different scales. Finally, the existence of a  
perspective dominant within international relations which views the state as existing prior 
to society and containing society within its own organizational framework.527 Rather than 
a static framing that serves only as a limit upon interactions, space needs to be viewed as 
a mutable and flexible concept whose manner of existence has real material effects upon 
reality. Space represents a specific configuration of power that arises because of 
particular processes. This is not a singular dynamic with state actors responsible for the 
entirety of this process. Instead, space arises because of a complex series of interactions 
across a range of political actors. Space then should be viewed as a contested practice, 
one that alters based upon prevailing geoeconomic conditions, rather than an a priori 
assumption.  
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The production of space is the result of complex social processes. Space, as Smith 
notes, is not only produced, it also serves as the field within which social relations 
themselves arise and develop. For Smith, “…space is both available as a foundational 
metaphor and at the same time as a produced, mutable, and intrinsically complex 
expression of social relations. Not only is the fragility and transitoriness of social 
relations expressed in space; the production of space is increasingly the means by which 
social difference is constructed and reconstructed.”528 There is no single unifying form of 
space, nor a single actor responsible for its construction. While the territorial based space 
of the modern nation-state is often seen as the most predominant form of space that 
suppresses alternative configurations and acts as homogenizing force, the space that the 
state constructs is not a uniform one. The practices that an individual is exposed to and 
forced to engage with alter depending upon ones location within the space of the state. 
Interactions that occur in border spaces for example are radically different from those that 
confront one in other state created spaces.529 
Spaces then, as Soja notes, overlap with and intersect one another. “The 
production of spatiality in conjunction with the making of history can be described as 
both the medium and the outcome, the presupposition and embodiment, of social action 
and relationship of society itself. Social and spatial structures are dialectically intertwined 
in social life, not just mapped onto the other as categorical projections.”530 Spaces arise 
                                                     
528 Neil Smith, “Geography, Difference and the politics of scale,” in Joe Doherty, Elspeth Graham and Mo 
Malek, eds., Postmodernism and the Social Sciences, (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992), 64. 
529 The explosion in border studies in recent years is a testament to the manifold composition of state 
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from a multitude of actors and processes. Some are durable, other quickly emerge and 
collapse as the forces that gave rise to them dissipate resulting in the enclosure of space. 
As the overarching socioeconomic system that penetrates all facets of modernity, 
capitalism of course has a determining effect upon the creation and maintenance of space. 
Many of the processes of spatial creation originate from the demands of capital 
accumulation. Indeed the incorporation of spatial concerns within the social sciences was 
led by a wave of Marxist geographers in the 1980s who sought to examine how the ever-
changing dynamics of capitalism were resulting in the privileging and exclusion of 
particular spaces as well as creating new spaces to spur the accumulation of capital.531 
The dynamic of capital accumulation continues to affect the construction of space today 
with the logic of austerity leading to the closure of some spaces, as options for public 
engagement are increasingly foreclosed, and the creation of others, as the ever-greater 
complexity of financial instruments continues largely unabated.  
While the role of economic processes in prefiguring spatial production have 
received a large amount of attention the generative role that security practices have on the 
production of space has been less examined.532 This oversight is surprising in light of the 
intertwining of space and violence noted by Lefebrve, who was responsible for providing 
the initial impetus that reasserted discussion of space within the realm of social theory. 
                                                     
531 Some of the noteworthy early texts that inserted discussions of geographical space into social theory are: 
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201 
 
As he argued “…the logic of space, with its apparent significance and coherence, actually 
conceals the violence inherent in the abstraction. Just as violence is intrinsic to tools in 
general, it is also of necessity immanent to instrumental space no matter how rational or 
straightforward this space may appear.”533 The presence of violence then is always 
inherent within the construction of space. Often this violence is not directly present, but 
exists as an implicit understanding between actors interacting within the space, violence 
that is manifested if specific conditions are not met.534 My own elaboration of a trans-
scalar space of intervention is an effort to explain how NATO is involved in and 
contributing to these dynamics.  
The Formation of Trans-scalar spaces of Intervention 
Trans-scalar spaces of intervention closely resembles the concept of transnational 
deployments elaborated by Latham. As he explained, “Transnational deployments are by 
definition specialized in relation to any local social order they enter since they rest on the 
forward displacement of a defined and delimited organization from the outside. In other 
words, they move along relatively narrow bands of intervention or engagement with local 
order…The most extreme form of this external movement is extraterritorial, where the 
deployed organizational form carries its own culture, laws and juridical authority.”535 
Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are narrow and ephemeral engagements designed to 
remove identified risks to NATO’s interests. The conclusion of a NATO intervention and 
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the collapse of the trans-scalar space of intervention results in the creation of a new set of 
often highly unpredictable processes. The involvement of NATO however has concluded. 
The high potential for disarray created in the wake of the removal of NATO lies outside 
of purview of its concerns, unless they are deemed at some point in the future to again 
pose a risk to NATO’s interests. 
My own concept of a trans-scalar space of intervention while related to Latham’s 
transnational deployments expands upon it in three ways.  First, it links the practice of 
NATO’s intervention to the practice of space creation and hence wider political and 
economic processes. While NATO instigates this practice, it does not have full control 
over the eventual outcome. On this point I concur with Lefebvre who stated that  
“…space produced serves as a tool of thought and action, in addition to being a means of 
production it is also a means of control and hence of domination, of power that; yet that, 
as such, its escapes in part from those who make use of it.”536 Second, my concept of a 
trans-scalar space of intervention is linked to a specific actor, NATO, and will be utilized 
to explain the role that it, as a global security nexus, is currently playing as one of the 
primary global circuits of violence whose actions transcend static territorial boundaries, 
in the effort to alter and change the prevailing situation within these states to suit the 
collective geopolitical interests of its members. Finally and a point that until now has 
remained unexamined, but is explicit in the term itself, NATO’s interventions do not only 
produce space, but in doing so they impinge upon and reshape a number of scales, they 
are thus trans-scalar in nature.  
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The manner by which NATO intervenes within the affairs of targeted states has 
altered. NATO now moves down through a number of scales from the transnational level 
at which its actions are organized, down through the national and into the local, level 
where its military force is brought to bear. The created trans-scalar space of intervention 
is one that simultaneously contains the interactions between entities that are organized at 
a number of different scales. In crossing through these scales, NATO’s actions affect 
each of them.  
The elaboration of scale is a continually unfolding process that NATO as a 
political and security actor is deeply involved within.537 Scale, as Brenner argues, is 
constructed by the intrusion of political power; his conceptualization of a politics of scale 
is worth quoting at length as it encapsulates the dynamic and complex arrangement of 
social forces contained within any scalar arrangement. 
The notion of a politics of scale refers to the production, reconfiguration or 
contestation of particular differentiations orderings and hierarchies among 
geographical scales. In this plural aspect, the word ‘of’ connotes not only the 
production of differentiated spatial units as such, but also, more generally, their 
embeddedness and positionality in relation to a multitude of smaller or larger 
spatial units within a multtiered, hierarchically configured geographical 
scaffolding. The referent here is thus the process of scaling through which 
multiple spatial units are established, differentiated, hierarchized and, under 
certain conditions rejigged, reorganized and recalibrated in relation to one 
another. Here, then, geographical scale is understood primarily as a modality of 
hierarchization and rehierarchization through which the processes of sociospatial 
differentiation unfold both materially and discursively.538 
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Brenner’s exposition of a politics of scale and what it entails deeply informs my own 
perspective which strives to encapsulate and explain the multivariate and complex 
processes presently underway within NATO. My research methodology privileges a 
number of specific scales, the local, national, and international, while recognizing that 
they are not discrete and self-contained entities, but rather exist in relation to one 
another.539 In doing so I seek to make a contribution that connects the configuration and 
manipulation of space and scale to alterations in world order and illustrate the politically 
charged nature of this dynamic. Although I am using the example of NATO to provide an 
empirical center to my argument I believe that the schema that I have begun to lay out 
can be applied to examine other actors who possess the ability to cut across scales and 
create new spaces of interaction.540  
This chapter sought to demonstrate the effects that the 2007 Global Financial 
Crisis had on NATO. The crisis and the turn towards austerity that followed was 
provoked, in part, by the failure to quantify and understand risk within the financial 
sector. Ironically, the miscalculation of risk in one sector would lead to its incorporation 
within another, the military sector, which had largely stood outside the prerogatives of 
neoliberal economic policy prior to the crisis.541 The current prevalence of risk 
                                                     
539 For an elaboration of how the dynamics of scale can only be grasped relationally see Neil Brenner, New 
State Spaces: Urban Governance and the Rescaling of Statehood, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 
10. 
540 International Financial Institutions, NGOs, and transnational activist groups all fall under this category.  
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management within the military sector, particularly NATO, is one of the key changes that 
can be linked to the continuation and extension of neoliberalism in the wake of the crisis.  
The force driving these developments in NATO is the desire for ever greater cost 
efficiencies, which lie at the heart of austerity, combined with the pervasive sense of 
uncertainty amongst policy makers. This provoked an alteration in how NATO perceives 
itself and the form in which it projects power internationally resulting in its 
transformation into what I termed a global security nexus.  
This new institutional arrangement of NATO is far more dynamic and flexible 
than its Cold War configuration. I noted, at length, what NATO as a global security nexus 
entails in practice, through an examination of the two institutions within NATO, ACT 
and the STO, which are responsible for spearheading the promotion of knowledge 
sharing and the creation of new mechanisms of command and control. Following this, I 
engaged in a critique of the two main methodological approaches in international 
relations, levels of analysis and agent-structure and argued that both were inadequate for 
the task of conducting a contemporary analysis of NATO. The full ramifications of what 
NATO, as a global security nexus that is involved in the creation of trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention, entails necessitates a methodology approach that prioritizes flexible notions 
of space and scale. While have I have traced NATO’s institutional evolution and argued 
that it has created a new conceptual framework to guide its activities, I have yet to 
discuss how the format of its interventions have changed. This will occur in the next 
chapter, which compares NATO’s last two interventions in Afghanistan and Libya I 
argue that the Libya intervention provides a template for future NATO operations.   
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CHAPTER 4 
 A REDESIGNED ALLIANCE: COLLECTIVE SOVEREIGNTY AND THE 
CREATION OF A TRANS-SCALAR SPACE OF INTERVENTION IN LIBYA 
NATO’s current configuration as a global security nexus is one that provides it 
with a great deal of flexibility both in how it engages with other security actors and in the 
format of its interventions. While NATO has succeeded in weaving a vast security web 
and establishing a number of innovate governance mechanisms, its efforts to confront 
threats to its members are curtailed by its inability to independently raise revenue and 
provide more comprehensive direction to members’ military forces.  These are functions 
that are central to the practice of national sovereignty. The failure to reconfigure 
sovereignty upon a broader institutional basis, to create a form of collective sovereignty, 
is the root cause for the continual frustration of NATO projects and circumscribes its 
ability to alter the geopolitical environment in a manner that suits its interests and those 
of its members.  
NATO has had far more success generating an ideational framework,542 than it 
has been in fashioning a comprehensive material order. This success can be most clearly 
observed in the foreign policies of its members. NATO, as Buzan and Weaver argue, now 
overlays many aspects of foreign security policies for the majority of its members, and in 
doing so redefines how they conceive of security.  As they state “Much of the defense 
policies and the interventions by NATO countries are not now driven by existential 
                                                     
542 Two accounts which examine this process are Michael Hampton, “NATO, Germany and the United 
States: Creating Positive Identity in Trans-atlantia,” Security Studies 8 (1998): 235-269. Helene Sjursen, 
“On the Identity of NATO,” International Affairs 80 (2004): 687-703. 
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concern for one’s own security, but occur as foreign policy, with military means, whether 
as policies for positioning one’s own country, or in response to the securitization of 
humanitarian issues and human rights principles.”543 NATO has inserted a new collective 
transnational dynamic into the foreign policy process of its members and by doing so has 
created a new set of strategic interests and priorities that did not exist prior its formation.  
As a global security nexus NATO bisects the national and international scale, but 
does not submerge them; states retain a large amount of autonomy within NATO.  The 
interplay of the international and national scale, specifically how international factors 
shape domestic policy, has long been a major stream of analysis within international 
relations, especially in game theory.544 This style of analysis however produces artificial 
separations by positing that the international and national are distinct arenas of 
interaction.545 Under this rubric, something is either an international or a domestic 
concern. What this perspective ignores however are process and practices that are not 
either or, but are rather intertwined and thus trans-scalar in origin.546  
Trans-scalar formations arose prior to and were studied in depth before the end of 
the Cold War,547 but have assumed a renewed prominence since its conclusion and the 
                                                     
543 Barry Buzan and Ole Waever, Regions and Powers: The Structure of International Security 
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emergence of a plethora of new vulnerabilities. Rosenau, for example, identifies 
structural changes in world politics after the Cold War548 as responsible for the 
increasingly determinative role of transnational forces in modern life which he 
characterizes as  “…the interplay of events which may reconfigure identities and redraw 
boundaries as they cascade into and through every community, country and region of the 
world, sometimes resulting in a globalizing transnationalism that embraces popular forces 
as well as governments, sometimes culminating in a localizing individualism and 
sometimes remaining confined to the interactions of governments in the interstate 
system.”549 Under these conditions, institutions of trans-scalar governance550, such as 
NATO, are assuming ever more crucial roles in the manufacture of modernity. 
However despite the elevated stature and increased responsibilities of NATO in 
the current moment its efforts to coordinate with public and private actors to elaborate a 
cohesive institutional architecture that would allow it to more effectively meet the 
challenges faced by its members have encountered considerable difficulties. NATO’s 
attempts to synchronize crisis-management efforts with both the EU and the UN, 
NATO’s two most obvious partners in any crisis, are beset with obstacles.551 In the 
private domain, NATO has aggressively pursued contacts with relevant NGOs, regularly 
inviting them to attend NATO conferences and seminars on issues of mutual interest. 552 
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551 See Peter Jakobsen, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach to Crisis Response Operations: A Work in Slow 
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However due to the greater amount of resources available to it these interactions have 
been dominated by NATO, creating suspicion in the NGO community about its 
intentions. As Jakobsen explains, “The imbalance in resources between NATO and the 
NGOs has made training cooperation a rather one-side affair…this contributes to the 
perception in the NGO community that NATO-NGO cooperation is driven and dictated 
by military concerns.”553 Yet the biggest obstacle to NATO’s attempts to improve its 
governance capabilities comes not from external actors, but from its own membership.554  
States are reluctant to circumscribe their own sovereignty in order to increase the 
collective sovereignty of NATO, even if this may promote their foreign policy interests. 
This conflict between the national sovereignty of member states and the emergent 
collective sovereignty of NATO has been a reoccurring theme in the Alliance that 
assumes a renewed prominence whenever a new intervention is undertaken. NATO’s two 
major interventions since September 11th in Afghanistan and Libya have both been 
imperiled by this dispute. In each instance, the strategies that NATO developed to guide 
its actions in the country were undermined as crucial material resources and command 
responsibilities were denied. NATO’s efforts to obtain the material resources necessary to 
expand its governance capabilities are thus being undercut by the jealous defense of 
sovereign prerogatives by member states. 
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This chapter will begin by exploring the fundamental attributes of national 
sovereignty and juxtapose them to the new form of collective sovereignty that NATO as a 
global security nexus and an organ of trans-scalar governance is attempting to strengthen. 
Despite its lack of sovereign capacity, NATO has been able to alter the format of its 
operations in response to shifting geopolitical and economic conditions. As my 
subsequent case studies will demonstrate, the strategy NATO adopted in Afghanistan and 
Libya differed significantly, from sustained peacekeeping to a restricted trans-scalar 
space of intervention. While concerns of sovereignty and governance prefigure NATO 
operations the dramatic contrast between its missions in Afghanistan and Libya were not 
caused by debates over governance, but rather the economic and political consequences 
of austerity. In an era of constrained budgets and reduced political will for sustained 
foreign commitments, Libya will serve as a template for future NATO missions. That 
NATO succeed in adapting to these new circumstances, despite a dearth of resources 
illustrates the flexibility of its present configuration as a global security nexus. However, 
the experience of Libya also provides a cautionary tale for the Alliance, as it struggled to 
complete its objectives. Libya demonstrated that NATO is reaching the limits of what it 
can achieve with the current levels of commitment from members. In response, NATO 
has proposed the Smart Defense initiative, a radical new proposal that would integrate 
and coordinate the militaries of European members, sharply reducing costs and providing 
a stable commitment of military force that can be drawn upon in future operations. While 
Smart Defense offers a solution to the persistent capacity problems that the Alliance faces 
it is unlikely to be implemented, as it would dramatically restrict the sovereignty of 
participating countries. The dispute between national sovereignty of members and the 
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incipient collective sovereignty of NATO will remain a reoccurring problem with 
negative consequences for Alliance force projection.    
Sovereignty; National and Collective  
Sovereignty is a central concept in the study of political science and international 
relations. Yet no universally accepted definition of sovereignty exists, provoking one 
commentator to remark that, “…there exists perhaps no conception, the meaning of 
which is more controversial than that of sovereignty.”555 At its most basic level, 
sovereignty can be understood as the organization and projection of power and authority 
through an institutional framework within a defined space of interaction. As Philpott 
plainly states, “Supreme authority within a territory-this is the general definition of 
sovereignty. Historical manifestations of sovereignty are almost always specific instances 
of this general definition.” 556 Sovereignty then is an overriding form of power that is able 
to obtain, through consensual or coercive means, the loyalty or acquiescence of 
individuals residing in the space where it is operative.557  Sovereignty is intrinsic to the 
modern state. The state, by wielding sovereignty, generates a sphere of generally 
predictable and sustainable interaction that makes political engagement possible.558  
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University Press, 2006), and Aristotle, The Politics, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984). 
212 
 
States that are unable to exert sovereignty over their populations and territory exist in 
only a de jure or legal sense.559  
What is considered to be the modern Westphalian form of sovereignty, in the 
form of a distinctive nation-state only emerges in the late 17th century, with the waning of 
the medieval period and the formation of states560 within Europe, that were  able to assert 
their dominance within  a specific territory and over a particular population.561 Biersteker 
and Weber argue that factors that comprise sovereignty are not static, but rather exist in a 
complex relationship with one another. How sovereignty is expressed alters over time 
and is dependent upon the arrangement of forces and prevailing social conditions. As 
Biersteker and Weber argue, “The modern state system is not based on some timeless 
principle of sovereignty, but on the production of a normative conception that links 
authority, territory, population and recognition in a unique way and in a particular 
place…The ideal of state sovereignty is a product of the actions of powerful agents and 
                                                     
559 This is the condition of many African states today which exercise either highly circumscribed or 
effectively no sovereignty at all over much of their recognized territorial domain. Discussions about how 
these conditions clash with the predominant Western idea of sovereignty can be found in Robert Jackson, 
Quasi-states: Sovereignty, international relations, and the third world (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1990). William Reno, Warlord Politics and African States (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1998). Alexis 
Arieff, “De Facto Statehood?: The Strange Case of Somaliland,” Yale Journal of International Affairs 3 
(2008): 60-79. Kevin Dunn and Timothy Shaw, eds., Africa’s Challenge to International Relations Theory 
(London: Macmillian, 2013). 
560 This process and the changes which occurred in this new form of sovereign power manifested itself 
amongst the populace is elaborated at length in Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the 
Prison, (New York: Random House, 1975. For a Marxist approach see Perry Anderson, Lineages of the 
Absolutist State, (London: Verso, 1985) 
561 The state, following Weber’s classic formulation, is usually conceived of as the sole authority within a 
specific territory space, one that, in the last instance, is able to enforce its will on the population through the 
extension of coercive force. Weber wrote that,  “…a state is a human community that successfully claims 
the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory…the state is considered the 
sole source of the right to use violence.” Max Weber, “Politics as a Vocation,” in Max Weber: Essays in 
Sociology, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1946), 77. 
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the resistances to those actions by those located at the margins of power.”562 Sovereignty 
should be understood as a flexible concept, one that needs to be continually reproduced 
and harnessed by the institutional framework that comprises states and allows them to 
both organize and project their power internally and externally as they jockey for position 
with other states.563   
Realist and liberal international relation perspectives have tended to obscure both 
the formation and perpetuation of sovereignty and its interrelation with the dynamics of 
capital accumulation.564 Sovereignty is often simply presumed.565 For realists the state is 
seen a “black box”566 whose internal features are bracketed and largely ignored.567 For 
liberals reductionist game theory is commonly employed to understand the convergence 
                                                     
562 Thomas Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, “The social construction of state sovereignty,” in Thomas 
Biersteker and Cynthia Weber, eds., State Sovereignty as a Social Construct. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 3. 
563 The state has endured as the dominant mode of political organization because it remains the most 
efficient means for the organization and propagation of violence. The state was formed in the crucible of 
war and remains at its core a war fighting organization as Tilly has eloquently argued. See Charles Tilly, 
“War Making and State Making as Organized Crime,” in Peter Evans, Dietrich Rueschemeyer, and Tehda 
Skocpol, eds., Bringing the State Back in, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 169-187. 
564 It was the economic cost of war as Kennedy argues, that led to the formation of a coherent fiscal 
framework and the eventual birth of capitalism. As he wrote, “...the only way a government could finance a 
war adequately was by borrowing: by selling bonds and offices, or better, negotiable long term stock 
paying interest to all who advanced monies to the state. Assured of an inflow of funds, officials could then 
authorize payments to army contractors, provision merchants, shipbuilders, and the armed services 
themselves. In many respects, this two way system of raising and simultaneously spending vast sums of 
money acted like a bellows, fanning the development of Western capitalism and of the nation-state itself.” 
Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 
to 2000. (New York: Fontana Press, 1988), 100. This interrelationship between the state and capital 
continues today, with the state, as Gramsci argues, serving a crucial role in the production and maintenance 
of class hegemony. See Antonio Gramsci, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, eds., Quintin Hoare and 
Geoffrey Smith, (Moscow: International Publishers, 1971). The work of Nico Poulantzas and his 
conceptual framing of the state as the terrain that organizes, but is also a product of class dynamics is also 
very useful. See Nico Poulantzas, State, Power, Socialism (London: New Left Books, 1978). 
565 Barkin and Cronin echo this point in J. Samuel Barkin and Bruce Cornin, “The state and nation: 
changing norms and the rules of sovereignty in international relations,” International Organization 48 
(1994): 107-130. 
566 John Mearsheimer, “Structural Realism,” in Tim Dunne, Milja Kurki, and Steve Smith, eds., 
International Relations Theories: Discipline and Diversity, 2nd Edition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2010), 72. 
567 Stephen Walt, “International Relations: One World, Many Theories,” Foreign Policy 110 (1998): 29-45. 
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and divergence of interests568 or the examination of how societal ideas, interests, and 
institutions influence and order state behavior is done in a manner that abstracts these 
features from the structural dimensions of power.569 The teleological assumption that 
both perspectives share of the state as the predetermined authority within its own territory 
is reflected in how they comprehend the interactions that occur between states. As Nelson 
makes clear, “…the discipline of international relations takes form in its quest for 
certainty about the state and the international system as constitutive entities, and 
especially the state’s many and highly varied relations in which, quite remarkably, the 
disciple then fashions into a self-enclosing system of analytical inquiry where the forms 
of power required to effect the state’s very presence in history are themselves used to 
constitute the interpretive-analytics of a bounded field of international relations itself.”570 
Yet, a concept as central as sovereignty cannot simply be presumed, especially since the 
core coercive aspect of sovereignty571 is now being shared, to an ever greater degree, 
                                                     
568 For an overview of game theory in international relations see Randall Stone, “The Use and Abuse of 
Game Theory in International Relations: The Theory of Moves,” Journal of Conflict Resolution 45 (2001): 
216-244. 
569 An example of this is Andrew Moravcsik, “Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of 
International Relations,” International Organization 51 (1997): 513-553.  Barnett and Duvall reference 
Moravcsik and complain that, “The failure to develop alternative conceptualizations of power limits the 
ability of international relations scholars to understand how global outcomes are produced and how actors 
are differentially enabled and constrained to use resources to control the behavior of others.” Michael 
Barnett and Raymond Duvall, “Power in International Politics,” International Organization 59 (2005): 41. 
570 Scott Nelson, Sovereignty and the Limits of the Liberal Imagination, (London: Routledge, 2010), 2. 
571 The power to make a decision, to determine who the enemy is, is the centerpiece of sovereignty for 
Schmitt. The law, like politics, is not a separate sphere but is rather formulated directly as a result of 
sovereign power. If the sovereign creates the law, then the sovereign has the power to abrogate it, to decide 
when there is to be an exception to the law, summed up in the oft-quoted phrase by Schmitt, “…the 
sovereign is whoever decides what constitutes an exception.”  Carl Schmitt. Political Theology: Four 
Chapters on the Concept of Sovereignty. (Chicago: University of Chicago, 2005), 5. Under this logic is 
NATO clearly not sovereign as it does not have the independent capability to decide who an enemy is, nor 
is it able to act against it, both of these actions fall to individual members, who then collectively operate 
through NATO. 
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amongst other sovereign states and transnational actors such as NATO. This development 
represents the formation of a collective type of sovereignty.  
The ability of states to share aspects of their sovereignty amongst themselves or 
through a transnational organization such as NATO should not be viewed as an absolute 
decline in their sovereign power (although in some cases this may be the result). Instead 
as Heller and Sufaer argue such acts represent, from those tasked with exercising 
sovereign power themselves, not a reduction in their own state’s power but rather the 
contemporary transformation of sovereignty into new forms. As they note, “The concept 
of sovereignty is not a set of established rules, to which states must bend their conduct in 
order to preserve their capacities. It is instead an ever changing description of the 
essential authorities of states…their capacity to deal with the complicated problems of a 
changing world is seen by those engaged in the practices of statecraft as perfectly normal, 
an exercise rather than a diminution of sovereignty.”572 Just as sovereignty itself is often 
a contested concept, with no universally accepted definition of what is comprises,573 the 
organization and practice of sovereign power is summarily complex and multifaceted. 
Attempting to confine sovereignty to a specific set of practices and institutional 
arrangements obscures this reality along with the dynamic nature of sovereignty, as it 
exists in present. 
The argument that crucial aspects of sovereignty are no longer limited to national 
institutions but can be produced by transnational organizations may seem like a drastic 
                                                     
572 Thomas Heller and Abraham Sufaer, “Sovereignty: The Practitioners’ Perspective,” in Stephen Krasner, 
ed., Problematic Sovereignty: Contested Rules and Political Possibilities. (New York: Columbia University 
Press, 2001), 45. 
573 For a discussion from a legal perspective of the contested nature of the idea of sovereignty see S. Veitch 
and L. Farmer, Jurisprudence: Themes and concepts. (London: Routledge, 2007), 10-11. 
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change from an inviolable national sovereignty. However, as Latham notes sovereignty is 
not simply a product of national forces, but can be constructed by a variety of actors 
rooted in different political processes at a variety of scales. Latham writes, “Sovereignty 
can be and historically has been understood as an attribute not just of states but of other 
forms of social organization as well, operating across and within national 
territories…Defining sovereignty socially does not require that we abandon the close 
association of states and sovereignty, but only that we place that association in a wider 
context.”574 However, there are real limits imposed by nation-states upon the expansion 
of collective sovereignty and the transfer of powers to trans-scalar organizations.  
The European Union (EU) offers the most advanced example of collective 
sovereignty and has been commonly pointed to as a new type of multilevel or shared 
form of governance.575 Yet while deep fiscal and legal integration exists between EU 
states this same dynamic has not been extended to the military sphere, where national 
sovereignty has traditionally been jealously guarded.576 In comparison to the EU, the 
degree of integration in NATO is quite weak. NATO lacks any independent fiscal 
instruments and is completely as the mercy of its members in terms of the resources 
                                                     
574 Robert Latham, “Social Sovereignty,” Theory, Culture & Society 17 (2000): 2. 
575 Hadii Mamudu and Donley Studlar, “Multilevel governance and shared sovereignty: European Union, 
Member States and the FCTC,” Governance 22 (2009): 73-97. Stephan Leibfried, “The Social Dimension 
of the European Union: En Route To Positively Joint Sovereignty?,” Journal of European Social Policy 4 
(1994): 239-262. Jean-Marc Ferry, “The EU, the postnational constellation, and the problem of 
sovereignty,” Osteuropa 54 (2007): 76-86. Philipp Genschel, “How the European Union Constrains the 
state: multilevel governance of taxation,” European Journal of Political Research 50 (2011): 293-314. 
576 The Western European Union, Europe’s best chance for a cohesive and integrated military force has 
been defunct since 2011. Its successor, the Common Security and Defence Policy, who tentative agenda is 
constricted by American expectations, which as former Secretary of State Madeline Albright articulated 
mean: no duplication of what has been done effectively under NATO, no decoupling from the US and 
NATO, and no discrimination against non-EU members. See Madeline Albright, “Transcript: Albright 
Press Conference at NATO HQ,” December 8, 1998.    
http://www.fas.org/man/nato/news/1998/98120904_tlt.html These American expectations remain in place, 
sharply curtailing the effectiveness of the Common Security and Defence Policy. 
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available to it.  While NATO has attempted several times in the past to create military 
sharing arrangements the strong resistance to these measures by many of the states within 
the Alliance is a testament to endurance of the logic of self-help in an anarchical 
international system.577  
Despite these restrictions, NATO is central to the increasing prominence of the 
trans-scalar forms of governance. In the current moment the trans-scalar is serving as a 
terrain which both organizes and give rise to multitudes of interactions that blurs the 
responsibilities of national sovereigns as some of their functions are shifted upwards 
while others are parried way. This tendency is not a recent development, but was noted 
by E.H Carr in the early decades of the twentieth century when he observed that, “The 
concept of sovereignty is likely to become in the future even more blurred and indistinct 
that it is at the present.”578 This process has accelerated in recent decades as organizations 
such as NATO acquire new tools and mechanisms that infringe upon the sovereignty of 
member states. Austerity, the magnitude and unpredictability of present threats, coupled 
with the declining power of the West following the 2007 Global Financial Crisis have all 
coalesced to  provide further momentum to this process.  
Governance has expanded beyond the national scale to encompass a growing 
array of transnational organizations. As Sinclair notes, with the complex and diverse 
                                                     
577 The extent of the cooperation that exists within NATO can be read, as one alternative reading argues, as 
an example of self-help and a form of “contingent realism” as states realize that they can best achieve their 
security goals within a collective framework. Charles Glaser, “Realists as Optimists: Cooperation as Self-
Help,” International Security 19 (1994): 50-90. Clearly however there are limits to the extent that states are 
willing to cooperate, particularly when their independence begins to be sacrificed in a substantial manner.  
578 E.H Carr, The Twenty Years Crisis 1919-1939, (London: Macmillan and Company, 1981), 229. For 
greater detail as to have this blurring of conventional boundaries effects the provision of security see 
Alexandra Gheciu, Securing Civilization? The EU, NATO, and The OSCE in the Post-9/11 World, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2008), 156-157. 
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range of issues in the contemporary world governance that takes place at multiple levels 
may be better suited to confronting modern problems. He argued that “…governance, 
when used as part of the term global governance suggests that the informal, sub or supra 
governmental systems it comprises may actually be better adapted for a world of new 
challenges that the formal legal mechanisms of government. Global governance should 
not be understood as a weaker or less developed system of rule because it lacks a united 
government. Although global governance may seem amorphous, it operates at more 
levels than formal systems.”579 The problem in NATO’s case is it is often unable to 
assume the governance functions that would allow it to carry out the ever-growing set of 
tasks expected from it by its members. The real world effects of the lack of governance 
and material capacity that the Alliance has long suffered from can be observed in the two 
radically different type of interventions that NATO has carried out in the 21st century in 
Afghanistan and Libya. 
Afghanistan: Neoliberal state building under the Comprehensive Approach 
Over ten years since NATO assumed leadership over the International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) in 2003; over 41,000 troops580 remain in Afghanistan engaged in 
combat operations. By the end of 2014, just under 10,000 foreign troops will remain in 
the country with the primary task of training Afghan forces and ISAF’s mission will have 
finally concluded.581 Discerning the financial cost of ISAF is difficult as most 
                                                     
579 Timothy Sinclair, Global Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 28. This argument is also made 
in Anne Mette Kjaer, Governance (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2004). 
580 ISAF, “Key facts and figures,” September 3 2014. 
http://www.isaf.nato.int/images/media/PDFs/140904placemat.pdf 
581 Karen DeYoung, “Obama to leave 9,800 U.S troops in Afghanistan,” Washington Post, May 27 2014. 
NATO, “NATO and Afghanistan,” September 3, 2014. 
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_8189.htm 
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contributing countries do not separate their commitments to the American led Operation 
Enduring Freedom and ISAF, but the cost is easily in the hundreds of billions of 
dollars.582 The human cost however is clear. Total deaths of coalition troops in 
Afghanistan up to 2014 are 3,469.583 The occupation of Afghanistan than has imposed 
significant human and economic cost upon coalition states. 
The invasion of Afghanistan was the initial American and allied countries 
response to the attacks of September 11th and marked the start of the War on Terror. 
Policymakers constructed a grandiose narrative in order to justify the restricted liberties 
at home and unending warfare abroad. The War on Terror was cast as a war to save 
civilization584 against insidious and barbaric regimes that threatened the liberal 
democratic way of life.585 The United States was portrayed as a blameless victim who 
was attacked completely unprovoked.586  As Jackman argues, framing the War on Terror 
in this manner appealed to the emotions of American populace and undercut criticism of 
                                                     
582 The total cost of military operations in Afghanistan from 2002-2009 has been estimated at $243 billion 
by Development Initiatives and $482.2 billion from 2008-2012 by the Stockholm International Peace 
Research Institute. L.Poole , “Afghanistan: Tracking major resource flows 2002-2010,” Development 
Initiatives Briefing Paper, January 2011 htpp://www/globalhumanitarianassistance.org/wp-
content/uploads/2011/02/gha-Afghanistan-2011-major-resource-flows.pdf  S. Perlo-Freeman and C. 
Solmirano, “The Economic Costs of the Afghanistan and Iraq Wars,” SIPRI Yearbook 2012, (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2012), 159-161.  
583 The same difficulty in discerning financial contributions in replicated in determining between American 
troops serving under Operation Enduring Freedom and ISAF forces. I have decided to include the 
combined number. “Operation Enduring Freedom.” Icasualties.org/oef 
584 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), 48. 
585 George W. Bush, “Remarks by the President upon Arrival,” The South Lawn, Washington D.C 
September 16, 2001. 
586 Of course nothing justifies attacks on civilians; however policies pursued by the United States in the 
Middle East and Central Asia generated huge amounts of anger that eventually resulted in the terrorist 
attacks of September 11th as a response. To argue otherwise would be to make the nonsensical claim that 
September 11th was caused by irrational hatred with no basis in reality. By people who “hate our freedom” 
as President Bush often claimed. George W. Bush, “President Bush Address the Nation,” Congress, 
September 20, 2001. For detailed historical overviews of American foreign policy in the Middle East and 
Central Asia see, respectively, Robert Fisk, The Great War for Civilisation: The Conquest of the Middle 
East, (London: Fourth Estate, 2005) Steve Coll, Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan 
and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10,2001 (New York: Penguin Books, 2004).  
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its conduct.  He writes that, “…the discourse of grievance and victim-hood fulfills certain 
functions and has a genuine political value to officials…inducing anger, hatred, fear and a 
desire for revenge, which then translates into support for the violent policies of 
leaders.”587 In order to make the world safe for democracy it was not enough for the 
United States and its allies to simply expel the Taliban from Afghanistan, instead 
following in the pattern of Western interventions set by the watershed of Kosovo in 1999 
significant resources would be expended in an effort to transform the country into a (neo) 
liberal society. 
Afghanistan is likely to be the last in a string of interventions that marked the end 
of the Cold War and were characterized by long, grinding conflicts in the quest to socially 
engineering target societies into liberal democratic states. These efforts grew out of an 
expansive liberal triumphalism that sought to recast the world and integrate states within 
a liberal world order dominated by the United States.588 This resulted in a considerable 
modification in the purpose of peacekeeping, from the original purpose of maintaining 
ceasefires to reconstructing societies.589 In a sense, as Suzuki notes, this represented a 
return to the nineteenth century, when Western states colonized most of the planet 
empowered by the belief that their method of societal organization was the only valid 
one. He observes that, “…peacekeeping operations shifted their focus from the traditional 
                                                     
587 Richard Jackson, Writing the War on Terror: Language, Politics and Counter-Terrorism (Manchester: 
Manchester University Press, 2005), 36. 
588 The apex of this triumphalism was reached in 2004, in the wake of the invasion of Iraq, when Karl Rove 
declared, “We’re an empire now, and when we act we create our own reality. And while you’re studying 
that reality-judiciously, as you will, we’ll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, 
and that’s how things will sort out. We’re history’s actors…and you, all of you, will be left to just study 
what we do.” Ron Suskind, “Faith, Certainty and the Presidency of George W. Bush,” New York Times 
Magazine, October 17 2004. 
589 The first peacekeeping operation took place in 1956 to end the Suez Canal crisis and separate the 
warring parties. Further detail can be found in Michael Carroll, Pearson’s Peacekeepers: Canada and the 
United Nations Emergency Force, 1956-1957 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009). 
221 
 
ones of maintaining ceasefires to peacekeeping, where attempts are made to reconstruct 
states based on Western models of liberal democracy and market capitalism. In a similar 
fashion to the paternalism prevalent in the late nineteenth century, Western liberal 
democracies’ command of the truth or knowledge towards a better life, as well as their 
superior social standing was rarely questioned.”590 Some of the impetus behind this wave 
of peacekeeping was motivated by a genuine desire to improve the lives of people in the 
states within which these operations occurred; giving rise to a new academic paradigm of 
human security that argued that the protection of the individual, rather than the state 
should be the primary referent of security.591 Yet, as authors such as Chandler have 
shown592, the nebulousness of the concept of human security and its lack of a clear 
strategic policy vision meant that the term was rapidly co-opted by the Western political 
establishment to legitimize and provide a humanistic cover to their foreign policies.   
Perhaps it was unsurprising then that the lack of coherence inherent within the 
idea of human security was replicated in the interventions that were ostensibly carried out 
to promote it. As Mayall and de Olivera note there never was a clear model or guiding 
rational behind the peacekeeping missions of the 1990s and early 2000s. As they note 
“When the Cold War ended, there was no clear strategic design that could be discerned, 
and no single will or competing wills to give one shape. None of the traditional responses 
was available after 1989. The specific manner chosen by the leading Western states- 
                                                     
590 Shogo Suzuki, “Paternal Authority, Civilized State: China’s Evolving Attitude towards international 
trusteeships,” in James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira, eds., The New Protectorates: International 
Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States, (London: Hurust & Co, 2011), 90. 
591 The first exposition of human security was made in a United Nations report. United Nations, United 
Nations Development Programme: Human Development Report 1994, (New York: UN, 1994). 
592 David Chandler, “Human Security: The Dog that Didn’t Bark,” Security Dialogue 39 (2008): 427-438. 
See also Roland Paris, “Human Security: Paradigm Shift or Hot Air?” International Security 26 (2001): 87-
102. 
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expeditionary warfare, postwar occupation and the social and political re-engineering of 
societies is consequently best understood as an elective approach that reflects a vaguely 
defined liberal convergence of views at a certain moment in time.”593 Viewed in this 
context it becomes apparent that the scattered and ineffectual efforts to remake the 
societies in question have their basis in the intellectual confusion and strategic 
inconsistency that defined the period, a condition that continues unabated today.  
Not only is humanitarian intervention as a foreign policy concept troubling in and 
of itself, but also the development that followed the initial deployment of force occurred 
along narrow neoliberal lines, with the primary concern being upon establishing avenues 
for foreign capital accumulation, rather than creating state capacities or improving social 
stability. In the case of Afghanistan, a highly problematic approach to development 
occurred under the rubric of the Comprehensive Approach, which adopted a singular 
focus to development and brought non-military development assistance and military units 
under the same command. By blurring the lines between military and civil functions, the 
Comprehensive Approach was fiercely resisted by civil actors, who feared that by 
integrating their activities and serving alongside NATO forces they would lose their non-
combatant status.  
NATO’s Riga summit in 2006 officially endorsed the idea of a Comprehensive 
Approach to security and crisis management. The Summit Declaration stated that, 
“…today’s challenges require a comprehensive approach by the international community 
involving a wide spectrum of civil and military instruments…”594 In traditional NATO 
                                                     
593 James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira “Introduction,” in James Mayall and Ricardo Soares de 
Oliveira, eds., The New Protectorates: International Tutelage and the Making of Liberal States, (London: 
Hurust & Co, 2011), 11. 
594 NATO, “Riga Summit Declaration,” November 29 2006, section 10. 
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fashion however actually defining what a Comprehensive Approach officially entailed 
remained vague.595 NATO would encourage its members to not view threats as requiring 
a predetermined response. As its forward-looking NATO 2020 report argued, “Instead 
they should nurture the habit of thinking of these issues as developing along a 
continuum.”596 Clearly, NATO’s Comprehensive Approach called for an integrated 
response to crises involving a broad spectrum of both public and private actors, but what 
this actually meant in practice remained elusive. 
 It was not until mid-December 2010, four years after the Riga summit, that Allied 
Command Operations released a Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive that 
clarified what a Comprehensive Approach to Operations entailed from a military 
standpoint and how it would relate to non-military actors in a future operation.597 This 
planning directive extensively detailed, at both the strategic and the operational level, a 
six phase process that NATO decision makers would conduct internally, prior to, during, 
and after the completion of a mission. Engagement with outside civilian actors should 
occur as early as possible in the first phase of situational awareness, prior to actual 
engagement. Interaction with these actors should occur through two primary mechanisms, 
the Civil-Emergency Planning Directorate (CEPD) and the Civil Military Fusion Centre 
(CFC). The main task of the CEPD in a crisis would be to compile a database of experts 
                                                     
595 Indeed NATO’s Comprehensive Approach developed a reputation as a broad catchphrase that lacked 
real content. See Philipp Rotmann, “Built on shaky ground: The comprehensive Approach in Practice,” 
Research Paper Number 53, NATO Defense College, December 2010. 
596 NATO, NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement, 2010, 24. 
597 The United States introduced provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan in 2002, which combined 
military and non-military components and can been seen as an early example of a comprehensive approach 
to security.  
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in relevant areas,598 while the task of the CFC would be to facilitate the exchange of 
information on current conditions between the various organizations in the field.599 Taken 
together the information gleaned from these interactions would allow NATO to develop 
an ever more elaborate systems analysis of the operational area. NATO’s Comprehensive 
Operations Planning Directive argued that, “A system analysis examines potential 
adversaries, friendly and neutral actors holistically as complex adaptive systems to 
understand their behavior, capabilities and interaction within the operational 
environment. This analysis will reveal strengths, weaknesses, vulnerabilities and other 
critical factors, including the actors’ capacity for adaptation, which provides insight into 
how they can be influenced.”600 In theory then NATO has established the internal 
mechanisms and procedures that set how it is supposed to interact with other actors 
during a crisis. Yet as is often the case with NATO, actual practice did not coincide with 
reality.   
The one sustained example of the Comprehensive Approach in action, the 
deployment of provincial reconstruction teams in Afghanistan, has been widely decried 
as a failure, which threatened the lives of humanitarian workers.601 As Williams explains, 
“The criticism from humanitarian organization is essentially that the assistance programs 
provided by PRTs can blur the differences between humanitarian NGOs and military 
forces in the eyes of Afghans. The very nature of PRTs, argue the critics, militarizes 
                                                     
598 NATO: Allied Command Operations, Comprehensive Operations Planning Directive, December 2010, 
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599 Ibid., 2-6 
600 Ibid., 2-10. 
601 Save the Children, Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Humanitarian–Military Relations 
in Afghanistan. (London: Save the Children, 2004). Barbara Stapleton, “Best Practices of CPA by 
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assistance.”602 While this is a valid concern, the large scale rejection of the 
Comprehensive Approach by humanitarian actors ironically further militarized the 
provision of aid and development in Afghanistan as NATO was forced to become more 
directly involved in the reconstruction process, triggering further protests by NGOs and 
an increased reluctance to work within the framework of the Comprehensive 
Approach.603  
Not only was the manner in which the Comprehensive Approach was deployed in 
Afghanistan problematic, but as Albo notes, the content of its projects were highly 
dubious. According to his analysis, “The various members of the PRT attempt to establish 
governance, security, and development projects. The new modes of administration  
however are dominated by neoliberal precepts that give priority to the building of 
markets and providing opportunities for capital investment…military objectives dominate 
the PRT, development is subordinated to military strategy, and both are designed to 
stabilize capitalist development in Afghanistan.”604 This neoliberal development agenda 
was set from the early stages of the Afghan occupation, with the amount of funding 
provided for the rebuilding of the country after thirty years of warfare not only 
inadequate,605  but with the lions share earmarked for Western NGOs in support of 
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privatization schemes.606 Only 20 percent of international aid went directly to the Afghan 
state.607 The result was the creation of a non-functional state that exercises little control 
outside of Kabul.608  
If the objective in Afghanistan was to create, a state aligned to the West and 
capable of providing a stable investment climate for transnational capital, then it is clear 
that the extended peacekeeping operation in the country is a failure. Under the neoliberal 
model of state building crucial funding was denied to the embryonic Afghan state and 
projects of questionable validity, were pursued, which significantly undercut the chances 
for the success of the stabilization mission in the country. The Comprehensive Approach, 
NATO’s peacebuilding strategy in the country is unlikely to be used as a model for 
development in the future. This is due not only to the apparent deficiencies the 
Comprehensive Approach suffers from, but because also because of the high costs 
associated with peacekeeping on this scale, costs that become more difficult to endure as  
austerity drains the financial resources of Western governments. Instead Libyan style 
interventions, bombing campaigns that lack any sustained or coherent peacekeeping 
component afterwards are likely to become the new norm for NATO engagements. 
                                                     
606 Sultan Barakat and Margaret Chard, “Theories, Rhetoric, and Practice,” in Sultan Barakat, ed., 
Reconstructing War-Torn Societies: Afghanistan, (London: Palgrave Macmillian, 2004), 24-25. 
607 Angela Joya, “Failed States and Canada’s 3D Policy in Afghanistan,” in Jerome Klassen and Greg Albo, 
eds., Empire’s Ally: Canada and the War in Afghanistan, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2011), 
292. 
608 Stephen Biddle, “Ending the War in Afghanistan: How to Avoid Failure on the Installment Plan,” 
Foreign Affairs 92 (2013):49-63.  Karl Eikenberry, “The Limits of Counterinsurgency in Afghanistan: The 
Other Side of COIN,” Foreign Affairs 92 (2013):32-38. Ahmed Rashid, Descent into Chaos: The United 
States and the Failure of Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Central Asia, (New York: Penguin, 
2009). Timo Noetzel and Benjamin Schreer, “NATO’s Vietnam? Afghanistan and the Future of the 
Atlantic Alliance,” Contemporary Security Policy 39 (2009): 529-547. Susan Page, “Grim Assessment of 
wars in Iraq, Afghanistan,” USA Today January 31, 2014. 
227 
 
NATO’s intervention in Afghanistan occurred during a period of heightened 
liberal confidence and with far more ideological currency invested in it then the 
subsequent operation in Libya a decade later. Afghanistan should be viewed as an 
example of neoliberal state building on an extensive and prolonged scale, one unlikely to 
be replicated in the future. In contrast, NATO’s subsequent operation in Libya occurred 
in the midst of an age of austerity with a declining liberal triumphalism prevalent 
following debacles abroad and did not easily fit in the prevailing logic of the War on 
Terror. Libya therefore would be characterized by a lack of a sustained post-combat 
presence and any meaningful effort at state building.  The stark contrast between 
Afghanistan and Libya illustrates the role that NATO played in the past and the possible 
direction that it is headed in the future.   
Geopolitical Dynamics and the Fabrication of Trans-scalar Spaces of Intervention: Libya 
and the Changing Nature of NATO Operations 
NATO’s most recent foray into Libya, under the auspices of Operation Unified 
Protector, provides a stark example of how the new logics, practices, and institutional 
arrangements that have been developed since 2008 have modified the planning, 
implementation, and aftermath of NATO interventions. The implications of these 
processes are far reaching, impinging upon economic and political dynamics and giving 
rise to new practices of spatial creation. All of these dynamics can, I argued, be 
encapsulated and linked together under the rubric of geopolitics. Understood as both a 
scale of analysis and a distinct plane of interaction the geopolitical provides an 
overarching clarity and coherence to what might otherwise been seen as essentially 
disparate and compulsive actions taken by political actors in response to the current 
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security environment.   
 Traditionally geopolitics has examined the impact that geographical factors 
(resources, physical location, demographics, etc.) have upon the positions of states in the 
international system and their ability to project power.609 Geopolitics has historically been 
implicated with the process of empire building. It was initially theorized and employed as 
a method of foreign policy analysis by Germany in the early 20th century, with an 
American variant forming during the Cold War and a European geopolitics emerging 
after the end of the Cold War.610 My own deployment of geopolitics as a concept and an 
analytical framing sharply diverges from these perspectives. I am not interested in 
encouraging or providing substance to projects of imperial expansion. Instead a critical 
understanding of geopolitics will inform the discussion which follows in this chapter.611 
Critical geopolitics, following Agnew and Corbridge, is concerned with “…not only the 
                                                     
609 The three earliest theories of geopolitics were elaborated by the American Alfred Thayer Mahan, the 
German Friedrich Ratzel, and the Englishman Sir Halford Mackinder in the late 19th and early 20th 
centuries. Each of these theorists was intimately connection with the imperialist expansion of their 
respective states underway at the time and saw themselves as offering valuable contributions to these 
projects. Mahan was an Admiral in the Navy and a major advocate of the development of a blue water navy 
by the United States in order to control valuable commercial chokepoints and project power. Mackinder 
was the first to formulate a theory of the heartland and the concepts of the world island and the pivot area, 
which were later popularized by Brzezinski. Ratzel saw states as naturally expansive and growing entities 
with no natural borders and argued that the expanse of a state’s borders is a reflection of the health of the 
nation, what he referred to as Lebensraum, which later became central to justifying the expansion of Nazi 
Germany into Eastern Europe. See A.T Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History 1660-1783 
(London: Dover Military History, 1987). H.J Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” The 
Geographical Society 23 (1904): 421-437.Harriet Wanklyn, Friedrich Ratzel: A Biographical Memoir and 
Bibliography (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961). 
610 The most notable examples of contemporary practitioners of American geopolitics are Henry Kissinger 
and Zbigniew Brzezinski. The clearest elucidation of their respective foreign policy positions can be found 
in Henry Kissinger, American Foreign Policy: Three Essays (New York: WW. Norton & Company, 1974). 
Zbigniew Brezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and its Geostrategic Imperatives (New 
York: Basic Books, 1998).  For European geopolitics see The Return of Geopolitics in Europe? Social 
Mechanisms and Foreign Policy Identity Crises, ed., Stefano Guzzini, (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
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Geopolitics: Towards a Neo-Classical Geopolitics,” Geopolitics 19 (2014): 19-39.  
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material spatial practices thorough which international political economy is constructed 
but also to the ways in which it is represented and contested.”612 Geopolitics, utilized in 
this sense, refers to the spatial configurations that arise due to the deployment of political 
and economic power.613 Geopolitics in the manner which I will utilize it is concerned 
with the creation of defined areas through which a particular set of interactions can occur, 
which are designed to either increase the capabilities of the actor responsible for their 
creation or achieve a particular strategic interest. 
 While both classical geopolitics and critical geopolitics possess a spatial 
component, it is only within the critical perspective that space is considered a contested 
concept. As Kelly notes in his comparison of classical and critical geopolitics, “To the 
classicist…the world can be seen as objectively distinct from the viewer and its spatial 
parameters are fixed.”614 In contrast, for those in the tradition of critical geopolitics the 
construction of space is a central concern, O Tuathhail, one of the most prominent 
scholars working in the field of critical geopolitics sums up his approach as, “The study 
of geopolitics is the study of the spatialisation of international politics by core powers and 
hegemonic states…struggles over ownership, administration, and mastery of space are an 
inescapable part of the dynamics of contemporary global politics.”615 Yet while my focus 
is on the spatial component of contemporary geopolitics, it differs in an important respect 
from critical scholars. Their concern is largely on how geopolitical space is discursively 
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constructed through the production of foreign policy documents and inherent cultural 
dispositions. 616 The analysis that follows below is concerned with the construction of 
space, but will exclude discussion of these elements that are central to the contemporary 
study of critical geopolitics.  
 My reasoning for doing so is simple. My focus is on the creation of trans-scalar 
spaces of intervention, which are temporary sites created purely through the application 
of violence. There is no interest in the governance of these spaces, nor in conducting any 
forms of Western centric cultural analysis to glean useful knowledge about the terrain, the 
sole reason for the creation of these spaces is to eliminate a threat the apparatus that is 
deployed in one that simply enacts violence and lacks a positive regulative function.  
This, as I will demonstrate below, is what occurred during NATO’s most recent operation 
in Libya. There was no cultural analysis conducted,617 as there was in past interventions 
in Iraq and Afghanistan,618 because there was never the impetus to conduct a prolonged 
peacekeeping operation designed to reengineer Libya into a good neoliberal state. In this 
instance the extent of Western involvement would be limited to dropping bombs from 
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aircraft, providing armaments to militia groups opposed to Gaddafi, and encouraging 
their respective oil firms to increase their investments in the country,619 although with the 
prolonged instability which has marred Libya since 2011, many firms have actually 
reduced their investments, 620 despite continuing American political intervention in the 
country.621 Conducting a discursive and cultural examination of the Libyan intervention 
then would only serve to add a superfluous layer of complexity to my methodological 
framework and detract from my interest in the construction of new geopolitical spaces. 
Operating at the geopolitical scale NATO is now involved in the practice of 
creating, through its application of coercive force, what I refer to as trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention, because they exist simultaneously at a variety of national, international, and 
transnational spaces, each of which harbors a different set of actors and institutional 
frameworks whose engagement alters the general projection of the particular space of 
intervention. Trans-scalar is hence adopted as a prefix to space of intervention because it 
encompasses interactions occurring within a variety of scales and their impact upon the 
specific space of intervention in question.  These are temporary spaces where violence is 
enacted upon targets that are deemed a threat to NATO’s interests. Once the threat is 
eliminated, the coercive apparatus deployed by NATO is withdrawn and a new pattern of 
relations emerges.  
This was the manner in which Operation Unified Protector was conducted. A 
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direct application of force was organized and projected by NATO from the transnational 
level directly on the opposing Libyan forces. The discrepancy of capabilities between 
Libyan state and NATO was so vast that several scales of interaction were effectively 
negated, with only two scales, the transnational and the local relevant to the conflict as 
NATO’s weapons penetrated from the transnational scale, unimpeded to the point where 
they struck their targets.  The central concern of classical geopolitics with the movement 
of forces through territorial space was rendered irrelevant, as NATO forces were able to 
strike freely throughout the country. Thus, a highly circumscribed set of interactions 
occurred because the Libyan state was incapable of offering a coherent response and 
engaging NATO forces, it was limited to the local scale, while NATO struck from the 
trans-scalar, out of reach figuratively and literally.622 NATO’s actions served to strip away 
the governance mechanisms of the Libyan state, to the extent that they existed. Yet as will 
be seen below no effort was made to replace the vacuum that now existed with a new 
more liberal form of governance that could offer economic, social, and political 
opportunities to a heavily armed and fractious populace. NATO’s concern with Libya 
ended with the death of Gadaffi and the closure of the trans-scalar space of intervention.     
I then conceptualize trans-scalar spaces of intervention as ephemeral sites of 
contestation whose existence is the result of risk calculations and the weighing of 
geopolitical concerns within transnational military bodies such as NATO.  What occurs 
inside a trans-scalar space of intervention is the layering of the geopolitical interests 
mapped onto a specific spatial site. What drives these geopolitical concerns can be 
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diverse, from threat elimination, the denial of economic advantages to rival states, or 
simply the desire to demonstrate ones material power. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention 
are sites in which an abundant interplay of interests and contradictions are concentrated 
and intensified.623 Their spatial form is distinct from territorial constructions, because, as 
I have noted above, of the disinterest present within them of establishing systems of 
governance. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention represent, in Sack’s terminology, non- 
territorial places. In his opinion, “…it should be emphasized that a place can be used as a 
territory at one time and not at another…it is important to distinguish between a territory 
as a place and other types of places. Unlike many ordinary places, territories require 
constant effort to establish and maintain. They are the results of strategies to affect, 
influence and control people, phenomena and relationships.”624 Trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention are examples of these “other types of places.” The nihilism of these spaces, 
with destruction their sole purpose illustrates the reduced horizons of what is politically 
possible in the current moment. Past interventions, shaped as they were by neoliberal 
proclivities, at least gestured to a vague vision of the future, this is absent in the new 
model of intervention propagated by NATO.   
 Libya was a realm of experimentation where NATO tested the viability of a new 
mission format and engaged in the practice of a unique form of spatial creation. However, 
the Libyan intervention also made starkly apparent a number of weaknesses in the 
Alliance. The most detrimental to its future viability was the frayed unity between NATO 
members, with only a minority actually contributing to Operation Unified Protector and 
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David Ley, eds., Place/Culture/Representation (London: Routledge, 1993), 263-264. 
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key members such as Germany, making public their opposition to the mission.625 This 
prompted one commentator to argue that, “Given the lackluster levels of support provided 
by most NATO members, the mission in Libya could be more appropriately described as 
being conducted by a coalition within the Alliance.”626 This lack of support compounded 
with a dearth of crucial equipment627, especially intelligence sharing and unit 
coordination assets628 meant that NATO struggled to implement a coherent and sustained 
campaign against a country with inferior infrastructure and paltry military forces.  
 The Libyan intervention itself was significant for NATO for three reasons. First, 
the process behind the decision for NATO to intervene and assume control of the mission 
in Libya demonstrates the interplay of new factors and strategic calculations that only 
became relevant following the elevation of crisis management to a core strategic principle 
within the Alliance. Once it had decided to act NATO moved in its forces into position in 
record time and begun operations only ten days later, a marked contrast from the slow 
start to previous operations.629 Second, from a procedural standpoint, the refusal of 
several members to commit to the Libyan intervention illustrates the weakness of crisis 
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management in cohesively binding together NATO’s membership with a common 
purpose and understanding of the world. Third, the actual operation itself, how the 
combat phase was conducted and the lack of post-conflict reconstruction has numerous 
consequences regarding spatial configurations and the deployment and arrangement of 
military forces, and can, as I have argued, best be conceived of as a trans-scalar space of 
intervention.  
One of the primary motivations for the transition in mission formats between 
Afghanistan, where NATO undertook an operation of sustained duration and high 
expense, both in terms of human life and material cost, and Libya that was relatively 
inexpensive and did not result into a single NATO casualty, is due to the intensification of 
neoliberalism that has occurred since 2008. Afghanistan and Libya are examples of 
different varieties of neoliberal campaigns. What happened in Libya is a radical departure 
from the experience of Afghanistan. In Libya, the interest was not in implanting a new 
liberal society in a region with no history of one, but rather simply the elimination of a 
threat. If Afghanistan represents a neoliberal intervention in the classical sense, with the 
accompanying attempting at peacebuilding and supposed concern for human rights, then 
Libya, with its lack of post-conflict reconstruction and far more constrained ideological 
rhetoric is an example of an intensified neoliberal intervention. Libya, I believe, points 
the way towards what Western interventions will look like after the 2007 Global 
Financial Crisis.630 
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Libya and the End of Neoliberal Post-Conflict Reconstruction   
The guiding logic of intensified neoliberal style of interventions is one of 
significantly reduced expectations regarding the ability of Western states to reshape the 
geopolitical environment in their favor. Hodge, contrasting the Afghanistan and Libyan 
interventions, succinctly makes this point, when he declares that, “What was deemed 
possible in March 2011 involved a considerable retreat from the ambitions of 2001.”631 
What changed in the intermediate period was first, as I have already noted above, the turn 
toward austerity which greatly reduced the resources available to NATO member 
militaries and second ideological exhaustion and a waning enthusiasm for future 
extended interventions after two wars, with mixed, at best results, that lasted over a 
decade.632 Thus, the sustained commitment of resources, both material and ideological 
required for the classical style of neoliberal interventions is simply no longer available in 
the current moment. This dearth of capacity can be observed both in the lack of grandiose 
rhetoric that was deployed to justify the Libyan campaign and the relatively light 
footprint of NATO in the country.  
The justification for the Libyan intervention did not rely upon the discursive 
framework of the War on Terror. Not only has the manner in which NATO operations are 
conducted changed, but so too has the ideological justification which they receive. Gone 
is the rhetoric of state building and peacekeeping that surrounded past interventions. The 
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implication of this is that there is a growing disinterest in efforts to form liberal subjects 
and governance mechanisms that while rapacious and dysfunctional, allowed for some 
measure of interaction with and incorporation of a tiny stratum of targeted societies 
within wider economic and political flows.633  Instead, there is now simply disciplining 
without incorporation. Trans-scalar spaces of intervention, like Libya are not concerned 
with offering the chance at integration or even vague gestures towards it. Instead, Libya 
marks a blatant exercise in realpolitik. The dilution of liberal principles that this 
represents is not simply limited to the sort of justifications that will be provided for 
interventions in the future, but are part of the changing nature of the interventions 
themselves, with rationalization and the drive for efficiencies moving to the forefront. 
Peacebuilding is expensive, simply bombing positions from the air is considerably less 
so. 
Operation Unified Protector was not framed as a battle for civilization, but rather 
as necessary to protect the civilian population from a massacre by Gaddafi’s regime as 
they advanced eastward toward Benghazi from retreating rebel forces.634 UN Security 
Council Resolution 1973, which established the legal basis for a no fly zone over Libya, 
“authorizes member states…to take all necessary measures…to protect civilians.”635 The 
clash of civilizations narrative that had permeated Western military operations prior to 
                                                     
633 For physical and economic coercion utilized to achieve these ends and their relation to liberal 
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Libya was discarded in this instance. Instead, the Libyan campaign resuscitated the idea 
of the Responsibility to Protect, which had languished since its formal adoption by the 
United Nations in 2005.636 Ironically the manner in which NATO conducted itself in 
Libya, summarized as “bomb to win”637 by one commentator and the ensuing chaos in 
the country and its destabilizing effects upon the wider region undoubtedly resulted in 
greater civilian deaths than if NATO had simply stood aside.  
 By limiting itself to bombing runs, providing arms and advisors to the rebels and 
with no sustained ground presence, the financial costs of the Libya operation, especially 
compared to hundreds of billions of dollars spent in Afghanistan, was extremely 
economical. The Department of Defense estimated that the cost to the American taxpayer 
was just over a billion dollars,638 while the British and French governments, two of the 
largest contributors to the campaign to remove Gaddafi placed their costs at $337 
million639 and $502 million640 respectively. NATO suffered no combat casualties, 
prompting Vice President Joe Biden to crow that, “…we didn’t lose a single life. This is 
more of the prescription for how to deal with the world as we go forward than in the 
past.”641 Viewed solely from these metrics the Libyan intervention would appear to have 
been a highly successful and efficient operation that removed a reviled dictator from 
power. What occurred in Libya during NATO’s intervention in 2011 and its continuing 
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ramifications since are far more problematic and complex. Rather than an easy win for 
NATO and a demonstration of the effectiveness of its organizational transformation in a 
global security nexus and the corresponding viability of its new mission format, Libya 
exposed a number of fractures within the Alliance and posed a number of strategic and 
tactical challenges that it has still failed to terms with. 
The huge differences in the commitment of financial and military resources and 
the rhetoric to justify each intervention can be traced back to the different variety of 
neoliberalism predominant during the period when each operation was organized and 
executed.  NATO’s efforts to build the capacities of the Afghan state can be characterized 
as an example of classical neoliberal intervention.  In contrast the absence of a state 
building project from NATO’s intervention in Libya separates it from the earlier ISAF 
mission and represents a new model of intervention, one the arises from the current 
conditions of intensified neoliberalism and is likely, due to its low cost and speed at 
which it can be organized to be replicated in the future.  While this section offered, a 
broad outline of the general conditions in place during each intervention the next section 
will move on to the specifics of what occurred in Libya. It will analyze how NATO’s new 
institutional framework of the global security nexus projected force in Libya, expand 
upon my conceptualization of Operation Unified Protector as generating a trans-scalar 
space of intervention, and examine the wider geopolitical ramifications of the 
intervention.  
A Case Study of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector  
Historical Background 
At the start of 2011, Libya was not an obvious target for NATO intervention. It 
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had long ceased to be a persistent irritant on the scale of North Korea or Iran for Western 
policymakers. Indeed in the years prior to his removal from power and death at the hands 
of Western backed militias Gaddafi had guided Libya on a remarkable transition from a 
pariah state under heavy international sanctions642 that was listed as a state sponsor of 
terrorism by the American State Department643 to in 2004 hosting a remarkable meeting 
in the desert with then British Prime Minister Tony Blair644 and being feted across Europe 
by its political class.645 Libya’s short road back to international respectability began in 
2003 when it pledged to abandon its chemical weapons program646 and accepted 
responsibility, if not blame, for the 1988 Lockerbie bombing agreeing to pay out $1.5 
billion to the families of the victims.647 Blair’s early visit to Libya provided further 
crucial momentum and by 2007, Libya was welcomed back into the international 
community with decades of isolation and hostility seemingly evaporating after a 
momentous four-year period of rapprochement. The speed at which this rehabilitation 
occurred was due in no small part to Libya’s oil reserves, the largest in Africa with 47 
billion barrels of proven supply.648  In Chorin’s assessment, “…if it had not been for oil, 
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associated construction and power contracts, and, later arms deals, the commercial 
interest in Libya would have been decidedly weak. Oil was the key resource.”649 Gaddafi 
was welcomed back into the international community with open arms, despite his highly 
eccentric and erratic style of leadership, because of the riches that lay under Libyan soil. 
British industry would be generously rewarded by Blair’s shepherding of Gaddafi back to 
respectability with a huge windfall for corporations such as British Petroleum.650  
While Libya went through a process of reform at the international level, no 
pressure was applied at the domestic level to encourage greater democratization and 
respect for basic human rights in the country. Instead, Gaddafi was allowed to proceed as 
he had since coming to power in a nearly bloodless coup in 1969.651 In 1977 following 
the recording of his unique brand of political philosophy, referred to as “Third 
International Theory” which blended together elements of Islamic socialism, Arab 
nationalism, and the principles of direct democracy in his Green Book,652 Gaddafi 
declared the formation of the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya or state of the masses.653 Libya was 
now to be a direct democracy without any political parties governed by its populace 
through a series of national councils and communes. Gaddafi was merely, “the brotherly 
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leader and guide of the revolution.”654 In reality he was a dictator who governed as he 
pleased,655 publicly hanged protesting students,656 banned all independent organizations 
including unions, professional associations and women’s groups657 and administered a 
kleptocratic regime.658  
Despite Gaddafi’s erratic and incoherent approach to governance, he was correct 
in one regard about the nature of the relationship between the Libyan state and society. 
Libya, as several scholars have argued, was unique amongst despotic Arab regimes for 
lacking the cohesive institutional framework and extensive mechanisms of governance 
this is characteristic of modern states. Libya was effectively a nearly stateless society.659 
Outside of a few military units commanded by immediate family members660 and a basic 
surveillance and confinement apparatus significant enough to contain occasional minor 
outbreaks of dissent,661 the majority of Libya’s citizens had very few direct interactions 
with the Libyan state. This was not an accidental outcome, but was rather a direct result 
of Gaddafi’s policies, as he feared being ousted in the same manner in which he had 
come to power, through a military coup. Thus, Gaddafi sought to prevent the formation of 
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all coherent power bases that could be utilized to organize effective opposition to his rule. 
These efforts would, as Sorensen and Damidez note negatively impact him in 2011, 
forcing Gaddafi to rely primarily upon mercenary forces in a doomed effort to salvage his 
regime.662 As they write “Ironically the very system that the Colonel has taken great 
effort to organize, divide, and control in order for it not to pose a threat to this power 
eventually failed to protect him…In a sense, it was an intricate system based on divide 
and rule…The deficiencies in military organization, training, and equipment contributed 
to the fragmentation accepted, and even cultivated by the regime.”663 This lack of a 
central state, would as will be seen below, also shaped the direction that Libya would take 
post-Gaddafi. Absent a governance, apparatus that could unify its disparate ethic groups 
or an extensive project of state security sector reform Libya would rapidly descend into 
internecine warfare following the conclusion of NATO operations.  
In the immediate years prior to his downfall and following the lifting of the last of 
the sanctions against his regime, Gaddafi rapidly reverted to his old ways. Chorin posits 
that Gaddafi was pressured by his advisors and his family to reform himself in order to 
gain access to Western markets for Libyan oil and once he had succeeded in doing so 
carried on as he was accustomed to. He argues that “As soon as the last of the bilateral 
US-Libya sanctions were removed the old Gaddafi quickly reemerged…From 2007 to 
2010, Gaddafi’s performances became more and more bizarre.”664 Perhaps Gaddafi was 
confident that with the relationships he had developed with a number of European 
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leaders, combined with the fawning over him by prominent British academics, that his 
position was secure.665 Indeed this was an opinion that was shared by all major risk 
management assessment models, from the Economist Intelligence Unit to Crisis Watch, 
which all perceived Libya as a relatively stable country,666 with many of them only 
issuing a conflict risk alert after widespread violence had already broken out in the 
country. The failure to detect the volatility simmering just below the surface is a clear 
indication of the ineffectiveness of risk management techniques as tools capable of 
predicting geopolitical crises. Crises emerge from a complex interplay of factors, many of 
which are only relevant in hindsight, after the crisis has already occurred, thus their actual 
anticipation is a rarity; crisis are by their nature unpredictable.  
Although the West was not responsible for the initial outbreak of unrest in Libya, 
once the opportunity was presented to remove Gaddafi it was seized upon. Despite the 
public displays of goodwill, many Western states, especially European ones, merely 
tolerated Gaddafi as a necessary annoyance.667 A major source of their irritation was the 
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renegotiation of oil production agreements that occurred from 2005 onwards and resulted 
in significantly less favorable terms for Western oil firms along with requiring them to 
pay out a total of $5.4 billion in upfront bonus payments.668 As leaked diplomatic cables 
reveal, the United States closely monitored the reduced stakes of Western oil firms in 
Libya and periodic threats of nationalization from Gaddafi.669  Further, increased Russian 
investment in Libya, along with plans to open a naval base in the country also raised 
concerns in Washington.670 Gaddafi then was viewed in Western capitals as an unreliable 
partner who regularly antagonized the West and was seeking to strengthen ties with some 
of its perennial adversaries, most notably Russia. Forte argues that the eventual NATO 
strikes against Libya must be seen in this larger geopolitical context.  As he explains, 
“NATO’s war should be seen as part of a larger process…It is part of an ongoing conflict 
between U.S power against the interests of China, Russia and other ascendant regional 
hegemons to secure access to both material and political resources…”671 Libya became a 
battleground to guarantee the predominance of Western interests in the country; although 
the haphazard manner in which Western intervention occurred and the ensuing chaos 
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which followed would actually serve to deny Western access to Libyan resources and 
sharply curtail its influence in the country. 
It was the outbreak of the Arab Spring in early 2011 and its eventual spread to 
Libya that finally moved Western states and regional allies to intervene. As Prashad 
explains it was in Libya that a line was drawn in the sand to curtail the further extension 
of the Arab Spring.  He writes: “…the Libyan rebellion gave the Atlantic powers, Qatar 
and Saudi Arabia an opportunity to attempt to seize control over an escalating dynamic 
that had spread across the Middle East and North Africa…This dynamic needed to be 
controlled, or at least harnessed. Libya, which sits in the center of North Africa, with 
Egypt on one border and Tunisia on the other, provided the perfect space to hurry along 
the clock, to skip summer and hasten winter.”672 It can be argued than that the 
involvement of NATO in Libya can be read then as an attempt to ensure that the 
traditional pattern of relationships in the region, that was largely compliant to the West 
and had prevailed since the defeat of Arab nationalism remained secure.673 NATO’s strike 
on Gaddafi was also designed to send a message to potential rivals by demonstrating its 
ability to control the course of events in its immediate region. This was the broader 
context in which NATO would back a rebellion that would remove Gaddafi from power. I 
will now turn to examining the actual NATO intervention itself and the wider 
ramifications of it upon the unity of the Alliance, the configuration of world order, and 
arrangement of relations within the geopolitical scale.  
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NATO’s Operation Unified Protector: 
Protests in Libya, inspired by the events of the Arab Spring, began in earnest on 
February 17, 2011 with a national “day of revolt.”674 In the next several days, protests 
rapidly spread across the country with hundreds of deaths reported as Libyan security 
services opened fire on demonstrators.675 Defections of military and government officials 
mounted throughout the month as the government crackdown grew more brutal.676 Rebel 
forces coalesced into the National Transitional Council (NTC) on February 27, providing 
a political face and a government in waiting for the revolution.677  By March 1 the 
Eastern, half of the country had fallen under the nominal control of rebel forces, with 
pockets of resistance in around Tripoli and major cities in the West, such as Zintan and 
Misrata.678 Despite these early gains, Gaddafi’s forces rapidly regrouped and pushed back 
along the coast towards Benghazi, the heart of the resistance. With the position of rebel 
forces increasingly untenable and fears of a bloodbath taking place once Libyan forces 
entered Benghazi,679 the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1973 on March 17th, 
with authorized member states “To take all necessary measures… to protect civilians and 
civilian populated areas under threat of attack in the Libyan Arab Jamhariya, including 
Benghazi, while excluding an occupation force.”680  French forces planes were the first in 
                                                     
674 David Kirkpatrick and Mona El-Naggar, “Qaddafi’s Grip Falters as His Forces Take on Protestors,” 
New York Times, February 21 2011. 
675 Ian Black, “Libya on Brink as Protests Hit Tripoli,” Guardian, February 21 2011. Charles Levinson and 
Tahani Karrar-Lewsley, “Libya Death Toll Surges in Crackdown,” Wall Street Journal, February 21 2011. 
676 Ian Black, “Libya: Defections leave Muammar Gaddafi isolated in Tripoli bolthole,” Guardian, 
February 23 2011.  
677 Reuters, “Anti-Gaddafi figures say form national council,” Reuters, February 27 2011. 
678 For a harrowing on eyewitness account of the early days of the Libyan revolution see Andrei Netto, 
Bringing Down Gaddafi: On the Ground with the Libyan Rebels (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014). 
679 David Kirkpatrick and Kareem Fahim, “Qaddafi Warns of Assault on Benghazi as U.N. Vote Nears,” 
New York Times, March 17 2011. 
680 UN Security Council, “Security Council Approves No-Fly Zone Over Libya, Authorizing all necessary 
measures to protect civilians by vote of 10 in favor with 5 abstentions,” March 17 2011.  
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2011/sc10200.doc.htm#Resolution For background on the vote and 
248 
 
the air and began bombing Libyan positions on the evening of March 19th.681 From 
March 19th until March 25th, the enforcement of Resolution 1973 was organized under 
the rubric of Operation Odyssey Dawn, with United States AFRICOM command 
overseeing the conduct of a multinational military campaign that included European, 
American, Canadian, and Gulf forces.682 Command responsibility was handed off to 
NATO on March 25th, with the NATO led Operation Unified Protector officially 
beginning on March 31st 683 and continuing until October 31st,684 shortly after Gaddafi’s 
death on October 20th.   
With the overall timeline clarified a detailed examination of the actual operation 
and its wider consequences can now proceed. From the earliest stages of the campaign, it 
was clear that several unique dynamics were in play. This was an intervention that the 
United States participated in with only great reluctance. The American military 
establishment, reeling from the costs of Iraq and Afghanistan, was strongly opposed to 
any involvement in Libya. As Chorin elaborates, “…still recovering from a more than 
trillion dollar campaign in Iraq and an expanding effort in Afghanistan it was widely felt 
within the defense establishment that the US simply did not have the wherewithal to 
wage another major campaign…”685 The American position on Libya was confused until 
the nearly the last moment, with a firm commitment in favor of intervention only 
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becoming clear late on March 15th.686 In contrast, Britain and France, concerned about 
maintaining access to Libyan oil687 and worried by a potential flood of refugees across 
the Mediterranean in the event of a prolonged conflict, had already made the decision to 
intervene weeks earlier.688 While the United States would provide the initial command 
framework under Operation Odyssey Dawn, responsibility was handed off to NATO as 
soon as it became feasible. Britain and France then came to bear the brunt of the 
operation, carrying out the majority of the combat sorties under Operation Unified 
Protector, with the United States “leading from behind” and limiting its role to providing 
key enablers such as in-flight refueling and reconnaissance.689    
With Operation Unified Protector the advantages and drawbacks of NATO as a 
global security nexus was on full display. NATO clearly demonstrated its role as an 
indispensable forum for organizing multinational military campaigns. As Michaels makes 
clear, there is simply no other organization that offers the same framework, resources, 
and capabilities that NATO can provide. He argues, “Among the key reasons why it was 
felt NATO should take over was that it would have greater legitimacy than a coalition of 
the willing and would be better able to bring in partners. Moreover, it had the established 
military command structure, regional facilities and a transatlantic link that were not 
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guaranteed under alternative schemes.”690 The Libyan intervention also provided, as its 
Secretary General noted, the opportunity for NATO to put theory into practice and exhibit 
the effectiveness of its new crisis management procedures.691 Yet crisis management, as 
would quickly become apparent, is a far less binding strategic doctrine than collective 
defense.  
Under the logic of collective defense, NATO, as whole, must respond to a direct 
attack upon one of its members. The failure of all NATO members to respond in such an 
instance threatens the viability of the entire Alliance and undermines the security of each 
individual member by revealing that assistance from fellow members cannot be presumed 
and therefore every member can only rely upon themselves for their own defense. The 
circumstances in which collective defense would be invoked are narrow and clear-cut, 
any aggressive action that threatens the territorial integrity of a member state. This is not 
the case for crisis management, which is far more subjective and interpretive. At any 
particular moment in time, numerous crises are occurring or about to occur across the 
globe. What determines the involvement of NATO in these instances is the imperilment 
of the interest of one or more of its members. Yet it is highly unlikely the one crisis will 
be perceived as potentially harming the interests of all 28 members, who are all pursuing 
highly varied foreign policy agendas, and thus NATO collectively. Crisis management 
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interventions then are likely to be organized by a core group of member states within 
NATO and other concerned non-member states who feel that their interests are threatened 
by a particular event that is precisely what occurred in Libya. 
The threats posed by the situation in Libya to a number of national interests, but 
not significantly the general interest of NATO, explains the lack of sustained commitment 
from the United States and the lackluster response from its membership. It also clearly 
illustrates the pitfalls of NATO’s transformation into a global security nexus. As Noetzel 
and Schreer argue, cohesion has been sacrificed in the name of flexibility. They declare 
that, “Greater institutional flexibility will come at a cost. Crisis management operations 
will exacerbate the trend among allies to participate, abstain or even oppose common 
operations. In such cases, the influence of the Secretary General to generate strategic 
consensus will remain very limited, as NATO’s Libya operation demonstrated…with the 
challenge of an alliance fragmented into fractions of divergent strategic interests.”692 The 
more diffuse and extensive institutional structure that NATO has created over the last 
fifteen years has improved its response time to international crises, expanded its 
geographical reach, and allow it to carry out a new category of operations. Tasks that 
were once peripheral to the organization, if they were ever given any consideration at all, 
have now become central within its current configuration.  However by adding an 
additional layer of complexity, states whose primary concern is with ensuring their own 
territorial integrity and who joined NATO for this purpose and thus view their 
interactions within the Alliance through the prism of collective defense, do not see the 
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benefit of crisis management operations. This applies to the states that joined NATO as 
part of its post-Cold War expansion. Poland and the Baltic states, sat out Operation 
Unified Protector.693 A divide has therefore emerged in the Alliance, between its Western 
members who seek to utilize NATO to carry out a far greater range of tasks and those in 
Central and Eastern Europe who want it to adhere to its original purpose.  
The consequences of the gradual piecemeal alteration in the strategic calculations 
of NATO, which forms the basis of its transformation into a global security nexus, are 
now apparent. The intervention in Libya is a result of the shift from a narrow to the 
broader set of security concerns inherent in the focus upon crisis management operations 
that are now a major function of NATO.  Yet the absenteeism and outright rejection of the 
Libyan operation by a large portion of NATO’s membership demonstrates that significant 
resistance to these new strategic priorities exists. It is currently too early to tell whether 
the splintering in the unity of NATO that occurred in 2011 will be replicated as the 
Alliance takes on further crisis management operations in the future or if it is simply an 
ephemeral response by dissatisfied members to a single operation. If it is the former, the 
continued viability of the Alliance is in serious jeopardy. If the latter is the case then 
NATO will need to increase its capacities in several key areas, most notably intelligence 
and reconnaissance, where it experienced crucial shortages,694 and be wary of being 
drawn into conflicts where it has only a tangential interest.  
While Operation Unified Protector may have caused great discord within NATO 
at the same time, it also provided an example of the effectiveness of the extensive 
partnerships and greatly expanded institutional connections that have come along with its 
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development into a global security nexus. Despite NATO airstrikes, it is incredibly 
doubtful that rebel forces would have ever succeeded in toppling Gaddafi without the 
substantial contribution of Qatar, who had hundreds of special operatives on the ground 
working in conjunction with NATO, through the framework of the Istanbul Cooperation 
Initiative, providing material and organizational coordination to the rebels.695 Prior to 
Qatar’s involvement, which included the shipment of 20,000 tons of weapons and 
hundreds of millions of dollars in cash, rebel fighting forces were in a shambolic state.696 
Despite these extensive levels of support and constant NATO bombardment, the 
disorganization and ineptitude of the rebels was so great that it was only in mid- August 
that they were capable of launching a sustained and coordinated offensive against 
Gaddafi, after months of stalemate.697 Even then, Qatari Special Forces played a key role, 
storming Gaddafi’s compound in Tripoli during the final battle for the city in late August 
as NATO aircraft bombed positions throughout the city.698 This is what the global 
security nexus configuration of NATO, working as a multifaceted point of 
interconnection between multinational military forces and insurgent groups with a 
common interest can achieve.699 Without the advances in command and control that 
greatly elevated the tactical efficiency and effectiveness of units in the field, the creation 
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of new partnerships that expanded the access of the Alliance to area countries with a 
strong desire to contribute to the success of the mission, and the process of knowledge 
development which created the conceptual apparatus that allowed NATO to comprehend 
and respond to contemporary crises, the toppling of Gaddafi would not have been 
possible. Still, NATO struggled to remove him from power, taking seven months to 
complete its operations in Libya, far longer than originally envisioned against a 
decrepitate state with its people in open revolt. 
Despite the language of UN Resolution 1973, which only authorized a no-fly zone 
and aid to the civilian population, the aim of NATO’s Operation Unified Protector was 
always regime change in Libya.700 The declaration by Obama, Cameron, and Sarkozy on 
April 14th that the conflict would continue until Gaddafi was removed from power only 
publically formalized the violation of the terms of the resolution, which had already been 
discretely occurring for some time.701 Campbell argues that the objectives of Resolution 
1973 were achieved within the first two days of Operation Unified Protector and that a 
decision was made early on that Gaddafi had to go. As he observes, “Once the objectives 
of the UN Security Council Resolution had been achieved, that is the restricted mandate 
to protect civilians, the objectives of NATO became confused and driven by the unwritten 
plan to change the regime and execute Gaddafi.”702 This would appear to be collaborated 
by what was being targeted during combat sorties. Less than two weeks after the start of 
the operation NATO aircraft were attacking retreating Libyan forces that were not in the 
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vicinity of any civilian populations and thus outside the mandate of Resolution 1973.703 
Further, all efforts to end the conflict were refused.   
The rebels and NATO rejected three separate ceasefire offers by Gaddafi and the 
Libyan government. Venezuela offered to mediate between the rebels and Gaddafi as 
early as March 3 2011, prior to NATO intervention, an offer accepted by Gaddafi, but 
rejected by the rebels.704 On April 11th, Gaddafi approved the terms of an African Union 
proposal for an immediate ceasefire to be followed by a national dialogue; both NATO 
and the NTC rejected this.705 Finally, on May 26 the Libyan government offered not only 
a ceasefire, but also negotiations towards a constitutional government and compensation 
to victims of the conflict.706 The intransience of NATO led Kuperman to conclude that the 
real goal of Operation Unified Protector was not the protection of civilians, but the 
removal of Gaddafi. He argues that “…all available evidence indicates that NATO’s 
primary objective was to help the rebels overthrow Gaddafi, even if this escalated and 
extended the civil war and magnified the threat to Libya’s civilians.”707 Indeed 
Kuperman’s detailed analysis of the conflict found that NATO’s involvement extended 
the length of hostilities by thirty weeks, resulting in thousands of additional deaths.708 
Without the intervention by NATO, it is likely that the conflict would have only lasted six 
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weeks709 and the destabilization of Libya and the surrounding region would have been 
avoided.710   
Additional evidence that protecting civilian life was a secondary concern of 
Operation Unified Protector comes from NATO’s refusal to investigate the scores of non-
combatant deaths caused by its airstrikes, despite separate reports and calls for action by 
both Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International.711 If the real reason behind 
intervening in Libya was truly to protect its population than NATO should be transparent 
about the methods pursued and welcome suggestions to reduce the harm its actions have 
caused, instead of stonewalling any efforts to provide a more complete picture about its 
conduct, which Milne rightly criticizes. He writes that “…NATO leaders and 
cheerleading media have turned a blind eye to such horrors as they boast of a triumph of 
freedom…but it is now absolutely clear that, if the purpose of western intervention in 
Libya’s civil war was to protect civilians and save lives, it has been a catastrophic 
failure.”712 In blocking all efforts to both bring an early end to the conflict and ignoring 
calls for an internal review of its practice during the course of the conflict leaves only two 
possible reasons for why NATO engaged in Operation Unified Protector. Either 
considerations other than humanitarian ones were paramount or, if as policymakers claim, 
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protecting civilians was the only motivation,713 then the operation was run in an 
incredibly incompetent and inept fashion. 
 I adhere to the first position. I believe that humanitarian intervention and its latest 
variant, the Responsibility to Protect, are employed as a veneer to guarantee domestic 
support for overseas adventures and mask their true geopolitical motivations. I thus 
broadly align myself with both the realist and radical critique of humanitarian 
intervention, which both argue that they are carried out in the pursuit of national interest. 
Krieg summarizes the realist position as follows, “…realists argue that national interests 
must prevail in the decision to intervene…self-interested motivations have to be an 
inherent part of humanitarian intervention. Indeed, national interests cannot be divorced 
from humanitarianism or altruism…”714 The claim then that humanitarian interventions 
are completely selfless moral efforts is thus simply false.  On this point realists find 
common ground with more radical critiques of humanitarian intervention,715 who 
nevertheless present, what I feel, is a more sophisticated analysis of the ideological and 
economic motivations that condition these interventions.  These radical critiques argue 
that the proliferation of humanitarian interventions in the post-Cold War world can be 
understood as a contemporary manifestation of imperialism, one that employs the 
language of human rights and democracy to justify warfare in pursuit of national 
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advantage and to enrich a connected political and economic class.716 While the 
Responsibility to Protect was trotted out as a justification for the Libyan intervention and 
formed a core theme of NATO’s public relations strategy,717 NATO put more effort into 
media management than post-conflict reconstruction. The application of humanitarian as 
an adjective to the intervention in Libya is therefore an indefensible one. 
That Operation Unified Protector was humanitarian only in the sense of the 
language employed to justify it should not be surprising. As a trans-scalar space of 
intervention, it was created and maintained solely through the application of violence. 
While the conduct of the intervention clearly demonstrated advances in the military 
hardware, coordination between multinational forces, and the ability of the complex 
institutional nexus structure to tie together the strategic and tactical elements necessary 
for the success of such a campaign, it was absent the claims of political and social 
process that accompanied NATO’s mission in Afghanistan.  As hollow as those claims 
may have been, their disappearance from contemporary interventions illustrates the 
degraded importance attached to any substantive social project. The highly problematic 
projects of neoliberal state building which characterized the immediate post 9/11 period 
are being discarded in favor of attempts at simply maintaining the geopolitical perimeters 
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of Western order.  As Lindley-French argues the new style NATO interventions have an 
overwhelming focus on this single objective. In his opinion, “These interventions have as 
much to do with preserving the structure of the international system the West built by 
shoring up states as reflective of any humanitarian impulse. Therefore, structural 
intervention is the stuff of contemporary NATO and forces defense planners on tight 
budgets to make hard choices about the most cost-effective use of their national effort in 
pursuit of a stabilizing effect given the ever-increasing political imperative to intervene. 
In other words, NATO’s new interventions represent a strategic tipping point for the 
Alliance…”718 This is how trans-scalar spaces of intervention, should be conceived of, as 
a new format of post-humanitarian interventions occurring due to the conditions of 
intensified neoliberalism and heightened geopolitical uncertainty that characterize the 
present. The existence of these spaces then is representative of the collapsed horizon of 
what is politically possible in the contemporary conjuncture. 
 Trans-scalar spaces of intervention are rewriting the form of interactions 
occurring within the geopolitical scale and contributing to the condition of scalar flux that 
pervades the present. However, before these attributes are delved into it is first necessary 
to conclude my discussion of NATO’s 2011 intervention in Libya and survey the chaos 
that followed in its wake. Ironically, for an operation where the efficient elimination of a 
threat in an attempt to gain an advantageous strategic position, was the sole motivating 
factor, the concentration of violence did not lead to a productive outcome, but rather 
resulted in the destruction of the social basis of Libyan society. Trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention are not productive arenas. Indeed it was this very fixation with reducing the 
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cost and length of the operation that spurred a lack of planning for the post-conflict 
phase, thus leading to the wider destabilization of the region and laying the basis for 
future interventions and the further expenditure of funds. Trans-scalar spaces of 
intervention are hence not actually efficient or effective if viewed from a wider 
perspective, beyond the actual duration of the space itself.   
Post-Intervention: A crescendo of chaos after the closure of the trans-scalar space of 
intervention: 
The brutal execution of Gaddafi on October 20 as he fled Sirte by Mistra based 
militias was a foreshadowing of the violence and chaos that would soon envelop Libya.719 
As Netto notes the brutality of Gaddafi was mirrored by the brutality of the rebels, with 
their actions undermining the potential for the emergence of a stable democratic society 
in Libya. He explains that, “…the message the rebels were sending by having allowed the 
executions to take place and then protecting whoever had carried them out did not bode 
well for a country that had aspired to rebuild itself on democratic foundations…Despite 
the mood of freedom in the air, Libya in the first few days after the end of the regime was 
not much different, in terms of justice, from the country Gaddafi had controlled for so 
long.”720 The end of the Libyan conflict was thus encapsulated by a final act of violence 
that the violated spirit of justice along with the rule of law and denied the Libyan people 
the restitution that a trial and public accounting of the abuses of the Gaddafi regime 
would have brought.721  Instead, the final stage of Operation Unified Protector was 
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characteristic of the wider pretensions, under which the intervention had initially 
occurred, with its flagrant violation of the terms of UN Resolution 1973 and a lack of 
transparency regarding its conduct.    
With the decades of distrust sowed by Gaddafi and a paucity of state institutions, 
Libya lacked a strong basis to build a new liberal society following the official 
conclusion of NATO operations in the country on October 31 2011. Although the NTC 
was widely recognized as the official government of the Libya, fighters from a range of 
different ethic and regional militias had done the actual fighting against the former 
regime. United by little else than a hatred of Gaddafi,722 a sustained project of 
reconciliation and nation building would have been necessary to demobilize them and 
unite the fractious former opposition to Gaddafi that as now faced with the tasked of 
governing. Unfortunately, as Pack points out, the NTC lacked this very capacity. As he 
notes, “The NTC was largely unable to appeal over the heads of the militias directly to 
the Libyan people because throughout the transitional period it was too weak to launch 
infrastructure projects, create jobs, establish functioning institutions, or even establish 
sufficient demobilization or vocational training programs to get militiamen prepared for 
civilian employment.”723 The NTC’s problems were further compounded by the lack of 
legitimacy it held within the country, with much of its leadership viewed as representing 
Western or Gulf rather than Libyan interests.724  
In contrast to the sustained presence that followed the initial period of conflict in 
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Afghanistan and Iraq, the international community rapidly abandoned Libya. Michaels 
observes that, “Interestingly, despite the experience of Afghanistan and Iraq, there seems 
to have been no meaningful consideration of the post-conflict period.”725 This was not a 
simple oversight, or forgetfulness on the part of NATO. Instead, once the trans-scalar 
space of intervention was closed and the enactment of violence ceased, all interest in 
Libya as a political and social entity vanished.726 The mission objective, the removal of 
Gaddafi, had been achieved. While public interest in Libya quickly waned, economic 
interest remained strong, as multinational oil companies jockeyed for position in this new 
environment.727 These machinations however would amount to little, as despite the early, 
misplaced, optimism by some scholars728 the situation in Libya would rapidly degenerate. 
Western states would lose their ability to influence events on the ground, destabilizing 
wider geopolitical dynamics. Eliminating the perceived threat of Gaddafi would then 
result in the proliferation of multitude of further threats.   
The power vacuum in Libya would be filled by the violence of hundreds of 
militias, originally armed and backed by Western and Gulf States, would jockey amongst 
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themselves for power, run amuck over an ineffectual central government, and drag the 
country into a cycle of lawless revenge.729 A brief survey of the major events in Libya 
since NATO departed from its skies is sufficient to provide an idea of the depth of the 
disorder that has gripped the country. Since the election of the General National Congress 
in July 2012, Libya has had four Prime Ministers, one who resigned after he was 
kidnapped and other after his family was threatened.730 In September 2012, Islamic 
militants attacked and burned to the ground the American consulate in Benghazi, killing 
its ambassador.731 Benghazi has become a hub of Islamist militancy following the fall of 
Gaddafi.732 In early 2013, France bombed and sent an expeditionary force to the 
neighboring country of Mali, after Islamic forces, empowered by weapons looted from 
armories in Libya, seized large swaths of the country and threatened its government.733 
The Libyan intervention thus led directly to a future intervention and sparked a new 
conflict.  
Throughout 2013 anti-militia protests in Libya were regularly met with violence, 
with dozens killed and hundreds wounded.734 In January 2014, the General National 
Congress refused to stand down once its mandate had expired.735 Its weakness was put on 
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clear when it was unable to prevent Eastern based militia groups from selling oil to a 
North Korean flagged tanker, prompting a US Navy Seals operation, which seized control 
of the tanker and handed it over to the Libyan government.736 In May former General 
Haftar, who had refused to recognize the authority of the General National Congress 
when it had extended its mandate, launched Operation Dignity with elements of the 
Libyan army and aligned militia groups against Islamic militants in Benghazi and 
concurrently attacked the Libyan parliament in Tripoli with heavy weapons.737 
Astoundingly in these circumstances, elections were called in June of 2014, with turnout 
at 18%738, the Council of Deputies, the successor to the General National Congress, fled, 
due to security concerns east to the city of Tobruk. Due to a lack of suitable 
accommodations in the city, it has been holding meetings in a Greek Ferry offshore.739 
Meanwhile Islamist parties that had refused to recognize the election results formed a 
rival New General National Congress and remained in Tripoli.740 France, Britain and the 
United States closed their embassies and recalled their staff in August, an inglorious end 
in Libya for the states what had spearheaded the intervention only three years prior.741 
Shortly after this departure, a coalition of Islamist and Misrata militias seized and largely 
destroyed Tripoli’s international airport.742 Fearing the growing strength of Islamist 
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militias the UAE and Egypt secretly launched airstrikes against their positions in Tripoli, 
without the prior knowledge of the United States, strikingly illuminating its declining 
influence in the region and providing alongside Mali, further evidence of the 
unpredictable and expansive regional blowback that NATO’s actions have had.743 
From the overview above it is clear that whatever promise post-Gaddafi Libya 
had has quickly evaporated.  As Gaub puts it, “Libya appears to be heading for disaster, 
harried by kidnappings of high-ranking officials, mortar strikes, assassinations, car 
bombings, attacks on diplomats, mob rule and a lack of institutions strong enough to 
rebuild the country. In this volatile climate, political decision-making is fatally slow, oil 
production is down 70% and Libyans are increasingly pessimistic about their country’s 
fate…the country seems poised on the edge of lawlessness, violence, political 
atomization and even renewed authoritarianism.”744 Libya is on the verge of becoming a 
new Somalia on the Mediterranean, a failed state that is a source of regional instability 
and a site for the proxy conflicts of neighboring states; that may once again draw in 
Western countries as new sanctions and a possible future intervention are 
contemplated.745  
The initially restricted and concentrated violence of the trans-scalar space of 
intervention has generated an expansive, permeable, and durable area of disturbance. The 
percolating effects that continue to reverberate from NATO’s intervention provide a 
practical example of what Beck referred to as a risk boomerang, where what at first 
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glance can seem a fairly innocuous action to eliminate a singular risk results in the 
production further dangers in the future. He writes, “Formerly unseen secondary effects 
thus become visible primary effects…”746  The projection of power downward by NATO 
from the transnational to the local, has been reciprocated by the upward projection of 
Libyan militia groups,747 who operating from the local scale, have shattered any 
coherence or semblance of governance at the national scale within Libya and are 
impinged upon both the international and transnational scale, forcing actors at both levels 
to adjust their security calculations.  
With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear the outcome of NATO’s first intervention 
as a global security nexus has not been a desirable one. Despite the high levels of 
planning and coordination that occurred during the duration of Operation Unified 
Protector, it has proven to be disastrous to the Libyan people, regional stability, and 
Western interests in the area. Although a large portion of the blame for this result is due 
to the lack of thought given to Libya post-Gaddafi, it is questionable whether the eventual 
outcome would have been different if this were not the case. Previous Western 
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan were followed by a sustained peacekeeping 
component, yet the situation in both countries has deteriorated and lasting stability has 
proven to be elusive. In my opinion, the optimal response would have simply been one of 
non-intervention.  Western excursions abroad have historically been fraught with 
contradictions and hypocrisy. It is preferable to simply allow independent dynamics to 
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develop based a relationship of upon mutual respect. Too often, the result from the 
unintended consequences of these actions is the loss of additional life and the expenditure 
of resources that could have been directed to more socially beneficial ends.   
The conflict between national and collective sovereignty was clear during 
Operation Unified Protector in Libya, where a majority of NATO’s membership refused 
to contribute to the mission that was subsequently plagued by supply shortages. Libya as 
I outlined in this chapter was notable in two further respects. First, it demonstrated the 
practical operation of NATO as a global security nexus under conditions of austerity. 
Second, Libya represents a new format of intervention; one that I argued could can be 
conceptualized as a trans-scalar space of intervention. NATO’s immersion in 
contemporary economic and geopolitical pressures have highlighted weaknesses in its 
new organizational form as the unity of its membership increasingly frays.  
Smart Defense and the deep integration of European militaries that it proposes 
are, as I argue in the next and final chapter, a response to these problems. Yet if history is 
any guide it is highly unlikely that Smart Defense, if it is enacted at all, will remotely 
resemble what has been proposed. Instead, NATO will muddle through until the next 
crisis that besets the West sparks a plethora of new proposals for reform that will be 
largely forgotten once the looming danger fades. Indeed this is exactly what has 
happened with NATO’s response to Russia’s annexation of Crimea and its threatening 
posture to its Baltic members.  
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CHAPTER 5 
 A RETURN TO COLLECTIVE DEFENSE? 
This final chapter begins by examining the repercussions of NATO’s Libya operation. 
After arguing that Libya demonstrates a declining interest by NATO and by extension, 
the West in sustained governance projects the chapter turns to examine the impetus 
behind the ambitious Smart Defense initiative. I argue that Smart Defense is driven by 
both the demands of austerity and the necessity of providing NATO with a dedicated 
force if it is to successfully carry out future out of area expeditionary operations. 
However because it challenges core aspects of national sovereignty Smart Defense is 
unlikely to be fully implemented. The later portion of the chapter discusses how Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea in 2014 and its increasingly bellicose posture towards NATO is 
sparking a renewed focus upon collective defense after over a decade of attention upon 
risk management. The rapidly shifting geopolitical environment then is altering the 
strategic logic of NATO and will likely spark an institutional reorganization of the 
Alliance. While, as the concluding section argues, this dissertation has traced the 
movement from one strategic orientation to another and how it sparked a wide-ranging 
transformation of NATO, it is likely that the Alliance is on the cusp of just such another 
momentous moment in its long and storied history. 
The Wider Ramifications of the Libyan Intervention 
NATO’s Libyan experience illustrates its sharply declining capability for coherent 
spatial management. Since the end of the Cold War, how space has been conceived and 
its relationship to the geopolitical scale has undergone at least two marked shifts. During 
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the Cold War a strategy of containment, against the geopolitical rivalry of the Soviet 
Union prevailed, in the decades following the victory of the West and with no clear 
ideological competitors, a sharp reversal occurred; now the encouragement of political 
and economic flows and transversal linkages between societies was of paramount 
concern. Indeed, it was the spaces that remained static and refused to integrate within this 
new post-Cold War geoeconomic order that were deemed threats and viewed with 
suspicion.748 Barnett referred to these spaces as the “…non-integrating gap, where 
connectivity remains thin or absent. Simply put, if a country was losing out to 
globalization or rejecting much of its cultural content flows, there was a far greater 
chance that the United States would end up sending troops there..”749 Integrating these 
areas within the flows of neoliberal globalization became a primary strategic concern of 
Western states in the immediate post-Cold War period. 
A project of this magnitude required the extension of new governance 
mechanisms to guide this process. The peacekeeping operations of Iraq and Afghanistan 
were efforts to implant the mechanisms of neoliberal governance within states that stood 
outside of the post-Cold War geoeconomic world order. They were designed to enmesh 
these states in a subservient relationship with the West. This strategic initiative influenced 
the format of geopolitics practiced in this era, spawning what Roberts, Secor and Sparke 
labeled as a new form of neoliberal geopolitics.750 My contribution in the last chapter was 
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to place this discussion of geopolitics and geoeconomics within a wider framework of 
space and scale and utilize it to discuss how the format of NATO’s interventions have 
changed over the last decade from Afghanistan to Libya.  
The Libyan operation represented the abandonment of the attempt at integration 
that characterized these earlier efforts and thus the decline of traditional neoliberal 
geopolitics. In its place a new variant of geopolitical reasoning has emerged that will 
foster further sources of instability in the future. The foreclosure of ambition and the 
reduction of strategic horizons present in this new formulation will impact upon the 
production of the geopolitical scale. The ramifications of the intervention in Libya then 
exceed the duration of the operation itself and offer a window to the contours of the 
present conjuncture and the wider systematic structure of the current geoeconomic order. 
This is because Libya served as both a site for the interplay of geopolitical relations and 
its current state is a result of their outcome. As Agnew puts it, the geopolitical and its 
linkage to the process of spatial, formation is a central component of contemporary 
existence. He writes that “…the modern world is defined by the imaginative ability to 
transcend the spatial limits imposed by everyday life and contemplate the world as a 
whole…The geopolitical imagination therefore is a defining element of modernity.”751 
The geopolitical is thus the fulcrum upon which practices of spatial creation and the 
elaboration of new forms of strategic knowledge interrelate and emerge in the world. 
Libya provides an example of their actualization in the sense that realization of the 
intervention in the country transgressed a number of formal spatial separations, as I have 
noted above  
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While the geopolitical strategy of the West, and hence NATO, had been on 
extending the breadth of spaces considered ordered, i.e. neoliberal, prerogatives have 
shifted. This strategic turn has been driven by the imperative of austerity and the logic of 
risk management, elements that were both encapsulated within the formation of a trans-
scalar space of intervention in Libya.  What has occurred is a movement from the attempt 
to instill governance mechanisms to a strategic agenda that can best be understood as the 
governance of non-governance. NATO’s intervention in Libya was not guided by a wider 
programmatic purpose, but was simply an effort to remove an irritant and demonstrate the 
vigor of the West and its allies. What this lashing out has actually illustrated however is 
the ineptitude of the West and its inability to control the course of events as an ever more 
expansive area of disorder is generated.  What should have been an obvious realization, 
that the non-governance that exists at the local and national scale within a trans-scalar 
space of intervention would be replicated as a wider and seemingly permanent condition 
once it collapsed was remarkably not apparent to policymakers.  
Libya displayed the ability of NATO to reconfigure space and scale and formulate 
a new style of intervention in reaction to changing economic and geopolitical dynamics.  
The experience of Libya made clear strains between NATO members and the lack of 
resources that the Alliance had at its disposal. Following on the heels of Operation 
Unified Protector, a new initiative, Smart Defense, began to rapidly take shape in 
response to these issues.  Smart Defense seeks to build upon past interoperability and 
integration initiatives and reconfigure the military forces of NATO’s European members 
into an expeditionary force capable of carrying out limited interventions within its 
regional sphere.   
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To do so Smart Defense proposes a substantial reconfiguring of the sovereignty of 
some NATO member states into a collective format with important elements of 
sovereignty being assumed by NATO. The circumscribing of sovereignty in order to 
bring into force a greater collective sovereignty, is not a uniform and linear process; 
neither however is the practice of sovereignty, as Lake reminds us, “…pure Westphalian 
sovereignty of the type assumed by the classical perspective may be a status this is 
enjoyed only by the greatest powers…Nearly all others face greater or lesser restriction 
on their sovereignty.”752 The dozens of Status of Forces Agreements that the United 
States has signed with states across the world, which provide the legal framework the 
allows for the stationing of the American military in foreign states and commonly 
provides immunity from all local laws to military personal, is a stark example of how the 
sovereignty of one state can be reduced, and consequently, that of another increased.753 
Thus, the curtailing of one state’s coercive apparatuses to in effect align it with that of 
another more powerful state is not unpredicted. The circumstances with NATO are 
unique however because this process is now being affected by a transnational military 
organization and not a hegemonic state.  
Smart Defense: Establishing the Foundation for Future NATO Operations 
Smart Defense proposes the integration of many aspects of NATO’s European 
militaries. The Smart Defense initiative is therefore far more radical in its aims than the 
any previous programs examined thus far like the Combined Joint Task Force or NATO 
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Response Force. If successfully enacted to the full extent presently proposed Smart 
Defense would in effect establish a new form of collective sovereignty and see the 
emergence of trans-scalar military force on the European continent and the disappearance, 
in many respects of independent national militaries. Numerous capabilities that are 
considered an intrinsically part of national sovereignty would cease to exist. Participating 
states would lose the ability to solely determine the composition of their military forces, 
this would have knock on effects upon their foreign policy,  requiring them to act in concert 
with other Smart Defense states on a wide range of security areas, or not at all. Integration 
to this extent requires a far more extensive and sophisticated level of governance than 
NATO has demonstrated up to this point. Indeed, it has struggled to promote the far less 
strenuous task of interoperability between members. It is highly doubtful that Smart 
Defense will become a viable initiative that will transform the military landscape in Europe 
and across NATO. The fact that such a program merits serious discussion by policymakers 
however is indicative of how much the geopolitical and geoeconomic landscape is altering 
with austerity and the rise of new strategic challenges forcing the elaboration of creative 
solutions in response.  
Smart Defense was formally approved at NATO’s 2012 Chicago summit754 and 
focuses upon encouraging prioritization, cooperation, and specialization amongst NATO 
members.755 Prioritization encourages national governments to pursue defense spending 
in specific areas that will allow them to operate with greater efficiency with other NATO 
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forces. Cooperation attempt to achieve economies of scale and promotes strategic sharing 
of information. Out of these three components, it is specialization that separates Smart 
Defense from past initiatives and will be by far the most difficult aspect to implement.756 
Specialization tries to get states to focus on particular areas of national expertise, while 
allowing their capabilities in other areas to degrade.  Ongoing budget cuts are the main 
rational behind encouraging specialization.  NATO admits this in a press release 
explaining the motivation behind Smart Defense, “With budgets under pressure, nations 
make unilateral decisions to abandon certain capabilities. When that happens the other 
nations fall under an increased obligation to maintain those capabilities. Such 
specialization by default is the inevitable result of uncoordinated budget cuts. NATO 
should encourage specialization by design so that members concentrate on their national 
strengths and agree to coordinate planned defense budget cuts with Allies…”757 
Specialization then seeks to develop a comparative advantage for each country where 
they already have expertise. Germany for example would focus upon battle tanks, while 
France could increase its capacity in fighter-bombers. 
To be successful specialization depends upon bonds strong enough between 
members to overcome the suspicions of other states that are one the hallmarks of an 
anarchical inter-state system. As MacDonald notes, “A paramount political constraint for 
Smart Defense is the considerable trust and shared sense of identity which is necessary 
when security issues are on the table. Governments desire to maintain complete 
autonomy when it comes to military and security issues is a constant feature throughout 
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history…Smart Defense initiatives will raise fears of entrapment. On the other hand, 
countries will also experience fears of abandonment related to pooling partners’ possible 
refusal to take part in a given military mission.”758 Smart Defense demands unity in order 
to function. One could easily imagine a situation in which a state that had specialized in a 
crucial capacity refused to take part in an intervention, thus effectively exercising veto 
power over the mission. As the experience of Libya indicates, where the majority of 
members chose not to contribute to the operation these are not idle fears.  
In addition to the requisite high level of trust, which it is doubtful exists at this 
stage within NATO; successful specialization requires the creation of new decision 
mechanisms to protect the formal equality that NATO members have historically held 
within the organization. Yet historically NATO has been far better at prosing creative 
solutions, then actually not enacting them. Henius outlines the difficulties that NATO 
faces, “…if NATO pursues specialization, in addition to the challenges of keeping 
physical capacities available one should take into account the need to ensure a just and 
fair politico-strategic decision process. If an ally no longer possess certain capabilities 
and thereby is physically prevented from participating in a certain mission, should it still 
have the same voice in the Alliance as those allies who actually do hold the assets 
required for the mission?”759 Ironically then specialization could serve to aggravate 
divisions within NATO and institutionalize a multitier alliance, with states that have 
specialized in key areas exerting greater influence upon the organization.760 At present no 
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new decision mechanisms that could address these issues has even been proposed, a 
significant oversight, if NATO is serious about pursuing national specialization.  
While the idea of national specializations is a unique development, the Smart 
Defense projects currently being pursued and its other two areas of focus: prioritization 
and cooperation are not novel creations. The pooling and sharing of resources they 
propose is in fact a common arrangement between allied states. Indeed the European 
Union has pursed its own pooling and sharing arrangements through the European 
Security and Defense Policy. Central to this policy is the policy European Defense 
Agency that is tasked with encouraging the integration of national European defense 
industrial bases into a common European one. Concerns with maintaining national 
sovereignty have blocked any substantial progress. As Molling argues, “…states are 
blocking a higher level of economic efficiency and military effectiveness by clinging to 
their desire to decide unilaterally on the interest of their armed forces.”761 This is a 
position echoed by other authors.762  
If pooling and sharing arrangements have encountered severe difficulties amongst 
members of the European Union, who are linked together by an extensive institutional 
framework that far exceeds NATO; then the prospects of joining together non-EU 
members such as Turkey within such an arrangement, are not good. Even within NATO 
Smart Defense is not the first attempt at a comprehensive pooling and sharing 
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agreement.763 The Defense Capabilities Initiative was created at the 1999 NATO 
Washington Summit, laid out several broad defense related categories, and sought to 
secure commitments from states to focus upon particular areas.764 After only ten months, 
however the initiative was effectively dead in the water, due to a lack of interest from 
NATO members. A relaunched effort in 2002, the Prague Capabilities Commitment, also 
met with little success.765 
The impetus for the renewed effort at pooling and sharing which Smart Defense 
represents arises from and is being driven by the contemporary era of austerity that is 
reshaping political and economic relations. While burden sharing has long been a point of 
contention within NATO,766 the scale of the defense cuts being passed by NATO’s 
European members threatens to undermine the viability of the organization. Smart 
Defense is viewed, in words of NATO’s Secretary General, as the answer to 
“…preventing the financial crisis from becoming a security crisis.”767 With the United 
States pivoting towards Asia and possessing its own independent globe spanning military, 
Smart Defense can be seen as a project to preserving the terms of the trans-Atlantic 
bargain that NATO has always embodied.768 Smart Defense is designed to maintain the 
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ability of NATO’s European members to function as a coherent and credible military 
force, in concert with, or separate from the United States. In this sense then Smart 
Defense is a new answer to the dilemma that has persisted within NATO since its 
foundation how to connect the disparate defense capabilities of the United States and 
Europe together in a sustained and systemic fashion. 
Smart Defense and the retooling of NATO this entails is ambitious and far 
reaching. It is designed to provide a sustainable foundation that will allow NATO to carry 
out a new format of missions in the future. At the conceptual level, as Lindley-French 
argues, echoing my perspective, NATO has no shortage of solutions to the contemporary 
challenges which its faces. Whether it will have the material capacity to act upon this 
potential doubtful however. As Lindley-French observes, “NATO has just about got its 
vision, structure and organization right for the new missions…However too many of the 
member nations are unable to provide forces capable enough and with sufficient capacity 
to make best use of the Alliance.”769 Smart Defense seeks to generate the material 
capacities that will make NATO’s transition into a global security nexus successful. This 
process however is fraught with tension. Far less ambitious NATO pooling and sharing 
programs have failed. Even if Smart Defense achieves a measure of success, as Larrabee 
reminds us, pooling and sharing is not a cure-all solution. He argues, “Pooling and 
sharing is no panacea. It can help to rationalize defense efforts and reduce costs, but it 
cannot make up for sustained drops in defense spending.”770 Yet Smart Defense is more 
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than simply a pooling and sharing program, it seeks, through its specialization 
mechanism, to provoke a reorganization of power from the national to the trans-scalar 
level. 
If Smart Defense is successful, it will solidify a new internationalization of 
military force across its member states. This process is still in its early stages and is 
primarily gestating within, across, and through the states of the European Union, as 
Mayer notes, “A transnational military network is emerging particularly within the EU, 
with widely shared practices, cross-border cooperation, and often multinational and hence 
interlocked capabilities in which Member States’ autonomous capacity for action is 
increasingly subject to political, institutional, and physical constraints.”771 Smart Defense 
is by and for Europe. The United States is encouraging this process, as a Europe capable 
of organizing and projecting its own military force frees up American forces for 
engagements in other endeavors, but is standing largely outside of it, as it has the 
capacity to maintain a full spectrum military force for the foreseeable future; the US, in 
contrast to Europe, has no need to specialize.  
Smart Defense exemplifies transnationalism, serving as a stark example of how 
NATO is striving to become a trans-scalar organization, through rendering a central 
element of the national and international divide, domestic control over external coercive 
force, irrelevant. Smart Defense arises out of the demands of austerity and the 
consequential decline in national levels of defense spending. While Smart Defense is 
being blocked because it circumscribes the ability of NATO’s European members to field 
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forces capable of engaging in the full spectrum of traditional military operations,772 
austerity is quickly making this fear a reality.   
For over sixty years for as an alliance concerned with the collective defense of its 
members and now as a global security nexus engaging in crisis management operations 
NATO has built bridges between formerly distinct national and international concerns, 
fostering a trans-scalar synthesis across its membership that has generated new 
approaches to security. While NATO has experienced great success ideationally, 
producing new norms and values, it has been largely unable to translate this success into 
actual practice. The full realization of its efforts to promote interoperability and 
integration have been blocked by states concerned about potential infringement upon 
their sovereignty. The tension between national and collective sovereignty is one that has 
continually stymied NATO operations. 
A Renewed Emphasis on Europe and Collective Defense  
Opening the 69th Session of the United Nations in the autumn of 2014, Secretary 
General Ban Ki-Moon painted a bleak picture of world affairs. “The horizon of hope is 
darkened. Our hearts are made very heavy by unspeakable acts and the death of 
innocents. "Cold War ghosts have returned to haunt our times. We have seen so much of 
the Arab Spring go violently wrong.”773 A series of escalating crises, geopolitical, 
economic, and environmental in origin, all with no easy solution in sight mark the arrival 
                                                     
772 Full spectrum forces are able to engage in the complete range of military operations in land, sea, and air 
situations. 
773 Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon, “Secretary-General’s address to the General Assembly- From Turmoil 
to Peace,” United Nations, New York, 24 September 2014. 
http://www.un.org/sg/statements/index.asp?nid=8037 
281 
 
of a more turbulent state of global affairs. The balance, as Haass has argued, shifted from 
order to disorder, with altered structural conditions alongside blunders by policy makers 
responsible for destabilizing the international system.774   
Unsurprisingly in this climate the constant, drumming rhetoric about the necessity 
of identifying and containing risk and reacting to crisis has only intensified. A narrative 
of constant crisis has encapsulated current discourse and subsumed political expression. 
As Skilling explains, “…characteristic of modern politics is the construction of a constant 
crisis and of a permanent state of exception…crises no longer look like crises, but have 
become an everyday, taken-for granted part of social reality.”775 The condition of 
pervasive uncertainty is the reality of the post-Cold War world where the ceaseless and 
grinding logic of the War on Terror serves as an empty signifier776 that can be applied to 
justify a broad spectrum of Western policies from drone strikes abroad to the curtailment 
of civil liberties at home. Despite tottering in 2007-2008 neoliberalism remains firmly 
entrenched as a matter of socio-economic policy and political practice. NATO, as I have 
demonstrated, sought to transform itself  to effectively operate in this new world 
The overarching goal of this dissertation was to analyze what I identified as a 
systemic shift in the institutional and intellectual apparatus of NATO, a process that 
started in 1990s but was rapidly accelerated following the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. 
Collective defense, the basis upon which NATO was founded and its central operating 
principle for more than fifty years saw its influence in both theory and practice 
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significantly diminished. In its place, crisis management was elevated to the centerpiece 
of NATO strategy.  Crisis management became the predominant approach in NATO for 
largely two reasons. First because it offered techniques which allowed for connections to 
be drawn between the seemingly distinct entities that challenge the West, enabling policy 
makers to make sense of what would otherwise be an inconceivable set of dangers. 
Second because crisis management was seen to improve the efficiency by which threats 
could be identified and reduce the cost with which these threats could be eliminated. In 
contrast to the lengthy and expensive Comprehensive Approach style operations like 
Afghanistan, crisis management operations were conceived as relatively short affairs that 
lacked any sustained or coherent peacekeeping component afterwards, thus significantly 
reducing their cost. In this regard, NATO’s most recent operation in Libya can be seen as 
an example of a crisis management operation in action.    
The shift between the strategic logics of collective defense and risk management 
would result in fundamental changes in NATO’s behavior. Operating under the logic of 
collective defense during the Cold War NATO would never strike first, but would only 
respond to a direct attack against one of its members. In contrast under the logic of crisis 
management NATO adopted a far more proactive and aggressive posture. NATO would 
now seek to respond to and contain threats as they emerged, rather than react only if 
attacked. This transformation, as I have endeavored to illustrate, has touched upon all 
aspects of NATO and is responsible for giving rise to new institutions such as Allied 
Command Transformation, new models of collective command and control, new styles of 
intervention, and a new conceptual apparatus to comprehend and direct these 
developments. From my perspective conducting an academic examination of these 
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developments required that I reach beyond the traditional confines of the discipline of 
international relations and draw upon a diverse spectrum of thought in order to elaborate 
a trans-scalar methodology that I felt was more effective at capturing the complex 
dynamics occurring. While NATO has sought to position itself as the world’s premier 
global security organization and an effective calculator of risk, it has also through its 
actions served to increase the risk and unpredictability of the international system. The 
enveloping chaos presently engulfing Libya following NATO’s intervention in the 
country provides a clear indication of the unforeseen boomerang effects that its actions 
can have. 
Crisis management is an outward looking approach that assumed, with the end of 
the Cold War that security issues on the European continent were largely settled. NATO 
was only able to go abroad, inserting itself into conflicts in Afghanistan and Libya, 
because peace reigned at home. This is clearly no longer the case, as the European 
geopolitical environment is now beset with uncertainty, sparked by Russian incursions 
into Ukraine that culminated in its annexation of Crimea and support for separatist forces 
in the east of the country.777 The old predictability and regularity that characterized 
interactions between Europe and Russia is quickly fading778 as a growing chorus of 
current and former world leaders proclaim that a new Cold War is looming.779 Although 
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Smart Defense, as I noted in the last section, was developed in order to provide NATO 
with the capacity to engage in out of area operations it could also be utilized to provide 
the Alliance with a stable commitment of force to deter an ever more hostile Russia. 
 NATO spent more than a decade fixated on regions outside of its traditional area 
of operations, now it is being forced to reorient itself once again and shift its strategic 
focus back to its borders with Russia. Russia’s actions in Ukraine, its annexation of 
Crimea, and bellicose posture780 towards the West has required that NATO reassure its 
concerned Baltic members about their territorial integrity. These efforts are leading to a 
return of collective defense to the centerpiece of current NATO strategy.781 This shift in 
focus can be seen in the formation of rapid response units based in Eastern Europe 
designed to respond to any Russian incursions.782 The renewed prominence of collective 
defense within NATO will result in a modification of both collective defense and crisis 
management, they will increasingly no longer appear as opposed doctrines but instead as 
complementary approaches with each modified under the pressures of current 
geopolitical realities.   
The next section of this chapter will compare and contrast NATO’s 2012 Chicago 
and 2014 Wales summit. Although separated by only two years the concerns that were at 
the heart of each summit were radically different from one another. While NATO’s 
Chicago Summit was focused upon Smart Defense and how it would operate under 
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conditions of prolonged austerity the Wales Summit was dominated by Russian actions in 
Ukraine and warnings of a return to the confrontations that characterized the Cold War. If 
Chicago sought to put into practice and solidify the foundations of crisis management 
Wales may be remembered for starting a turn back towards collective defense. This 
discussion will be followed by a brief section that will offer some comments about 
possible future research agendas and a conclusion that will summarize the long, winding, 
and often contradictory path of NATO’s progression since the 1990s and situate this 
dissertation within its wider historical context.  
Chicago and Wales: From Smart Defense to Collective Defense? 
NATO’s 2012 summit in Chicago was meant to serve as the final encapsulation of 
the redesigning of the Alliance that had begun in earnest with its 1999 Strategic Concept, 
which provided the first official sanction to the elevated role that crisis management was 
coming to play in its strategic orientation. It was in Chicago that NATO finalized its 
terms of withdrawal from Afghanistan and congratulated itself for its seemingly 
successful operation in Libya.783 Chicago was where Smart Defense, a radical solution 
that threatened to blur the sovereignty of NATO’s European members was put forward as 
the solution to its perpetual budget crisis as I recounted in the last chapter. Regardless a 
Deterrence and Defense Posture Review conducted during the summit concluded that 
while budgetary issues remained a concern, “NATO has determined that, in the current 
circumstances, the existing mix of capabilities and the plans for their development are 
                                                     
783 NATO, Chicago Summit Declaration, May 20 2012, sections 13 and 14. 
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sound.”784 Chicago then was about solidifying the current course of NATO, not forging a 
new direction.  
In contrast, the 2014 Wales summit occurred under the cloud of the unfolding 
crisis in Ukraine, with the Russian annexation of Crimea in March and its continuing 
support for separatists in the country’s east. Although Ukraine was not a NATO member, 
these actions occurred on its doorstep. Amidst the suddenly highly fluid geopolitical 
situation in Eastern Europe, with political leaders warning about a return to the tense 
atmosphere of the Cold War785, and Russian incursions occurring in numerous Baltic 
States786 collective defense assumed a renewed prominence. However, NATO will have 
to elaborate a modified form of collective defense. Russia has adopted a hybrid or non-
linear style of warfare in Ukraine787 – one that involves covert use of Special Forces and 
intelligence agents, local proxies, mass disinformation campaigns, intimidation through 
displays of military strength, and all manner of economic coercion. Collective defense 
against these types of attacks will not succeed if NATO simply reinvests in traditional 
military forces, such as tanks, artillery, and nuclear deterrents. Instead, NATO will have 
to prioritize a new set of assets, including intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance, 
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command and control, border management, and the capacity to deploy forces rapidly 
throughout Europe.788  
This renewed focus on collective defense does not mean that crisis management 
will fade away. Rather NATO will also have to rely upon the tools of crisis management 
in order to anticipate the evolving situation in Eastern Europe.789 The Readiness Action 
Plan formulated at the Wales summit in response to Russia’s actions, demonstrates that 
complementary nature of both collective defense and crisis management.790 A core 
element of the Readiness Action Plan is the formation of a Very High Readiness Joint 
Task Force, a continuous presence of 10,000 soldiers stationed in Eastern Europe along 
the Russian border and able to deploy within days, if called upon.791 This force will serve 
as a tripwire monitoring the situation along the border and utilizing crisis management 
techniques to do so in an effort to secure the collective defense of NATO members. 
The Wales Summit is likely to herald a new era of restrained realism for NATO. 
In contrast to earlier summits where out of area operations and forging closer 
partnerships with states far outside NATO’s traditional domain of activity were high on 
the agenda, the discussion in Wales was focused upon issues that were the original 
function of the Alliance. As Rynning explains, “…NATO was not ready to extend new 
guarantees in response to threatened values in outside countries but instead focused on 
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ramping up its capacity to defend existing members…This new found sense of realism 
resulted in the Readiness Action Plan for allies and deferred membership perspectives for 
Ukraine and Georgia.”792 With an era of steadily worsening relations between Russia and 
the West is likely for the foreseeable future and  both sides digging in for an extended 
confrontation, barring any extraordinary developments, such as Ukraine joining 
NATO,793 a dynamic of managed hostility will define the relationship between Russia 
and the West. Rather than facing the choice of going out of area or out of business that it 
did in the 1990s NATO’s renewed realism places it in familiar territory. 
Future Research Agendas 
NATO is a vibrant and complex domain of study with an array of different areas 
that could be focused upon in future research. The most obvious one would be to analyze 
how NATO reacts to Russian actions and the impact that its response has upon Russia 
and the wider global economy. So far, efforts to encourage a resolution to the dispute 
over Ukraine have led NATO to level an array of sanctions against Russia794, which 
Russia has responded to with its own counter-sanctions.795 These retaliatory sanctions 
have had a negative effect upon global trade and financial flows and could possibly 
herald a gradual Russian decoupling from the global economy as it attempts to forge a 
regional based economic order through the institutional framework of the Commonwealth 
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of Independent States and the Eurasian Economic Union. A thickening and hardening of 
a Russian regional security complex, is then a very real possibility.796 
Another future research project would be to employ the trans-scalar methodology 
I developed during the course of this dissertation to improve the comprehension and 
provide a greater range of detail to operations of other multilayered transnational 
organizations. In this manner the genesis and enactment of projects by international 
financial institutions such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund could 
be traced in a new way that demonstrates their interactions across a range of spaces both 
Western and non-Western and the dense exchange of information that occurs across a 
variety of scales local, national, and international in order to put these projects into 
action. Turning from the economic to the military sphere, my methodological framework 
would also be particularly useful in analyzing the drone strikes regularly conducted by 
the US military across the world and the trans-scalar spaces of intervention that they 
establish nested within a set of supposedly formal and rigid spaces and scalar 
apparatuses. Indeed the greater chaos that these strikes generate increases the 
unpredictability of the international system, paralleling in this sense NATO’s intervention 
in Libya.  
Conclusion 
 The initial impetus for my project began with a desire to understand the effects 
that the 2008 Global Financial Crisis and the subsequent turn to austerity in 2010 would 
have upon the projection of Western power. The new era of austerity would place great 
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strain upon the liberal world order that had been in place since 1945 and would require 
institutional and strategic alterations in response. While the post-war order which has 
determined so many aspects of social, political, and economic life around the world has 
undoubtedly been American centric, I did not want my dissertation to be simply about the 
how the United States has responded to a challenging economic and geopolitical climate, 
instead I wanted to discuss how the larger cultural and political configuration of the West 
was being changed post-2008. While this certainly required a large amount of focus upon 
the United States, it also required an analysis of the pressures that the extended crisis was 
placing upon the linkages that bind the aligned states that comprise the West. In this 
regard, NATO, the linchpin of Western security since the end of the Second World War, 
provided an obvious case for study. Defying critics, NATO had survived the end of the 
Cold War and embarked on a path of transformation, one that would surely be impacted 
by new global economic realities.  
Central to this transformation was the gradual decline of collective defense as the 
core strategic logic of NATO, the growing influence of risk management, and the 
eventual acceptance of out of area operations by Alliance members. The 2008 Global 
Financial Crisis is the pivotal moment that accelerates and solidifies these pre-existing 
trends which it why discussion of it occupies large portions of chapters one and three. 
The stark contrast between NATO’s operations in Afghanistan and Libya, with 
Afghanistan occurring prior to the crisis and Libya coming afterwards provided an 
illuminating instance of what the decline in resources and the shift in strategic priorities 
resulting from the crisis would entail in operational terms.  
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The research methodology and the conceptual framework that I developed to 
analyze NATO’s transformation and the ramifications of the Global Financial Crisis upon 
the provision of security is one that is highly critical of the traditional, levels of analysis 
and agent structure approaches in international relations and is cross disciplinary in its 
orientation. These perspectives elaborated by Waltz, Singer, and Wendt offer, as I discuss 
at length through my survey of the relevant literature in the first and third chapters, what I 
feel to be a greatly circumscribed and static form of analysis, the alternatives, proposed 
by Doty amongst others are highly abstract and separated from political and economic 
considerations. Thus, I elaborated a methodology that relies upon developments in 
geography and political economy and places trans-scalar interactions and spatial 
production at its foundation. This approach offers a more responsive and comprehensive 
understanding of the manner in which traditional boundaries of national sovereignty are 
being traversed through the proposal of programs like smart defense, offering a 
recognizable way of comprehending the expanding array of linkages that NATO is 
pursuing with other political actors, and provides a manner of conceptualizing both why 
NATO choose to intervene in Libya and the actual format of its intervention. Insights that 
cannot be gained if we simply make the a priori assumption that the rigid 
national/international divide offers the sole way of framing a research agenda.  
The institutional evolution of NATO, marked by its transition away from a 
defensive alliance concerned with the collective defense of its members to a pre-emptive 
logic of risk management and its reconfiguration in what I term a global security nexus, 
illustrates the necessity of the methodological approach which I employ. Over the last 15 
years NATO has become a far more diffuse and complex organization than it was during 
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the decades of the Cold War. This is a process that I traced a length in chapter two where 
I explored how NATO broadened its understanding of security to include preemptive 
action in the 1990s and definitely settled the out of area debate at the end of the decade 
with intervention in Kosovo; in chapter three, where I examined the growing influence of 
the Science and Technology Office and Allied Command Transformation, which resulted 
in a post-territorial strategic posture and the formulation of an integrated multinational 
command structure and in chapter four where I analyzed the ramifications of these 
changes upon NATO’s style of intervention by comparing the decade long sustained 
peacekeeping effort in Afghanistan to the relatively short bombing campaign in Libya, 
which I argued could be viewed as what I labeled a trans-scalar space of intervention. 
This concept provides a coherent manner of analyzing how NATO organized and 
projected force in Libya, as well as its consequences.  
My dissertation strived to demonstrate the interrelationship between political and 
economic factors, which is why I frequently delve into discussions about the broad 
structural forces shaping the global environment. I did this for example in chapter two, 
where I discuss the idea of geoeconomics. Austerity as I have previously noted is a 
central logic in this regard, impinging upon and shaping a plethora of processes. In the 
case of NATO, while less severely affected than a country like Greece, austerity did have 
an important impact, spurred the elaboration of new programs like Smart Defense, a 
focus on expanding its partnerships, and a shift in strategic orientation. 
While I have situated my research within various academic literatures, I would 
like to conclude by talking briefly about its wider implications. In the early stages of 
conducting research and writing I believed that NATO’s Libya intervention, an out of 
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area operation, highly dependent upon NATO partners rather than members, and 
conducted relatively quickly and at low financial cost would serve as a template for 
future operations. Libya would be the first of many crisis management operations and 
would mark the final shift away from the traditional collective defense posture NATO 
had held since its formation. As I have discussed in this chapter however Russia’s 
annexation of Crimea and its perceived aggression towards NATO’s Baltic members has 
completely transformed the geopolitical environment in Europe. NATO is now shifting 
its focus back to Europe. Growing concern about defending NATO borders from 
intrusions means that future out of area operations are a diminishing possibility. Rather 
than pointing the way towards the future, as I originally thought, my dissertation is now 
properly thought of as a periodization study which covers a roughly two decade span, 
with particular emphasis on 2008 to 2014 and examines the causes for the waning 
influence of collective defense and the rise of crisis or risk management within NATO. 
The current moment is defined by the development of the opposite trend, a topic that is 
best left to future studies. 
NATO’s constant elaboration of alternative doctrines could be read as a sign of 
weakness, of it simply lurching from crisis to crisis, with no overall coherence or formal 
vision. A contrasting and I believe more accurate assessment is that these shifts illustrate 
the flexibility of NATO by demonstrating its ability to rapidly shift in response to 
contemporary events. It is by effectively responding to the challenges faced by its 
members that NATO has continued as a viable and vibrant security organization for well 
over six decades.  
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